SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS ON GOVERNMENT FORMATION NOT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 005098

SIPDIS

CENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/23/2025
TAGS: PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: SERIOUS NEGOTIATIONS ON GOVERNMENT FORMATION NOT
UNTIL AFTER CERTIFICATION OF RESULTS

Classified By: PolCouns Robert S. Ford, reason 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Summary: Hussein Shahristani, a leading
independent in the strong Shia Islamist bloc, told us
December 23 that the bloc is unlikely to settle on its
prime minister candidate for another week or two. He
thought it possible a dark horse independent might
emerge as a compromise choice given the intense
rivalry between Prime Minister Jafari and Deputy
President Abd al-Mahdi. Shahristani said the Shia
bloc has already contacted both Kurds and the Sunni
Arab Tawaffuq bloc about forming a national unity
government. He doubted these contacts would deepen
into serious negotiations until the final election
results are announced. He agreed with PolCouns
recommendation that the Shia bloc avoid harsh rhetoric
while the election commission investigations
allegations of electoral fraud and pledged that the
Shia bloc would accent the need for national unity and
reconciliation. End Summary.

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Negotiations Must Wait
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2. (C) First Deputy Speaker of the Transitional
National Assembly (TNA) and leading Shia independent
Dr. Hussein Shahristani told Poloffs December 23 that
serious negotiations on government formation will not
begin until the election results are certified. He
estimated this meant not before the end of the first
week of January. The Shia Alliance has appointed
delegations to begin negotiations with the Kurdish
Alliance and Tawaffuq, but these have not progressed
beyond phone calls. (Shahristani said that he has
been appointed to the negotiating teams for both Kurds
and Sunni Arabs.) He added that, unlike the January
elections, the negotiations will be by party blocs,
not by sectarian divisions (Comment: The party blocs
are all sectarian, so there will be no difference).

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Who Will Be Shia Islamist PM ?
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3. (C) He said the Shia Alliance should be able to
agree on their Prime Minister candidate before the
results are certified in early January. They should
be able to agree on a consensus choice, but, if not,
their parliamentarians will vote for their selection.
He said the 555 List will hold a meeting on December
26 to launch the selection process. Shahristani
agreed with the assessment that the Shia independents
will play a swing role in the selection. He added
that the independents might well prefer a third choice
for PM (a not so subtle reference to himself),as
opposed to PM Jafari and VP Abd al-Mahdi


4. (C) Shahristani fished a bit by observing good
naturedly that the Americans appeared to be
disappointed by the strong showing of the Shia
Islamist 555 list. PolCouns countered that many
observers, including in the U.S., had anticipated the
555 list would be the strongest bloc. The U.S. now
looks to the list to demonstrate leadership by moving
ahead to establish a broad-based and capable
government filled with ministers who are qualified and
can work for national unity. PolCouns underlined that
ministers should not be appointed merely on the basis
of political spoils. Shahristani readily agreed with
all these points. (Comment: His agreeing is one
thing. His acting in this direction is another. End
Comment.)

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Getting the Sunni Arabs to Yes
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5. (C) When asked about the recent meetings of groups
opposed to the election results, Shahristani said he
did not understand the motives of parties like
Tawaffuq and the National Dialogue that had no
interest in the election results in the South. The
votes in the South were for the Shia Alliance or for
Ayad Allawi, not the Sunni Arab blocs. When asked
about the pre-election and election intimidation,
Shahristani said it is important to distinguish
between the organized supporters of the Shia Coalition
and support from the masses over which they have no
control. He said it would be a very serious matter if
organized supporters were behind any attacks and the
Shia Coalition leadership would take action. PolCouns
told Shahristani that it was important for all parties
to tone down their rhetoric while the election
commission looked at complaints. Shahristani said the
Shia Coalition had already decided four days earlier
not to respond publicly to charges leveled against it.


6. (C) Shahristani said the Shia Alliance also had
taken a decision not to file any official complaints
since it would not affect the election results and
would poison the government formation negotiations.
He highlighted with us Kurdish pesh merga intimidation
of Shia Turkmen and Arab voters in Kirkuk, Khaniqin
(Diyala),and Tuz Khurmata (Salahadin). He commented
that the Kurds also had bussed in thousands to
vote in Tuz Khurmata and even set up tents with food
and music on election day. He emphasized, however,
that the List 555 would not complain publicly.

7. (C) Shahristani opined that the elections were
like a census. The Sunni Arabs have seen they are no
longer a majority in Iraq, especially in Baghdad, a
city that they have always viewed as Sunni Arab
capital. Meanwhile, the Kurds realized they are not a
majority in Ninewa. PolCouns underlined that these
shocks made all the more useful statements from the
strongest political group, the Shia Coalition, that
underlined the Coalition's desire for national unity
and reconciliation. Shahristani agreed and said the
Coalition would keep repeating that theme.


8. (C) Comment: Shahristani can often be prickly,
but this time he was in a ebullient mood; he had the
same seat count that we have estimated and he was very
pleased. We think Shahristani truly does have
ambitions to be Prime Minister; he almost got the nod
in 2004. Shahristani's glee extended to Ahmed
Chalabi's being shut out ("even I thought he would get
one seat.") as well as other Shia independents like
Ali Debagh. It was noticeable when he talked about
forming a national unity government that he avoided
each time any mention of bringing in the Allawi List
731 into discussions. End Comment.
KHALILZAD