CAMPAIGN TONE GETS SHARPER, MORE INTENSE

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 005002 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2015 TAGS: PGOV PNAT PHUM IZ SUBJECT: CAMPAIGN TONE GETS SHARPER, MORE INTENSE REF: A. A. BAGHDAD 4960 ¶B. B. BAGHDAD 4924 ¶C. C. BAGHDAD 4906 Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S. Ford for Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (U) With just one day before the elections, campaigning for the December 15 elections has been intense, incredibly more personal, organized and criminal than the campaign in January. This has included inter-sectarian conflicts: the destruction of Kurdistan Islamic Union (KIU) offices by forces allegedly aligned with the large Kurdish parties and United Islamic Alliance (555) verbal assaults on their secular and liberal Shias. Press reports and conversations reveal targeted attacks on parties, using sophisticated, pre-meditated methods that include threats, kidnappings, and assassinations. In January, the fear was related more to the insurgency and its ability to disrupt the election of a transitional government. This time, with the Sunnis guaranteed to participate in significantly more numbers, the fear has turned to what will happen when one or a few parties gain power, particularly since these elections are for a 4-year permanent government. In all, in comparison to the January 2005 contest, the stakes are higher, the incidents of violence nastier and the rhetoric has been ratcheted up to match. Iraqis know they have real choices on December 15, and they can make their votes count. It will be important for the parties and observers who allege voting fraud to document their allegations carefully and for the election commission to address them seriously. The commission's disqualification of several hundred thousand fraudulent votes in Irbil in January 2005 is an example of the kind of resolve the commission may well need again. End Summary -------------- Allawi and Sunni Parties Come Out Swinging -------------- ¶2. (U) Former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi's campaign has stepped up its criticisms on the record of Prime Minister Jafari's government, criticizing the current Shia Islamist government for its failure to develop the economy and restore security, and his latest poster does the same. He also has underlines in his public remarks the risk of Iraq falling into civil war if sectarian politics continue as they are. Meanwhile, Sunni Arabs are accusing the transitional government of helping the occupation; a Tawafuq (618) TV ad bitterly condemns the "occupation" for marginalizing people and then attacks the transitional government for helping. List 618 campaign events also condemn the government for violating human rights and running secret prisons, playing off the news of the Jadriyah investigation. National Dialogue Front slate (List 667) leader Saleh Mutlak has TV ads stressing the alleged sectarian tone of the Jafari government. Bordering on the hysterical, Allawist Saad al-Janabi is using his own al-Rasheed radio station to repeat the allegations frequently heard from Sunni politicians that vigorously accuse the Jafari government of arranging for one million Iranians with fake identification and registration to vote in the elections. On December 13, al-Rasheed radio issued news reports about the discovery of a 6,000 man secret prison operated by Iranian intelligence officers. -------------- Shia Islamists Firing Back -------------- ¶3. (U) The Jafari government defended its record releasing a 50-page document full of ITG achievements. Meanwhile, United Islamic Alliance leader Abdel Aziz al- Hakim lashed broadsides of his own not so subtly aimed at Allawi and the Sunni Arabs. Al Furat TV, controlled by SCIRI, reported that SCIRI head Abdul Aziz al Hakim offered 200,000 Badr Corps members to help ISF and IP provide election security. In the same press conference, Badr Corps head Hadi al-Amari said, "We used weapons against Saddam, and are not afraid to use them if Baathists are part of the government again." (A veiled threat to Allawi, whom they consider as Baathist.) Prominent Da'wa political leader Jwad Maliki, meanwhile, was on Al Furat December 13 evening warning viewers of the return of a "new Baath" party through the election. -------------- Assassinations on the Rise -------------- ¶4. (U) On December 7, election monitoring NGO IFES (International Federation of Election Systems) released a statement confirming that since November 10, there have been 17 assassinations of political party members, sitting officials, and religious figures with links to political parties. Base on preliminary data, IFES suggested that this number is expected to rise. (Prominent Sunni Arab political figure and TV commentator Mizhar al-Dulaimi was murdered while campaigning in Ramadi on December 13.) -------------- Unified Islamic Alliance Real Campaign -------------- ¶5. (SBU) During January, IECI workers, candidates, and party workers worried more about attacks by insurgents and not by their fellow competitors. Now, campaign attacks are perpetrated by other parties. Several Shia Islamist campaign workers were murdered in Baghdad, according to Iraqi press reports on December 10. In addition, this campaign has seen the murder of campaign workers for Allawi's list and a Christian list, the destruction of KIU offices (ref B) and attacks on Allawi offices in the south. (We received a call from the Allawi headquarters shortly before dispatch of this cable that the Allawi list headquarters in Nasiriyah was attacked midday December 14.) Other parties have alleged that the Unified Islamisc Alliance (555) has waged a war of dirty campaign tactics that include murder and kidnapping (ref C),character assassination, disinformation, bribes, house raids and de- Ba'athification. Conclusive evidence is lacking, but most allegations center on suspicion that the attacks in Baghdad and the South benefit the UIA and that the attacks in Kirkuk, Ninewa, and the North, benefit the Kurdish alliance. ¶6. In addition, the campaign battle has extended to: - (U) A POSTER WAR: Posters are an important means of campaigning in Iraq. (Posters, unlike TV, are not susceptible to electricity blackouts.) This is the most frequent complaints by non-Shia Alliance parties. As an example, negative campaigning in the form of anti-Ayad Allawi posters and flyers have appeared, comparing Allawi with Saddam Hussein and associating him with the Ba'athist regime. One of these posters shows half of Saddam Hussein's face and half of Ayad Allawi's face and asks, "Who does this man remind you of?" Allawi's campaign and Ali al-Dabbagh's campaigns have had their posters systematically torn down, according to supporters of these candidates. - (C) HOUSE RAIDS AND ARRESTS: The Justice and Future Coalition reported that several of their supporters have been harassed by Badr Corps (555) policemen who raided their homes under the guise of illegal weapons search. Abdulrahim Nasrullah, leader of the Justice and Future Coalition, added that many of the protective details have yet to receive weapon permits from the police despite repeated application. The police, aware of those awaiting permits, come to their homes and arrest them. Allawi officials have alleged similar intimidation in the southern provinces. - (U) CANDIDATE DEFECTIONS: SCIRI television station al- Furat started advertising on December 8 that political candidates from 5 parties had quit the political race in order to support the Shia Alliance: Free Iraq Forum (503), First Democratic National Party (617),Iraq Intifada Gathering (671),Loyalty to Najaf (696),Imam Ali Society (753). - (C) PARTY DEFECTIONS: Al-Furat television also claims that the Rise and Reform (707),Council of Misan Marshes (655) and the Peace Organization for Shiite Kurds (810) have dissolved their parties to vote for the Shia Alliance. Several political contacts alleged that the Shia Alliance registered these parties as shell parties in order to defect with days before the elections. - (C) DE-BA'ATHIFICATION: Answering the most serious charges by Shia parties is that secular and Sunni parties will bring back the Baathists if Iraqis vote for them. In the Iraqi context, this is am explosive charge. Charges of de-Baathification are a part of this. National De- Ba'athification Commission board members who are UIA 555 politicians insisted the IECI remove candidates they identified as Baathists. They went so far as to threaten the IECI Board of Directors by saying that they would publicly denounce the IECI for failing to comply with the applicable De-Ba'athification laws. -------------- Comment -------------- ¶7. (C) Over-the-top rhetoric is part of the rough and tumble of emerging democracy, but in Iraq, this is part of a larger pattern in which parties with militias have at times operated more roughly. Solid evidence of who is behind the assassinations, intimidation, and campaign dirty tricks is, not surprisingly, hard to come by, but the Iraqis who are complaining are rivals to the UIA (555) and the Kurdish Alliance (730). Those complaining are the weaker parties, and their complaints also could aim to generate American pressure to even the playing field somewhat. In any case, acts of violence and intimidation will not foster democratic development in Iraq. The Embassy and the United Nations have made public and private statements against intimidation and fraud, including at the Ambassador's December 13 press conference. ¶8. (C) Of particular concern are SCIRI's election-eve charges of election fraud by the IECI, which has absolutely no basis in fact of which we are aware. Even charges that Ba'athists are trying to steal the election seem curious in light of the limited influence that any Ba'athist elements could possibly have on security procedures in Anbar and elsewhere. This rhetoric could simply be a way of motivating UIA (555) supporters to vote in the election. However, this could be a prelude to justifying more serious electoral fraud, in favor of, if notably the UIA, on election day. The IECI has taken steps to counter election fraud from any quarter, but the IECI has not shown itself able to enforce rules against the use of religious symbols. Our sense is that Iraqis know they have real choices and they can make their votes count. It will be important on December 15 for the parties complaining to document their allegations carefully and for the election commission to address the allegations seriously. The commission's disqualification of several hundred thousand fraudulent votes in Irbil in January 2005 is an example of the kind of resolve the commission may well need again. KHALILZAD