Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BAGHDAD5095
2005-12-22 19:58:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:
SUNNI ARAB PROTEST GROUP MARAM MUCH BARKING, HOW
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available. 221958Z Dec 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 005095
SIPDIS
CENTCOM FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2020
TAGS: PGOV PINS PHUM IZ
SUBJECT: SUNNI ARAB PROTEST GROUP MARAM MUCH BARKING, HOW
MUCH BITE?
Classified By: PolCouns Robert Ford, reason 1.4 (b) and (d)
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 005095
SIPDIS
CENTCOM FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2020
TAGS: PGOV PINS PHUM IZ
SUBJECT: SUNNI ARAB PROTEST GROUP MARAM MUCH BARKING, HOW
MUCH BITE?
Classified By: PolCouns Robert Ford, reason 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary. A variety of parties unhappy with the
election results, including Allawi's and the major
Sunni Arab blocs, met December 21-22 and issued a
"Pact of Honor" under the name MARAM. They demanded
an international investigation into the December 15
elections, as well as the formation of new elections.
If these demands are not met, they have threatened to
boycott the Council of Representatives. Some - but
not all - of those in the Maram group have told the
Embassy the demands are serious and the boycott threat
real. With demonstrations scheduled for tomorrow and
Saturday, we will soon know whether this movement has
real believers among its members and the Iraqi
population, or whether it is just posturing by some
parties prior to negotiations for the new government.
So far, we are inclined to think there is a big
element of bluff that will only change if the street
turnout surpasses their expectations. End Summary
2. (C) On December 22, PolFSN attended the second and
final session of the parties objecting to the current
election results. This group, which includes Ayad
Allawi's Iraqi National List, Tawaffuq, and National
Dialogue, issued a hard-line statement called a "Pact
of Honor" under the name MARAM (Arabic for the acronym
"Movement to Reject Fraudulent Elections"). Attendees
included Naseer al-Ani from the Iraqi Islamic Party,
Hassan al-Bazazz, an professor at Baghdad University,
part of Tawaffuq, Saad al-Janabi and Ibrahim al-Janabi
from former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi's National
Iraqi List, and Salih Mutlak from the National
Dialogue Front. Tawfeeq al-Yasiri from the Sun of
Iraq and Sungul Chapuk from the Iraqi National
Congress also attended.
3. (SBU) The "Pact of Honor" announced the following
demands: (a) a total refusal and cancellation of the
"forged" preliminary electoral results or else the
signatories would boycott the national assembly; (b)
formation of a new international committee to
investigate the violations and preparations for a new
election; (c) suspension of the work of the Iraqi
election commission (IECI) and (d) calling a national
conference from which a new national assembly will
emerge.
--------------
WE ARE SERIOUS
--------------
4. (C) TNA member and Allawi candidate Wijdan Salim,
who attended the session, told PolOff December 22 that
the demands are very serious. She said Iraqis are not
happy about the election results, particularly in
Baghdad. Given what they heard from their election
observers, they believed they had won 17 seats in
Baghdad, and not the 8 that they have won to date.
She said they do not believe the IECI will do anything
due to its alleged association with the Shia Alliance.
They therefore want an international team to
investigate. She said there would be a demonstration
in Baghdad December 23, and later others across Iraq.
She said the Maram group will continue to meet on a
regular basis.
5. (C) Hassan al Bazazz, an University of Baghdad
professor, told PolOff the decisions of the group
were serious. He noted that if the IECI
commissioners do not resign, some of those in the
group might reluctantly accept the IECI's results in
time, but a vocal minority of "trouble makers" would
persist. Al-Bazazz said there was clear, widespread
documentation of fraud in the election, and "several
groups" had presented their evidence to the IECI. He
added that leaders from the December 22 session were
meeting that evening with Ashraf Qazi, envoy to the
United Nations Secretary General to Iraq, to voice
their complaints.
6. (C) Shaykh Abdel Nasser al-Janabi of the National
Dialog Council and the Tawaffuq Front told PolCouns
night of December 22 that the threat of a boycott
mentioned in the Maram communique was real. He
claimed that much of the Sunni street was angry; it
could not believe that the Shia had such a large share
of the population as to win more than half the votes
cast in Baghdad. PolCouns commented that the Maraam
demand for an international team to come investigate
the election results was premature if the UN team in
country hadn't even finished its own investigation.
Janabi agreed, and was pleased to learn the final
results of the elections are unlikely to be released
before the end of the first week of January. (His
impression was that the Shia Islamists were pushing
for a fast announcement of final results.) PolCouns
cautioned that boycotting the next parliament would be
unwise. Janabi did not argue, but he said it would be
hard for him to justify to "the street" accepting the
results.
--------------
OR IS IT JUST SO MUCH TALK ?
--------------
7. (C) Ala'a Makki, the Political Director for the
Iraqi Islamic Party, cautioned PolCouns that while the
IIP had attended the Maram meetings and signed the
communiqu, it did not feel bound by its demands.
When PolCouns pushed on the folly of a boycott of the
election results, Makki immediately agreed. Salih
Mutlak and Allawi aides had written that language, and
it did not reflect IIP thinking, he stated flatly. He
also agreed that an international investigation was
premature, again blaming Mutlak for the hardline tone
of the communique Makki confirmed other reports we
had heard of a demonstration planned in the Yarmuk
district of Baghdad for December 23 after prayers. He
underlined that the Sunni Arabs are not seeking a
clash with Iraqi security.
8. (C) Saifaldin Abdurrahman, Chief of Staff to Hajim
al-Hasani, the Speaker of the TNA and Allawi list
candidate in Baghdad, told PolOff late December 22
that Dr. al-Hasani is taking a wait and see approach.
This source said Hasani does not think it is a good
idea to boycott the Council of Representatives.
Abdurrahman believes the threats to be empty.
--------------
IECI UNFAZED AND STAYS THE COURSE
--------------
9. (C) The IECI appears unfazed and has no plans to
chane its resent course of action. UN Commissioner
to the IECI Craig Jenness told PolOff late December 22
that the IECI will continue investigating complaints,
with particular emphasis on category red complaints
that, if the allegations are proven to be true, could
impact the election results. He also stated that the
IECI conducted an unofficial last-minute analysis that
compared the Baghdad data from this election with the
results of the October 15 referendum. The IECI found
that the 22 percent "no" vote in the referendum was
nearly identical to the projected percentage of votes
cast for Sunni Arab parties in the election. Since
complaints raised to the IECI by this coalition were
largely focused on the Baghdad results, Jenness
pointed out that the analysis suggests consistency
among the Sunni Arab voters for the referendum and the
election. This leaves these aggrieved parties little,
if any, leverage to support their argument of
widespread fraud in Baghdad.
--------------
Comment
--------------
10. (C) Our sense is that the Maram group has many
signatories, but some are far more committed than
others. The IIP, sensing it is on the verge of
entering the National Assembly in a serious way, is
far less eager to take a hard line. Even some of the
Allawi allies, like Hajim al-Hasani, are reluctant to
plunge ahead too far, too fast. By contrast, Salih
Mutlak (a true rabble rouser) and people around him
are driving this. We know that the IIP strongly
dislikes Mutlak. Ayad Allawi's team may be more
willing to ally, at least temporarily, with Mutlak and
his ex-Ba'ath allies. If this Maram movement grows
more serious, the most obvious pressure point is
Allawi and his team. In the meantime, we expect some
vivid television pictures on December 23, but we
should also remember that not all the Sunni Arabs are
convinced this is the right path. So far, we are
inclined to think there is a big element of bluff in
this Maram movement that will only change if the
street turnout surpasses their expectations.
KHALILZAD
SIPDIS
CENTCOM FOR POLAD
E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/22/2020
TAGS: PGOV PINS PHUM IZ
SUBJECT: SUNNI ARAB PROTEST GROUP MARAM MUCH BARKING, HOW
MUCH BITE?
Classified By: PolCouns Robert Ford, reason 1.4 (b) and (d)
1. (C) Summary. A variety of parties unhappy with the
election results, including Allawi's and the major
Sunni Arab blocs, met December 21-22 and issued a
"Pact of Honor" under the name MARAM. They demanded
an international investigation into the December 15
elections, as well as the formation of new elections.
If these demands are not met, they have threatened to
boycott the Council of Representatives. Some - but
not all - of those in the Maram group have told the
Embassy the demands are serious and the boycott threat
real. With demonstrations scheduled for tomorrow and
Saturday, we will soon know whether this movement has
real believers among its members and the Iraqi
population, or whether it is just posturing by some
parties prior to negotiations for the new government.
So far, we are inclined to think there is a big
element of bluff that will only change if the street
turnout surpasses their expectations. End Summary
2. (C) On December 22, PolFSN attended the second and
final session of the parties objecting to the current
election results. This group, which includes Ayad
Allawi's Iraqi National List, Tawaffuq, and National
Dialogue, issued a hard-line statement called a "Pact
of Honor" under the name MARAM (Arabic for the acronym
"Movement to Reject Fraudulent Elections"). Attendees
included Naseer al-Ani from the Iraqi Islamic Party,
Hassan al-Bazazz, an professor at Baghdad University,
part of Tawaffuq, Saad al-Janabi and Ibrahim al-Janabi
from former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi's National
Iraqi List, and Salih Mutlak from the National
Dialogue Front. Tawfeeq al-Yasiri from the Sun of
Iraq and Sungul Chapuk from the Iraqi National
Congress also attended.
3. (SBU) The "Pact of Honor" announced the following
demands: (a) a total refusal and cancellation of the
"forged" preliminary electoral results or else the
signatories would boycott the national assembly; (b)
formation of a new international committee to
investigate the violations and preparations for a new
election; (c) suspension of the work of the Iraqi
election commission (IECI) and (d) calling a national
conference from which a new national assembly will
emerge.
--------------
WE ARE SERIOUS
--------------
4. (C) TNA member and Allawi candidate Wijdan Salim,
who attended the session, told PolOff December 22 that
the demands are very serious. She said Iraqis are not
happy about the election results, particularly in
Baghdad. Given what they heard from their election
observers, they believed they had won 17 seats in
Baghdad, and not the 8 that they have won to date.
She said they do not believe the IECI will do anything
due to its alleged association with the Shia Alliance.
They therefore want an international team to
investigate. She said there would be a demonstration
in Baghdad December 23, and later others across Iraq.
She said the Maram group will continue to meet on a
regular basis.
5. (C) Hassan al Bazazz, an University of Baghdad
professor, told PolOff the decisions of the group
were serious. He noted that if the IECI
commissioners do not resign, some of those in the
group might reluctantly accept the IECI's results in
time, but a vocal minority of "trouble makers" would
persist. Al-Bazazz said there was clear, widespread
documentation of fraud in the election, and "several
groups" had presented their evidence to the IECI. He
added that leaders from the December 22 session were
meeting that evening with Ashraf Qazi, envoy to the
United Nations Secretary General to Iraq, to voice
their complaints.
6. (C) Shaykh Abdel Nasser al-Janabi of the National
Dialog Council and the Tawaffuq Front told PolCouns
night of December 22 that the threat of a boycott
mentioned in the Maram communique was real. He
claimed that much of the Sunni street was angry; it
could not believe that the Shia had such a large share
of the population as to win more than half the votes
cast in Baghdad. PolCouns commented that the Maraam
demand for an international team to come investigate
the election results was premature if the UN team in
country hadn't even finished its own investigation.
Janabi agreed, and was pleased to learn the final
results of the elections are unlikely to be released
before the end of the first week of January. (His
impression was that the Shia Islamists were pushing
for a fast announcement of final results.) PolCouns
cautioned that boycotting the next parliament would be
unwise. Janabi did not argue, but he said it would be
hard for him to justify to "the street" accepting the
results.
--------------
OR IS IT JUST SO MUCH TALK ?
--------------
7. (C) Ala'a Makki, the Political Director for the
Iraqi Islamic Party, cautioned PolCouns that while the
IIP had attended the Maram meetings and signed the
communiqu, it did not feel bound by its demands.
When PolCouns pushed on the folly of a boycott of the
election results, Makki immediately agreed. Salih
Mutlak and Allawi aides had written that language, and
it did not reflect IIP thinking, he stated flatly. He
also agreed that an international investigation was
premature, again blaming Mutlak for the hardline tone
of the communique Makki confirmed other reports we
had heard of a demonstration planned in the Yarmuk
district of Baghdad for December 23 after prayers. He
underlined that the Sunni Arabs are not seeking a
clash with Iraqi security.
8. (C) Saifaldin Abdurrahman, Chief of Staff to Hajim
al-Hasani, the Speaker of the TNA and Allawi list
candidate in Baghdad, told PolOff late December 22
that Dr. al-Hasani is taking a wait and see approach.
This source said Hasani does not think it is a good
idea to boycott the Council of Representatives.
Abdurrahman believes the threats to be empty.
--------------
IECI UNFAZED AND STAYS THE COURSE
--------------
9. (C) The IECI appears unfazed and has no plans to
chane its resent course of action. UN Commissioner
to the IECI Craig Jenness told PolOff late December 22
that the IECI will continue investigating complaints,
with particular emphasis on category red complaints
that, if the allegations are proven to be true, could
impact the election results. He also stated that the
IECI conducted an unofficial last-minute analysis that
compared the Baghdad data from this election with the
results of the October 15 referendum. The IECI found
that the 22 percent "no" vote in the referendum was
nearly identical to the projected percentage of votes
cast for Sunni Arab parties in the election. Since
complaints raised to the IECI by this coalition were
largely focused on the Baghdad results, Jenness
pointed out that the analysis suggests consistency
among the Sunni Arab voters for the referendum and the
election. This leaves these aggrieved parties little,
if any, leverage to support their argument of
widespread fraud in Baghdad.
--------------
Comment
--------------
10. (C) Our sense is that the Maram group has many
signatories, but some are far more committed than
others. The IIP, sensing it is on the verge of
entering the National Assembly in a serious way, is
far less eager to take a hard line. Even some of the
Allawi allies, like Hajim al-Hasani, are reluctant to
plunge ahead too far, too fast. By contrast, Salih
Mutlak (a true rabble rouser) and people around him
are driving this. We know that the IIP strongly
dislikes Mutlak. Ayad Allawi's team may be more
willing to ally, at least temporarily, with Mutlak and
his ex-Ba'ath allies. If this Maram movement grows
more serious, the most obvious pressure point is
Allawi and his team. In the meantime, we expect some
vivid television pictures on December 23, but we
should also remember that not all the Sunni Arabs are
convinced this is the right path. So far, we are
inclined to think there is a big element of bluff in
this Maram movement that will only change if the
street turnout surpasses their expectations.
KHALILZAD