FALLUJAH: ELECTION WEDDING IN CITY DESPITE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 005026

SIPDIS

CENTCOM FOR POLAD

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/16/2015
TAGS: IZ PGOV PHUM
SUBJECT: FALLUJAH: ELECTION WEDDING IN CITY DESPITE
INITIAL BALLOT MATERIAL SHORTAGES

Classified By: POL COUNS Robert Ford, reason 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Fallujans turned out in large numbers for
the December 15, 2005, parliamentary election. Poll site
estimates exceeded city leaders, optimistic expectations.
The November 30, 2005 murder of the city's mufti, Sheikh
Hamza Abass Al-Issawi, motivated the population on top of
post-referendum momentum. IECI Al Anbar province
operations director, Ra,ad Aboud, told Fallujah Poloff that
initial figures showed turnout in Fallujah proper at
140,000, with tens of thousands of additional voters in
outlying communities. He estimated that at least 250,000
Fallujah area residents participated, with the turnout of
registered voters at between 85-95 percent. Initial
shortages of ballot boxes were later largely addressed;
however, some Fallujans were turned away from poll sites
due to insufficient pre-positioned voting material. IECI
workers, co-located at the Fallujah Civil-Military
Operations Center, continue to collate and tally results.
The significant turnout should further focus Fallujan
attention on the national political track, even while they
remain critical of ongoing U.S. military operations,
detentions and lagging reconstruction. Fallujah City
Council Chairman, Sheikh Kamal Shakir Al-Nazal, suggested
to Poloff and Marine FAO that the Iraqi Islamic Party, Ayad
Allawi and Saleh Mutlak lists would likely gain a majority
of Fallujan votes. END SUMMARY.

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HIGH TURNOUT AMID SHORTAGES
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2. (C) The mayor of Fallujah, Sheikh Dhari Al-Zobaie,
described the day as an "election wedding" with high
turnout across the city. Other leaders noted similar
satisfaction and Fallujah civic pride. City council
chairman, Sheikh Kamal, criticized the IECI for a lack of
ballot boxes and number of pre-positioned ballots. He also
questioned the accuracy of some voter rolls and absence of
female searchers at many polling locations. COMMENT:
Initial reports about severe shortages proved to be
exaggerated. The IECI allowed Fallujah ballot boxes to
contain 1,200 ballots from the standard 600. This
exception greatly reduced the shortage. IECI,s Ra,ad Aboud
further told Poloff that the commission had distributed
144,000 ballots, which covered all registered voters. END
COMMENT.

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POLL SITES: FALLUJAH MODEL
SUCCESSFUL A SECOND TIME
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3. (C) Fallujah Poloff visited two polling locations
election day. At each site, local Iraqi police performed
extensive searches and appeared professional and focused on
their job. Marines and Iraqi Army provided security in the
outer cordons - positioning themselves several hundred
meters from polling locations. Notably, there were no
serious election-related security incidents in Fallujah,
apart from an unidentified explosion mid-day and a small
fire fight near the CMOC in the evening. In nearby Karmah,
a rocket landed at a site; no one was injured.


4. (C) The atmosphere at both polling sites reflected a
community-wide event. Families and children gathered at
each location, without a sense of fear. Many were playing.
Shuttle buses moved elderly and other residents from
neighborhoods to poll sites. In one location, a Fallujan
approached Poloff declaring that he had been tortured by
the MOI in 2004. COMMENT: he provided initial details
that seemed to validate the claims, and agreed to visit the
CMOC at a later date to discuss his experience. Another
Fallujan claimed that friends, families had to pay between
USD 10,000 and USD 20,000 to secure the release of detained
family members. Poloff will follow-up. City groups have
long pointed to abuse allegations in Baghdad directly
targeted at Sunni Arabs. END COMMENT.


5. (C) Another voter told Poloff that the new government
needed to act like a real government and not just one of
parties. Many criticized the current Jaaferi team as a
disaster and infused with Iranians. One voter said he and
many of his friends changed their vehicle registration
plates to Baghdad, not Anbar, out of fear of reprisals for
coming from the "terrorist haven" of Anbar -- an Iraqi
"scarlet A" so to speak.

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COMMENT
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6. (C) Fallujah remains a politically mobilized city.
Voters seek a better future, but also remain skeptical.
The ITG and PM Jaaferi have been widely viewed as
ineffectual, weak and dominated by sectarian influences and
Iranian plots. The recent abuse allegations in MOI
detention facilities reinforce outright Sunni Arab fear
that a Sh,ia-dominant government will continue to exclude
and, more unsettling, to persecute.


7. (C) The leadership shown by imams in Fallujah - calling
on residents to participate across many months - remains
the single most decisive factor behind the high turnout.
The hard-won and high-cost U.S. military and ISF security
efforts in the city were a precondition. Wider turnout
across the province should translate into a more balanced
sense of Anbar,s political voices, which, for much of 2005,
has primarily been Fallujans at the ballot box. The next
election, for the provincial council, will likely highlight
intra-Anbar fractures (IIP, secularists, imams). This
election, however, revealed a renewed focus on Baghdad
politics -- and rising expectations. A majority of
Fallujans again chose ballots over bullets. A weak and/or
abusive next government could quickly reverse that engaged,
while ever anxious, mindset.
KHALILZAD