BAGHDAD GOVERNOR HOPES TO HEAD MOI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 005069

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/20/2015
TAGS: KDEM PHUM PGOV PINR IZ
SUBJECT: BAGHDAD GOVERNOR HOPES TO HEAD MOI

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT S. FORD FOR
REASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY: At a December 18 meeting Hussein Mohammad
Al-Tahan, Governor of Baghdad, told PolOff that he expects
to be the next Minister of the Interior. Hussein, a member
of the Shia Islamist SCIRI party, said MOI requires a
complete overhaul and needs to be less aggressive with
terrorists. The governor believes gas prices should be
raised and that Coalition Forces (CF) openly favored Alawi
in the elections. He said Iran has a more appropriate
foreign policy toward Iraq than the United States. He
added that if the Coalition Forces (CF) want peace, they
need to withdraw from the cities. Hussein also stated a CF
withdrawal from Salah Ad Din, Babil, and Al Qadisiyah
Provinces would speedup the peace process. The governor
said democracy has reached its peak in Iraq with the
election results and can only go down from here. END
SUMMARY.

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EXPECTS TO BE NEXT MINISTER OF THE INTERIOR
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2. (C) Governor Hussein is a senior member of the local
Shia Islamist SCIRI party and a leader within the Badr
Corps. He was chosen to be Governor of Baghdad following
the democratic elections of January 2005. Though a
recognized leader within the SCIRI party in local Baghdad
politics, he is a less well known national figure.
Regardless, Hussein said if the SCIRI Party wins
substantial seats there is a good chance he will be next
Interior Minister. If appointed, he said, he would follow
an agenda of reconciliation. (The governor mentioned he
had a high personal opinion of the current minister but a
low opinion of his capabilities.) Hussein outlined a
program he would implement if selected. He would make a
more definitive distinction between the missions of the MOD
and MOI. He indicated current missions are blurred with
MOD doing police work and MOI acting like soldiers.


3. (C) The governor pointed out conflict is caused by
misunderstanding and exclusion of parties and individuals
from government. Hussein declared he would seek
representatives from all parties to participate in the MOI
mission (read Sunni Arabs). This action he feels would
diminish separatist and terrorist activities; by including
them in the government Baghdad could remove their motive of
exclusion. The governor also said he would freeze hiring
on all new employees into MOI. Hussein stated the ministry
needs a complete review of its mission, objectives,
training procedures and manpower requirements before hiring
new recruits.

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COALITION SHOWS FAVORITISM
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4. (C) The governor was very positive about the election
results. He feels SCIRI candidates did very well and could
have a majority in the new National Assembly. He did
express some negative comments regarding Coalition Forces
(CF). Hussein criticized the CF for showing favoritism to
Alawi's Party. He declared the CF had provided support to
Alawi during the January Elections and continued that
support into the December 15 Elections. He offered no
specific examples but asserted it was "clear and evident"
to everyone on the street. Hussein credited the success of
the elections to the coordination efforts between the Iraqi
Army and Police; he did not mention CF contributions.

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IRANIAN DIPLOMACY BETTER THAN U.S.
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5. (C) The governor was eager to present his plan for peace
in Iraq. He said the Iranian example of government is how
peace can be achieved in Iraq. Hussein offered that in
Iran the government embraces opposing viewpoints. This
leads to political opponents working within the system and
establishing a relationship with the government and people.
Hussein stated that if an opponent is allowed to express
his opinions and be listened to he is less likely to attack
the system. He presented an analogy between the foreign
policies of Iran and the United States. He gave an analogy
of Iran being a breeze through the forest and the United
States being an elephant. Hussein stated the United States
needed to make a greater effort working with political
opposition rather than trying to destroy it. (COMMENT. It
should be noted that Hussein Al Tahan spent a considerable
amount of time in Iran during the former regime. End
Comment)

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ROADMAP TO PEACE
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6. (C) Though critical of CF policies, the governor is not
in favor of an immediate, total withdrawal. He stated a
gradual withdrawal of forces will suffice. Hussein
insisted the withdrawal should only take place as Iraqi
forces become operational. However, he did insist the CF
could take some immediate steps. The governor emphasized
that that calm would spread if the CF moves out of the
cities. He believes our military is too visible and our
tactics disruptive in the municipalities. He suggests the
CF withdraw from Diwaniyah, Samarra and Hillah immediately.
Hussein said these three cities are relatively peaceful,
minimal threat, and do not have provincial borders with
neighboring countries. The governor suggested withdrawing
from these cities would undermine terrorist propaganda;
withdrawal would be based on operational objectives not
terrorist actions. When PolOff suggested insurgents could
possibly move into the vacated cities, the governor
disagreed and moved on to another topic.

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PEAK OF DEMOCRACY
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7. (C) Hussein opined that everything operates in cycles of
peaks and valleys. He considers Iraqi democracy at its
peak, but it will start a gradual descent as partisan
disputes begin to fracture coalitions. Hussein was pleased
that more people voted than before, the elections were
relatively peaceful, and the SCIRI Party achieved
unprecedented success. The governor stated that the CF,
having achieved success in the elections, should begin a
measured withdrawal.

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COMMENT
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8. (C) The governor's skills as a politician are difficult
to assess. He derives his power more from his standing in
the local SCIRI Party and Badr Corps then from personal
charisma or political acumen. He is the governor of the
most populous province in Iraq, but he is little known
outside of Baghdad. Hussein is making attempts to reach
out to the Embassy and Coalition Forces -- but more as a
forum for his views than as a vehicle for reconciliation or
active cooperation. Some of his political thinking,
obviously, is greatly at variance with our own.
KHALILZAD