COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM MEETS IRAQI

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 005031

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/18/2015
TAGS: PTER PREL IZ
SUBJECT: COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM MEETS IRAQI
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

Classified By: COUNSELOR FOR POLITICAL-MILITARY AFFAIRS DAVID C. LITT F
OR REASONS 1.4 (a),(b),(c),(d)


1. (S) SUMMARY: Ambassador Henry A. Crumpton, the
Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT),on December 8, 2005
in Baghdad, met with Dr. Mowaffak al-Rubaie, Iraq's National
Security Advisor. Rubaie described the dual role he plays as
National Security Advisor and as head of the National
Intelligence Coordination Commission (NICC). He explained
that Iraq lacks a single person responsible specifically for
counterterrorism policy, but hastened to add that he believes
his current positions make him best suited to fill this role.
He expressed concern that the U.S. overreacts when Iraqi
officials discuss security issues with Iran, and wondered
whether U.S. and Iraqi policies on counterterrorism are
really in harmony. Rubaie and Ambassador Crumpton agreed to
meet in Washington D.C. with a small group of senior national
security officials from both sides to further discuss
strategic CT issues affecting Iraq and the region.
Ambassador Crumpton was accompanied to the meeting by S/CT
Regional Affairs Officer Margaret Hawthorne and Acting
Counselor for Pol-Mil Affairs. END SUMMARY.

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FRANK QUESTIONS
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2. (S) Rubaie opened the meeting by explaining that there is
no single person responsible for counterterrorism policy in
Iraq, but that he views himself as the most logical choice
for such a role, given his current duties as National
Security Advisor and chairman of the NICC. He also said he
agrees with President Bush's recent remarks that Iraq is the
principal front in the war on terror. Therefore, he
continued, it is critical that we coordinate our activities
closely. That said, he fears we do not cooperate enough and
believes that U.S. and Iraqi views on terrorism are not
always in accord. As an example he cited what he considered
excessive USG concern whenever an Iraqi delegation visited
Tehran to discuss regional security or other issues.


3. (S) Rubaie continued that he had personal concerns about
the Iraqi-U.S. relationship. "Are U.S. counterterrorism
objectives the same as Iraq's? Can they be adjusted or
realigned to match?" In his view, the major, long-term
terrorism threat is posed by the Baathists, while the
immediate threat comes from the Takfiris (religious
extremists). He questioned whether the U.S. agreed with this
assessment. He asserted that we needed to consult more
closely on our negative roles and improve cooperation.

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DIFFERENCES IN PERCEPTIONS
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4. (S) Ambassador Crumpton thanked Rubaie for his frank
questions and acknowledged that differences and gaps may
exist in our views on terrorism. He welcomed the opportunity
to engage in a strategic discussion with Iraq on this
subject. For example, Ambassador Crumpton said he does not
agree with Rubaie's analysis as to what constitutes the
long-term terrorist threat. While Rubaie says the Baathists
are the real threat, on a broader, regional scale the U.S.
sees a global insurgent network that uses terrorism as a
tactic. This network also collects intelligence, engages in
counter-intelligence operations, successfully conducts high
quality information operations, and wages guerrilla war.
Iraq is a key battleground. This global insurgency is the
greatest long-term threat, not the Baathists. These
insurgents are trying to hijack and take advantage of the
political divisions in Iraq. Our goal should be to split the
Iraqi insurgents away from the foreign fighters and bring
them back into civil society. The U.S. and Iraq need to
discuss a complementary strategic partnership to accomplish
this.


5. (S) Rubaie said he agreed that the global terrorist
threat is real and also agreed on the need to split them from
the Baathists fighting in Iraq. But he persisted that the
Arab Baath party started in the 1950's as a leftist
organization, transformed into a pan-Arab, Nasserist
movement, and has finally, in search of a new ideology,
become an Islamist terrorist organization. They are a long
term threat to stability, like Nazism, and must be destroyed.
Ambassador Crumpton concurred that police and military force
must be utilized in the short-term, tactical fight but urged
Rubaie to take a broader and more strategic view and
recognize that ultimately the way to finally defeat this type
of enemy is to build a democratic, civil society.

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"THE SHIA ARE YOUR NATURAL ALLIES"
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6. (S) Citing the years of the Ottoman Empire and those
that followed, Rubaie noted that historically in the long
struggle against the rising tide of Islamic fundamentalism,
the West had relied on the Christian and Jewish populations
within the Muslim world to counter extremist thought.
"Today," he asked, "who are the natural enemies of the
Takfiris in the Arab world? The Shia! You should utilize us
to fight against them." Ambassador Crumpton countered that
there are also Sunnis who are fighting extremism, citing the
Jordanians, Pakistanis, and Malaysians. The U.S. welcomes
partnerships with the Shia, but not to the exclusion of
Sunnis. Ambassador Crumpton noted that an "Islamic
Reformation" was underway; Muslim leaders must assume a
greater role and work together against extremists. Rubaie
agreed that the fight was within Islam and said that
perversely, in a way, Usama Bin Laden has done us a favor by
bringing the U.S. to Afghanistan and Iraq where not only has
it liberated 27 million people, but it will also ultimately
liberate the whole religion of Islam.

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VIEWS ON IRAN
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7. (S) Ambassador Crumpton addressed Rubaie's earlier remark
about Iran by noting that the U.S. sees two Irans. One is
made up of young, vibrant, democratic, and entrepreneurial
people. But the other is a country controlled by a small
group of religious extremists who are determined to defy the
international community, acquire nuclear weapons, and
continue to support terrorism around the world. Iran is the
major state sponsor of terrorism in the world; this is a fact
that we cannot ignore, and nor should Iraq. He told Rubaie
that the U.S. needs Iraq's help in dealing with the problem
and would welcome a more detailed dialogue at a later date.
We need to coordinate our strategies and understand where we
agree and disagree. It may well be that Iran is a subject on
which we will ultimately disagree. The same can be said for
Saudi Arabia. Rubaie agreed on the need for a deeper
discussion and cautioned that Saudi Arabia is building an
ideological "nuclear weapon."


8. (S) Rubaie then said that he, too, had noticed troubling
changes in Iran. He said that he used to think there was
some real freedom there, but during his last visit he found
the leadership to be petrified of political enemies and
unable to tolerate any dissent. He said that the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps members were the real mullahs of
Iran and wield all the power in what has become a police
state. During his recent visits, the Iranians have been
hypersensitive with the Iraqis about satellite television
being beamed into Iran from the Kurdish regions of Iraq, and
also with the continued presence in Iraq of the
Mujahideen-e-Khalq who, according to Rubaie, are an aged and
disarmed group who are no threat to anyone. He said he
believes Iran fears a free, independent, secular Iraq and is
worried about what the millions of Iranian pilgrims who will
visit Iraq in the future will see here. Ambassador Crumpton
noted that young Iranians attending a free Iraqi university
would be a powerful force.

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"HOW CAN WE HELP YOU?"
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9. (S) Ambassador Crumpton next returned to another of
Rubiae's first questions: "How can the U.S. help Iraq?" He
suggested three ways. First, we would like to continue to
help build capacity, particularly with regard to the rule of
law. Second, the U.S and Iraq should engage in serious talks
about counterterrorism strategy. "What do you want? What do
we want?" Together we need to point the incoming government
in the right direction. Third, the U.S. can help facilitate
contacts in the region between Iraq and its neighbors. The
global insurgency takes advantages of border areas as
safehavens, recognizing that the U.S. and others view the
world as being made up of independent nation-states, and are
thus ill prepared to deal with problems in border areas. The
U.S. can work with Iraq and its neighbors to deny this
advantage to the enemy. Ambassador Crumpton stressed that
Iraq needed to forge strong counterterrorism ties with its
neighbors, including Saudi Arabia. Rubaie agreed that Iraq
needs immediate help in formulating a counterterrorism
strategy and welcomed Ambassador Crumpton's suggestions.
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NEXT STEPS
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10. (S) Ambassador Crumpton and Rubaie agreed that it would
be beneficial to meet again circa March, perhaps after the
new government is formed, to continue to explore these
subjects. It was tentatively agreed that both would assemble
a small group of key policymakers (no more than four or five)
to meet, in Washington, and spend a day discussing the way
forward. An agenda will be agreed upon in advance and each
side will take the lead on two or three topics.

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COMMENT
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11. (S) Rubaie is a strong supporter of forging close ties
to Iran, but is also anxious to cement his ties to the U.S.
and make himself an indispensable interlocutor. His
disparaging remarks about Iran should be taken in this
context.
KHALILZAD