IRAQI POLITICOS PONDER NEW GOVERNMENT: SHIA

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 005047

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/19/2015
TAGS: IZ PGOV
SUBJECT: IRAQI POLITICOS PONDER NEW GOVERNMENT: SHIA
ISLAMISTS PREPARE TO COURT THE SUNNI ARABS, A WILLING BRIDE

Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY ROBERT S. FORD, REASON 1.4 (B) AND (D)


1. (C) Summary: With even the preliminary announcement
of most election results still days away, Iraqi political
operatives are trying to consolidate alliances. Prime
Minister Jafari and Adil Abdel Mehdi, Jafari's rival within
the Shia Islamist Coalition (List 555),each are trying to
line up support. Jafari and Abdel Mehdi allies each think
their side will prevail, they told us December 17; both
think they have the support of independents and Fadilah,
for example. Jafari's strategy is clearly to first prevail
within the List 555 camp over Abdel Mehdi and then present
both the Kurds and the Sunni Arabs with a fait accompli and
cut a deal with them. Both Abdel Mehdi and Jafari are
likely to reach out to the Kurds and the Sunni Tawaffuq
Front (List 618) even before the competition inside the
List 555 is resolved. Meanwhile, a prominent member of
List 618 told us December 17 that the Sunni Arabs must make
a deal with the Shia Islamists and join the government. If
the Sunni Arabs political leaders are cut out of the
governing coalition, he warned, it would undo all the
political gains in the Sunni Arab community from the
December election. He opined that the Sunni Arab community
must have either the Presidency or the Prime Minister's
job, and Defense and Interior must go to security
professionals rather than politicians. If Bayan Jabr
Solagh returns as Interior Minister or Prime Minister, he
huffed, the Sunni Arabs would quit the political process
definitively. End Summary.

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Jafari Wants to Stay at Top
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2. (C) Prime Minister Jafari's top aide, Adnan Ali, told
PolCouns December 17 that Jaafari would work hard to retain
his position as PM. Al-Kathemi emphasized that Jaafari
wanted to finalize the government formation quickly.
Kathemi claimed that Jaafari received a message of support
from Mohammed Redha SISTANI December 16, and Jaafari
visited Najaf on December 17 to consolidate his support
from both SISTANI and Muqtada (whom al-Kathemi said is
strongly in Jaafari's camp). He told PolCouns on December
18 that Jafari had received messages supporting his staying
on as Prime Minister from Sadr via Baha al-Araji and from
Fadilah from Ayatollah Yacubi who received a Da'wa
delegation late last week. Kathemi also claimed that Da'wa
Tanzim's leader Musawi would support Jafari (he urged
PolCouns not to focus on Minister of State for National
Security al-Anzi as the decision-maker in Da'wa Tanzim.)

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Reaching Out to the Sunni Arabs
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3. (C) Al-Kathemi said they would immediately reach out
to the Sunni Tawffuq group (list 618). He told PolCouns he
had met Adnan Dulaymi on December 18 and asked Dulaymi to
appoint negotiators to work with Jafari's camp on
ministerial posts. He said Dulaymi was non-committal (but
al-Kathemi didn't seem concerned). Kathemi highlighted
that Jaafari wanted a Sunni Arab to be president, not
Talabani.


4. (C) PolCouns told al-Kathemi that the USG wants to see
a capable government formed as quickly as possible. He
cautioned that people should be selected not on the basis
of political connections only but also on the basis of
demonstrated management and technical skills. He also
stated that the security-related portfolios could not be
given to partisan political figures or those with ties to
militias. Al-Kathemi recalled his warnings to us in April
2005 about the risks of Bayan Jabr and said Jaafari
strongly wanted non-partisan people in the security jobs.

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Other Shia Islamists Want Him Out
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5. (C) Over dinner December 17 Qassem Daoud, number one
on the 555 list for Najaf (arguably the 555 list's safest
seat),told PolCouns that he and the other 29 independents
on the 555 list would support Adil Abdel Mehdi for Prime
Minister, not Jaafari. (He included among the list Husayn
Shahristani and Shaykh Mohammed Radhi.) He said Jaafari's
administration had been inept and Iraq needs a change.
Poloff at dinner heard from Shahristani himself that Abdel
Mehdi expected to have support for his prime minister
candidacy from the 30 independents the 555 list expected to
have in the new assembly, plus the 30 SCIRI
representatives, the 13 Da'wa Tanzim representatives and
the 15 Fadhila delegates. These 88 should be quite
sufficient to shoot down Jaafari's drive to return to the
prime ministry.

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More Bidders for the Sunni bride
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6. (C) Daoud asserted to Poloff that the 555 leadership
understood the importance of bringing the Sunni Arabs into
the government. Shahristani had been named as the 555
negotiator with the Tawaffuq list, and Daoud claimed that
Shahristani was to meet Ayed Samarrai'e, the number two of
the Iraqi Islamic Party, within days.


7. (C) Daoud opined that Mehdi would be politically
moderate and would bring in competent people. Daoud
thought Interior Minister Jabr had been too polarizing.
Non-partisan technocrats were needed in both the Defense
and Interior ministries, and Daoud speculated that Abdel
Mehdi would have the political power to appoint them. He
readily agreed with PolCouns' point that persons with ties
to militia would be inappropriate.

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A 555 List Member Lists Constitution Changes
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8. (C) Daoud thought it important that the new assembly
quickly begin work on five key constitutional amendments:

-- the central government's authority over present and
future hydrocarbons revenues must be affirmed;

-- the central government's authority to tax must be
affirmed;

-- the central government's sole responsibility for
foreign relations must be affirmed;

-- the central government's sole responsibility for
military (not police) forces must be affirmed; Daoud
thought the risk of militias posed an enormous threat.

-- the supremacy of central government law over regions'
laws in case of conflict must be established.

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Kirkuk Sunni Arab Politician Enthused
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9. (C) On December 17, Deputy Prime Minister Abid Mutlag
al-Jubouri enthused about how well the elections had gone
in Kirkuk (where he headed the Tawaffuq List 618 slate).
He claimed there is a real chance to reduce violence by
convincing the Sunni Arab community that the political
process can work. He listed for us steps he feels are
essential for this to happen:

-- it should be balanced, without extremists, and without
"ties to neighboring countries;" implying Iran.

-- a Sunni Arab must become either President or Prime
Minister;

-- Sunni Arabs must be brought into the ruling coalition
along with Shia Islamists and the Kurdish Allaince. If
they were kept out, the political gains from the election
in the Sunni Arab community would be lost;

-- the new ministers for the Ministry of Defense and
Ministry of Interior should be either Sunni Arabs or at
least non-partisan security professionals from the former
Iraqi Army. (He said there are Shi'a officers whom the
Sunni Arabs trust.)

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But He Has Lots of Demands Too
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10. (C) Al-Jubouri warned that if Bayan Jabr remains as
the Minister of Interior Sunni Arab support for the new
government would be finished. PolCouns reviewed our goal of
seeing a capable, strong government that is representative
of Iraq's key communities stood up quickly. Al-Jubouri
appeared relieved when PolCouns noted that we did not want
a figure tied to militias occupying top positions in the
security organizations.


11. (C) Al-Jubouri said new ministers should not have
lived abroad for decades because average Iraqis view such
people as outsiders. He commented snidely that many
political figures have been back in Iraq for 2 1/2 years,
but their families remain outside the country, and the
Iraqi public knows this. He also maintained that although
an alliance with former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, the
head of the Iraqi National Accord, would appease
secularists and Ba'athists - and balance the Kurdish
influence - Allawi ultimately is not a vital to forming the
new government. (By contrast, he thought the Sunni Arab
Tawaffuq bloc is.)

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Comment
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12. (C) The Sunni Arab Tawaffuq list may distrust and
dislike the Shia Islamists, but we sense great readiness on
both sides to deal. Indeed, if Jafari and Abdel Mehdi each
are sending envoys to talk to the Tawaffuq list, they will
end up bidding against each other. Abdel Mehdi probably
committed an initial faux pas by having Shahristani, whose
Iranian name alone raises suspicions among many in
Tawaffuq. Meanwhile, Jafari will have a harder time with
the Kurds. Curiously, Allawi's camp so far appears little
engaged with anyone, and we will urge them to open lines of
discussions. It is also important to remember that on
December 19 we are only at the very first stage of what
likely will be very hard negotiations.

KHALILZAD