AMBASSADOR'S EARLY GOVERNMENT DISCUSSIONS SHOW

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 005093 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2025 TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S EARLY GOVERNMENT DISCUSSIONS SHOW HOPE FOR UNITY GOVERNMENT Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D) ¶1. (S) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: The Ambassador held separate meetings with SCIRI leader Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, President Jalal Talabani, Sunni Arab Tawafuq leaders, and wavering Shia Islamist leader Nadeem Jabiri from December 19-21 to open early discussions on the shape and goals of Iraq's next government. He urged the leaders to work quickly and cooperatively to form a national unity government that is cross-sectarian and filled with qualified officials, not political hacks. He privately encouraged the Sunni Arabs and Kurds to form a bloc with Allawi so as to enter talks with the Shia alliance from a position of strength. ¶2. (S) SUMMARY AND COMMENT CONTINUED: Talabani and Tawafuq's Tariq al-Hashemi agreed to the Ambassador's approach but fretted over the size of the Shia alliance. Hashemi added that securing a strong place in the next government and overhauling the constitution would be critical steps toward calming the security situation in Iraq and within the Sunni Arab community in particular. Hakim, for his part, warned that the elections showed that the public backed the constitution as-is and would not accept a rollback of de-Ba'athification. He said he was ready to bring the Sunni Arabs into the government but warned that there would need to be agreement on key principles and the Shia alliance would reserve the right to withdraw confidence on unsatisfactory ministers down the line. Jabiri predicted a major showdown on the prime ministership that could shake the Shia alliance, but he believed it would weather the storm. Both Hashemi and Hakim pushed for greater transparency from the IECI and expressed grave concerns over electoral fraud. We are pushing for maximum IECI transparency and probing for cracks in the Shia alliance as the preliminary returns come in. END SUMMARY AND COMMENT. -------------- The Message on the Next Government -------------- ¶3. (C) In each of the meetings with the Shia, Sunni and Kurdish leaders on December 19 and 20, the Ambassador emphasized the need for a government of national unity, drawing on broad support from multiple sects and nationalities in Iraq. The government must be able to combat the insurgency and draw support away from it. That means bringing in Sunni Arab leaders as core partners, not offering them crumbs after a Shia-Kurd deal. The government also needs capable personnel, not political appointees without necessary skills. He recommended assigning such people to advisory positions if they must be brought on. He expressed hope that the government would be formed quickly. But if forming a good government requires more time, then more time should be taken, he said. -------------- Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim Responds -------------- ¶4. (C) Hakim listened patiently but nervously to the remarks, agreeing to the broad points but bucking at the particulars. In a side meeting with the Ambassador he agreed on the need for competent ministers and a broad-based government but insisted on an agreement over shared principles: no to terrorism, yes to federalism, and a rejection of the notion of "legitimate resistance." He also warned that Sunni Arabs like Salah Mutlak could not be worked with, and any who aimed to undo de-Ba'athification were threatening the new Iraq. In the larger meeting, Hakim also made clear that the Shia alliance would reserve the right to yank off-stage any minister that disappointed it. Since the parliament can withdraw confidence in individual ministers with a majority vote, he pointed out, the Shia alliance would be moved to change any officials who have not proved their worth within the fist six months. Hakim also argued to the Ambassador that Jafari should step down from the prime ministership and consider a role outside politics like the one Hakim himself has chosen. ¶5. (C) With Hakim out of the room, several other SCIRI leaders told Poloff that they were under no obligation to draw the Sunni Arabs into the government. Leading SCIRI official Humam al-Hamudi said that they would draw on their support on the condition that the Sunni Arabs recognized their generosity. He also argued that the vote demonstrated a mandate for the constitution and a rejection of the Ba'ath. He said any government would need to respect those positions. That meant that a serious review of the constitution and change of de-Ba'athification would be inappropriate. -------------- President Talabani Responds -------------- ¶6. (C) Talabani was immediately receptive to the Ambassador's message. He pledged to hold early discussions with Allawi and the Sunni Arab bloc so as to form a large countervailing bloc before entering into negotiations with the Shia alliance. Talabani said he had heard from mid-level SCIRI officials that even they think Allawi should play a role in the next government. He predicted that he would work with Hakim in a future government. He said he believed Adil Abd al-Mehdi was one of only a few SCIRI officials capable of talking back to Hakim. (Talabani's aide, Kameran Karadaghi, disputed this assessment when Talabani left the room, warning Poloff that Mehdi is cowed by Hakim.) ¶7. (C) Talabani argued that the government would have to include Sunni Arabs that truly represented the Sunni Arab community, not agents acceptable only to the Shia and Kurds. He nevertheless appeared uninterested in working with Salah Mutlak, audibly thanking God when his aides predicted that Mutlak would not lead a commanding bloc in the parliament. Talabani said he believed many Baghdad Kurds had actually voted for Allawi, which he said explained the Kurdistan Alliance's weak showing in Baghdad. -------------- The Sunni Arab Tawafuq List Responds -------------- ¶8. (C) Hashemi, agitated over the election results, managed a contented smile after hearing the Ambassador's vision for the phase ahead. Hashemi said his group had every intention of finding a major place in Iraq's next government. He said that he saw the period ahead as a real opportunity for Sunni involvement to calm the situation in Iraq. He said this would have to mean a true national unity government and a significant overhaul of the constitution. He warned that a failure on these two fronts would endanger recent gains in the Sunni Arab community. He added that he saw no reason why Allawi should present himself as a potential prime minister when the Tawafuq front enjoyed a bloc that appeared to double the size of the Iraqiyya list. Hashemi said he had heard a rumor that Jafari and his Da'wa Party were ready to split with the Shia alliance but he did not know whether to believe it. (He thought perhaps it might be easier for Tawaffuq to work with Jafari, but he evinced no genuine enthusiasm.) ¶9. (S) Hashemi complained that the U.S. was still not sufficiently supporting his group, and he warned that his rival, Saleh Mutlak, had managed to secure 5 million dollars in aid from the Gulf when the Iraqi Islamic Party received a pittance -- some 1 million USD. The IIP was thus in debt while Mutlak was able to air multiple ads on al-Arabiyya and distribute money and gifts. Hashemi said he owed his last al-Arabiyya ads to an unexpected call from a Saudi businessman who asked how he could help and gave USD 50,000 straight to the station on Tawafuq's behalf. -------------- A Wavering Shia Islamist Shows Confidence -------------- ¶10. (C) Fadila Party leader Nadeem al-Jabiri, who made a belated and failed attempt to withdraw his group from the Shia alliance before the elections, showed little sign of bolting from the coalition during his meeting with the Ambassador on December 21. He professed to agree with the Ambassador's vision of a unity government and said it bothered him as a political science professor to see Iraqis voting on sectarian lines. Nevertheless, he argued that the current distribution of government posts was an appropriate model for the next government. He said he favored retaining Jalal Talabani as president but believed that Prime Minister Jafari should move on. He recommended Adil Abd al-Mehdi, Humam Hammudi or himself as suitable alternatives. He warned that any compromises on de-Ba'athification could cause unrest. He said that Iraq needed a truly cohesive government, not one where each minister treats his ministry like a personal fiefdom. He faulted Jafari for failing to unite his cabinet under any common political or economic policy. -------------- Sunnis and Shia Warn of Election Fraud -------------- ¶11. (C) Both Hashemi and Hakim were concerned about the transparency and legitimacy of the vote count, although each seemed to be separately casting aspersions on the other. Hashemi insisted that the Baghdad numbers announced by the IECI conflicted with those collected by his observers. He said the number of votes for the UIA went up several hundred thousand and the votes for his list decreased by several hundred thousand between internal tallies and the public announcement. He mentioned that he had held an angry press conference on the subject earlier on December 20 and said he would demand a full investigation or re-vote. Hashemi also complained about ballot shortages in Falluja and the seat distribution in the parliament. He said that he had heard that IECI Chief Electoral Officer Adel Alami had received a 550,000 USD bribe and he declared the entire IECI biased. (Comment: we hear the same charge from the Allawi camp - probably circular reporting. End Comment.) The Ambassador urged caution and said that the IECI should be given an opportunity to investigate these and other complaints. ¶12. (C) Hakim passed the Ambassador a copy of a letter he had sent to the IECI demanding more transparency in the vote count. He said he still had concerns about last-minute tampering despite the meeting the Ambassador had arranged between SCIRI and UN SRSG Qazi. Hakim also portrayed the UIA as just as much of a victim of election intimidation as any group. He said he had a campaign worker killed in Baghdad. Hakim did make clear that he was satisfied with the outcome despite the complaints and irregularities. KHALILZAD