NEWSPAPER EDITORS LOOK TO PLAY A ROLE IN BUILDING

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 005001 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2015 TAGS: PREL KDEM IZ SUBJECT: NEWSPAPER EDITORS LOOK TO PLAY A ROLE IN BUILDING DEMOCRACY AFTER THE DECEMBER 15 ELECTIONS Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Ford, reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. Two newspaper editors-in-chief, Muhammad 'Abd al-Jabbar of al-Sabah and Shaker al-Jaboury of Al-Furat, both expressed concerns about the direction Iraqi politics is headed after the December 15 election, but both expressed interest in becoming more politically active afterwards. Jabbar believes more long-term democracy development is required, especially with the moderate Muslim democrats, in order to counter Iranian influence among the Shi'a. He is seeking funding from the International Republican Institute for more democracy promotion among Islamist Shi'a. Jaboury believes the next government will have too much Islamist influence compared to the views of the Iraqi people. Jaboury wants U.S. officials to meet with a group of non-exile intellectuals who can provide more legitimate ideas than the exiles that have dominated post-liberation Iraqi politics thus far. Jaboury urged the United States to get involved in pushing for government ministries to be in the hands of technocrats and for ministries not to be divided by the political parties as spoils. End summary. ¶2. (S) Separate conversations at the al-Rashid hotel on December 13 with two newspaper editors led down surprisingly parallel lines, given the different backgrounds of the editors and their newspapers. Muhammad 'Abd al-Jabbar al-Shabut, editor in chief of Al-Sabah newspaper and a former London-based oppositionist who had worked with the Iraqi Reconstruction and Development Council, told PolOffs he was very concerned about the long-term direction of Iraqi politics. Jabbar, who coined the term "moderate Muslim Democrats," said that the voices of "democratic Iraqis" (by which he meant moderate Muslim democratic Iraqis) were being drowned out by what he described as Iranian-backed parties. (Jabbar is Shi'a and ran on the Democratic Islamic Trend political party in the January 2005 election. He is not running in this election, although a number of his moderate Muslim democrats are running on other lists, most notably Ayad Allawi's Iraqi National List (731).) He criticized the role of the parties in the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA),which was using its influence to move into all areas of politics and the economy, especially in the South and in Baghdad. As an example, he cited an effort by Council of Ministers Secretary-General Khudayr Abbas to try to dismiss four SIPDIS members of the Iraqi Media Network's board, to be replaced by several of the dismissed members and two new members acceptable to Abbas's Da'wa Party. They tried about two weeks ago to replace the manager of Al-Iraqiyya, Habib al-Sadr, so that one of their own could be put in his place, according to Jabbar. Although this firing was deemed illegal and Sadr was still on the job, Jabbar said that the UIA was waiting until after the December 15 election to make another move to gain control of al-Iraqiyya television network. Each of the major, Iranian-backed parties had its own television station already, Jabbar said. ¶3. (C) Jabbar said that the parties now in power, Shi'a and Kurdish, were acting in their own interests as parties, not in the interest of the state. The state in Iraq was weak, Jabbar said, reminding PolOffs of a paper he had written in Iraqi opposition days on how the Iraqi opposition needed to make the transition to running a state, which, he pointed out, was an altogether different enterprise. "Instead of Ministers of State," he said, "We have Ministers of Parties." ¶4. (C) Jabbar expressed a desire to have further funding for his "Islam and Democracy" publications, which had been funded by the Department and, later by the International Republican Institute. (Jabbar had recently applied to IRI for further funding.) After the December 15 election, Jabbar believed that promoting democratic development in Iraq was likely to take years, and that the United States should begin funding such programs now, years in advance of the next Council of Representatives election. There were provincial elections, local elections, and other work that needed to be started now to promote democracy. ¶5. (C) Al-Fourat Editor in Chief Shaker al-Jaboury said that, while he may write editorials criticizing the United States, he is concerned about the way the election and the post-election environment is headed. (Jaboury is a Sunni Arab who lived in exile in France and holds French and Iraqi citizenship. His family lives in France.) He believes it will bring in disproportionately more Islamists than it should. He urged the United States to become more directly involved and to use our influence to push for more technocrats in the next Iraqi cabinet. PolOffs remonstrated that the days of CPA were over, and that it was not the responsibility of the United States to pick Iraqi cabinet ministers. Iraqis should elect their own leaders and Iraqis should pick the cabinet. Jaboury said that it was important for the United States to weigh in with Iraqis that technocrats, not politicians, should be picked for the key cabinet ministries. He challenged PolOffs to name any technocrats in the current Iraqi cabinet. PolOffs quickly named three (Barham Salih, Hoshyar Zebari and 'Ali Allawi),all of whom Jaboury said were either exiles, Kurdish and, in the case of 'Ali Allawi, not likely to stay on as ministers. Ayad Allawi's cabinet had technocrats in it largely because the CPA put them there. Left to their own devices, Jaboury said, the Iraqi political parties would act in their own interest, and not the interest of Iraq or the United States. For that reason, the United States should get involved. ¶6. (C) It was also essential, he said, for the United States to push for the dissolution of militias, which have a de-stabilizing effect. PolOffs agreed that only the Iraqi Police and Iraqi Security Forces should be responsible for security in Iraq. ¶7. (C) Jaboury wanted to bring a group of 10-15 intellectuals and others, not former exiles, to meet with U.S. officials, either in Baghdad or in Washington, to share their ideas on how the United States should help advance democracy in Iraq. These would include journalists, educators, and other professionals from a range of views. PolOffs invited Jaboury to explore further contacts and exchanges, and the many ways the U.S. Government has for promoting such exchanges. ¶8. (C) COMMENT. December 13 was the last day newspapers could print before the election, so the campaign was over the evening of the 13th as far as these print media moguls were concerned. They could afford to be reflective about the post-election future of their country. Both recognized the progress that Iraq had made since the liberation, but both felt -- despite their different political, social and religious backgrounds -- that they needed to get more engaged in politics. Both were sharply critical of the direction Iraqi politics has taken. Both urged that help from the United States was still, in today's Iraq, essential to continue Iraq's democratic development. END COMMENT. KHALILZAD