PRESIDENT TALABANI ON GOVERNMENT FORMATION,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 005094 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2015 TAGS: PGOV IZ SUBJECT: PRESIDENT TALABANI ON GOVERNMENT FORMATION, DETAINEE ISSUES REF: A. A: BAGHDAD 4892 ¶B. B: BAGHDAD 4924 Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In a meeting with President Jalal Talabani and other Kurdish government officials on December 21, the Ambassador reiterated the U.S. Government's commitment to an inclusive, cross-sectarian government in the interests of Iraqi national unity. Talabani agreed and stated his preference for a Shi'a Arab Prime Minister who had the support of his own party, the Coalition Forces, and the Kurds. Talabani also noted that no party had won enough seats to form a majority and a coalition government would have to be formed. He then moved to the topic of Syrian detainees and pressed the Ambassador to consider releasing these detainees who claimed political asylum in Iraq during Saddam Hussein's rule and were arrested by Coalition Forces for not having the proper residency documents. END SUMMARY. -------------- National Unity is Key -------------- ¶2. (C) In a meeting on December 21, the Ambassador informed President Jalal Talabani, Minister of Planning Barham Saleh, Minister of Water Works Abd al-Lateef Rasheed, and Fakhri Kareem of Madda newspaper that the next Prime Minister of Iraq must be a candidate that is accepted by the entire government in the cause of national unity. However fragmented the various political coalitions may become after the election, the Shi'a, Sunni Arabs, and Kurds must work together. The U.S. Government is firmly committed to a cross-sectarian coalition, the Ambassador continued, and rejects entirely a repeat of the Shi'a-Kurd alliance that excludes the Sunni Arabs. ¶3. (C) Saleh interjected that the Shi'a-Kurd alliance during this current administration had been a mistake. Talabani agreed, stating that it would be better this time to have talks with the Shi'a, Sunni Arab groups, and the Kurds so that no one would feel disenfranchised. The main positions should be shared amongst all the groups - a Vice-Presidency to one group; Speaker of the Council of Representatives to another, for example. Talabani added that the Sunni Arabs also had to play their part, however, to work with the Iraqi Government to crush the insurgency. ¶4. (C) Talabani also told the Ambassador that no decision had been made about who should be the next prime minister, but any candidate for the post had to be acceptable not only to his own party, but also to the Coalition Forces and the Kurds. He added that it would be preferable to have a Shi'a Arab candidate, and that Dawa was not insisting on maintaining current Prime Minister Ibrahim Ja'afari in the position. -------------- Gaming the Election Results -------------- ¶5. (C) Talabani then engaged the Ambassador in gaming the number of seats for each list, based upon the preliminary results. He stated that the Unified Iraqi Coalition (555) would get 127 seats, 130 at the most. This would not be enough to give them the majority, and there was no small party to ally with that 555 could easily dominate. The closest would be Al-Resaliyun, which only appeared to win 2 seats. The Ambassador noted that the Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) probably had won 5 seats, and they would most likely vote with the Kurdish Alliance. (Comment: Resaliyun is Shi'a cleric Muqtada al-Sadr's list. The KIU, on the other hand, had broken publicly with the Kurdish Alliance before the elections and recently were the victims of attacks on their leaders and office buildings, allegedly by the KDP. See reftels. End Comment.) ¶6. (C) Saleh pointedly asked whether Ahmad Chalabi had won any seats. The Ambassador replied that he had not, although not all of the votes - including the out-of-country (OCV) ballots - had been counted yet. Saleh then remarked that it was very important and impressive that independent Mithal al-Alusi had won a seat. The Ambassador added that Mishan al-Jabburi, who is close to KDP leader Masoud Barzani, had also won a couple of seats. -------------- On Detainees, Syrian and Iraqi -------------- ¶7. (C) Talabani then broached the subject of Syrian detainees in Coalition custody. He told the Ambassador that many Syrian opposition members, who had fled to Iraq during Saddam Hussein's rule, had been arrested by Coalition Forces for not having any documentation. Talabani asked the Ambassador to consider releasing these detainees, since they might be able to assist Iraq by fighting against the current Syrian regime. ¶8. (C) Saleh inquired about the status of the 7-8 high value detainees (HVDs) that were reportedly released by the Coalition Forces after the election. The Ambassador explained that he had kept Ja'afari informed of MNF-I's actions throughout the whole process. In the end, the Coalition Forces had no grounds by which to continue detaining these men, and Ja'afari's office had not provided evidence to keep the detainees in custody. MNF-I had informed Ja'afari's office that the men would be released promptly after the elections and had no reply. Saleh confirmed that when he had been involved in similar issues during the Allawi government, MNF-I had been scrupulous about keeping the Iraqi Government fully informed about all actions concerning detainees. Talabani noted that some of the released men had asked to go to Kurdistan, and the Ambassador stated that some papers had erroneously reported that the U.S. government had flown some of the men to Jordan. KHALILZAD