AMBASSADOR'S EARLY GOVERNMENT DISCUSSIONS SHOW

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 005093

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/21/2025
TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S EARLY GOVERNMENT DISCUSSIONS SHOW
HOPE FOR UNITY GOVERNMENT

Classified By: Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (S) SUMMARY AND COMMENT: The Ambassador held separate
meetings with SCIRI leader Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim, President
Jalal Talabani, Sunni Arab Tawafuq leaders, and wavering Shia
Islamist leader Nadeem Jabiri from December 19-21 to open
early discussions on the shape and goals of Iraq's next
government. He urged the leaders to work quickly and
cooperatively to form a national unity government that is
cross-sectarian and filled with qualified officials, not
political hacks. He privately encouraged the Sunni Arabs and
Kurds to form a bloc with Allawi so as to enter talks with
the Shia alliance from a position of strength.


2. (S) SUMMARY AND COMMENT CONTINUED: Talabani and Tawafuq's
Tariq al-Hashemi agreed to the Ambassador's approach but
fretted over the size of the Shia alliance. Hashemi added
that securing a strong place in the next government and
overhauling the constitution would be critical steps toward
calming the security situation in Iraq and within the Sunni
Arab community in particular. Hakim, for his part, warned
that the elections showed that the public backed the
constitution as-is and would not accept a rollback of
de-Ba'athification. He said he was ready to bring the Sunni
Arabs into the government but warned that there would need to
be agreement on key principles and the Shia alliance would
reserve the right to withdraw confidence on unsatisfactory
ministers down the line. Jabiri predicted a major showdown
on the prime ministership that could shake the Shia alliance,
but he believed it would weather the storm. Both Hashemi and
Hakim pushed for greater transparency from the IECI and
expressed grave concerns over electoral fraud. We are
pushing for maximum IECI transparency and probing for cracks
in the Shia alliance as the preliminary returns come in. END
SUMMARY AND COMMENT.

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The Message on the Next Government
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3. (C) In each of the meetings with the Shia, Sunni and
Kurdish leaders on December 19 and 20, the Ambassador
emphasized the need for a government of national unity,
drawing on broad support from multiple sects and
nationalities in Iraq. The government must be able to combat
the insurgency and draw support away from it. That means
bringing in Sunni Arab leaders as core partners, not offering
them crumbs after a Shia-Kurd deal. The government also
needs capable personnel, not political appointees without
necessary skills. He recommended assigning such people to
advisory positions if they must be brought on. He expressed
hope that the government would be formed quickly. But if
forming a good government requires more time, then more time
should be taken, he said.

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Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim Responds
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4. (C) Hakim listened patiently but nervously to the remarks,
agreeing to the broad points but bucking at the particulars.
In a side meeting with the Ambassador he agreed on the need
for competent ministers and a broad-based government but
insisted on an agreement over shared principles: no to
terrorism, yes to federalism, and a rejection of the notion
of "legitimate resistance." He also warned that Sunni Arabs
like Salah Mutlak could not be worked with, and any who aimed
to undo de-Ba'athification were threatening the new Iraq. In
the larger meeting, Hakim also made clear that the Shia
alliance would reserve the right to yank off-stage any
minister that disappointed it. Since the parliament can
withdraw confidence in individual ministers with a majority
vote, he pointed out, the Shia alliance would be moved to
change any officials who have not proved their worth within
the fist six months. Hakim also argued to the Ambassador
that Jafari should step down from the prime ministership and
consider a role outside politics like the one Hakim himself
has chosen.


5. (C) With Hakim out of the room, several other SCIRI
leaders told Poloff that they were under no obligation to
draw the Sunni Arabs into the government. Leading SCIRI
official Humam al-Hamudi said that they would draw on their
support on the condition that the Sunni Arabs recognized
their generosity. He also argued that the vote demonstrated
a mandate for the constitution and a rejection of the Ba'ath.
He said any government would need to respect those
positions. That meant that a serious review of the
constitution and change of de-Ba'athification would be
inappropriate.

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President Talabani Responds
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6. (C) Talabani was immediately receptive to the Ambassador's
message. He pledged to hold early discussions with Allawi
and the Sunni Arab bloc so as to form a large countervailing
bloc before entering into negotiations with the Shia
alliance. Talabani said he had heard from mid-level SCIRI
officials that even they think Allawi should play a role in
the next government. He predicted that he would work with
Hakim in a future government. He said he believed Adil Abd
al-Mehdi was one of only a few SCIRI officials capable of
talking back to Hakim. (Talabani's aide, Kameran Karadaghi,
disputed this assessment when Talabani left the room, warning
Poloff that Mehdi is cowed by Hakim.)


7. (C) Talabani argued that the government would have to
include Sunni Arabs that truly represented the Sunni Arab
community, not agents acceptable only to the Shia and Kurds.
He nevertheless appeared uninterested in working with Salah
Mutlak, audibly thanking God when his aides predicted that
Mutlak would not lead a commanding bloc in the parliament.
Talabani said he believed many Baghdad Kurds had actually
voted for Allawi, which he said explained the Kurdistan
Alliance's weak showing in Baghdad.

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The Sunni Arab Tawafuq List Responds
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8. (C) Hashemi, agitated over the election results, managed a
contented smile after hearing the Ambassador's vision for the
phase ahead. Hashemi said his group had every intention of
finding a major place in Iraq's next government. He said
that he saw the period ahead as a real opportunity for Sunni
involvement to calm the situation in Iraq. He said this
would have to mean a true national unity government and a
significant overhaul of the constitution. He warned that a
failure on these two fronts would endanger recent gains in
the Sunni Arab community. He added that he saw no reason why
Allawi should present himself as a potential prime minister
when the Tawafuq front enjoyed a bloc that appeared to double
the size of the Iraqiyya list. Hashemi said he had heard a
rumor that Jafari and his Da'wa Party were ready to split
with the Shia alliance but he did not know whether to believe
it. (He thought perhaps it might be easier for Tawaffuq to
work with Jafari, but he evinced no genuine enthusiasm.)


9. (S) Hashemi complained that the U.S. was still not
sufficiently supporting his group, and he warned that his
rival, Saleh Mutlak, had managed to secure 5 million dollars
in aid from the Gulf when the Iraqi Islamic Party received a
pittance -- some 1 million USD. The IIP was thus in debt
while Mutlak was able to air multiple ads on al-Arabiyya and
distribute money and gifts. Hashemi said he owed his last
al-Arabiyya ads to an unexpected call from a Saudi
businessman who asked how he could help and gave USD 50,000
straight to the station on Tawafuq's behalf.

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A Wavering Shia Islamist Shows Confidence
--------------


10. (C) Fadila Party leader Nadeem al-Jabiri, who made a
belated and failed attempt to withdraw his group from the
Shia alliance before the elections, showed little sign of
bolting from the coalition during his meeting with the
Ambassador on December 21. He professed to agree with the
Ambassador's vision of a unity government and said it
bothered him as a political science professor to see Iraqis
voting on sectarian lines. Nevertheless, he argued that the
current distribution of government posts was an appropriate
model for the next government. He said he favored retaining
Jalal Talabani as president but believed that Prime Minister
Jafari should move on. He recommended Adil Abd al-Mehdi,
Humam Hammudi or himself as suitable alternatives. He
warned that any compromises on de-Ba'athification could cause
unrest. He said that Iraq needed a truly cohesive
government, not one where each minister treats his ministry
like a personal fiefdom. He faulted Jafari for failing to
unite his cabinet under any common political or economic
policy.

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Sunnis and Shia Warn of Election Fraud
--------------


11. (C) Both Hashemi and Hakim were concerned about the
transparency and legitimacy of the vote count, although each
seemed to be separately casting aspersions on the other.
Hashemi insisted that the Baghdad numbers announced by the
IECI conflicted with those collected by his observers. He
said the number of votes for the UIA went up several hundred
thousand and the votes for his list decreased by several
hundred thousand between internal tallies and the public
announcement. He mentioned that he had held an angry press
conference on the subject earlier on December 20 and said he
would demand a full investigation or re-vote. Hashemi also
complained about ballot shortages in Falluja and the seat
distribution in the parliament. He said that he had heard
that IECI Chief Electoral Officer Adel Alami had received a
550,000 USD bribe and he declared the entire IECI biased.
(Comment: we hear the same charge from the Allawi camp -
probably circular reporting. End Comment.) The Ambassador
urged caution and said that the IECI should be given an
opportunity to investigate these and other complaints.


12. (C) Hakim passed the Ambassador a copy of a letter he had
sent to the IECI demanding more transparency in the vote
count. He said he still had concerns about last-minute
tampering despite the meeting the Ambassador had arranged
between SCIRI and UN SRSG Qazi. Hakim also portrayed the UIA
as just as much of a victim of election intimidation as any
group. He said he had a campaign worker killed in Baghdad.
Hakim did make clear that he was satisfied with the outcome
despite the complaints and irregularities.
KHALILZAD