'ABD AL-MAHDI ADVISOR SEES UIA GETTING 110-120

S E C R E T BAGHDAD 004996

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/14/2015
TAGS: PREL KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: 'ABD AL-MAHDI ADVISOR SEES UIA GETTING 110-120
SEATS, BUT PRIME MINISTERIAL RACE IS CLOUDY

Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S. Ford, reasons 1.5(b) and (
d).


1. (S) Summary. Vice President 'Adil 'Abd al-Mahdi
adviser Fareed Yasseen opined that the UIA would get 110-120
seats in the December 15 election. He hoped 'Abd al-Mahdi
would emerge as the UIA nominee for Prime Minister, but
acknowledged PM Ja'fari's stubbornness, and could not
describe a scenario in which 'Abd al-Mahdi was likely to
emerge as the UIA nominee. End summary.


2. (C) Vice President 'Adil 'Abd al-Mahdi adviser Fareed
Yasseen, formerly director of Policy Planning in the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and previously privatization
adviser to Iraqi Governing Council member Adnan Pachachi,
told Poloffs on December 11 that it was his assessment that
the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) would get 110-120 seats,
the Kurds 50-60 seats, the Sunni religious parties 50-60
seats, the Sunni secular parties about 10 seats, Allawi's
National List 20-30 seats, and other small parties 10-15
seats.


3. (S) When asked how 'Abd al-Mahdi might become Prime
Minister, however, Yasseen became far less precise.
Yasseen acknowledged PM Ja'fari's stubbornness and desire
for the job, but thought Ja'fari had failed as Prime
Minister. Yasseen's longtime personal friend Dr. Husayn
Shahristani also wants the job, but did not have
anywhere near as much support as 'Abd al-Mahdi or
Ja'fari. Yasseen criticized the UIA's archrival Ayad
Allawi by claiming surprise that Allawi had not developed
a crushing campaign based on the failures of the Ja'fari
government. Poloffs speculated that Da'wa might unite
behind Ja'fari, Sadr align with Ja'fari, and Fadhilla
members vote as Sadr supporters do, bringing Ja'fari
perhaps 70 votes within the UIA, an outright majority.
Poloffs asked how 'Abd al-Mahdi could become the UIA
nominee for Prime Minister then. After a
pause, Yasseen quipped "prayer." He then said that he
hoped the flaw in these assumption was that Da'wa would not
support Ja'fari for Prime Minister. If Ja'fari was not
supported by Da'wa, he reasoned the field would be open for
'Abd al-Mahdi to become the UIA's PM nominee. He also said
Grand Ayatollah 'Ali al-SISTANI might step in and intervene
on 'Abd al-Mahdi's behalf. (Note: He cited no evidence to
support this idea. End note.) He also said the Kurds
might try to block Ja'fari, but acknowledges that the Kurds
are not likely to have the 92 votes by themselves to block
Ja'fari.


4. (C) Yasseen anticipated that the decisionmaking process
for the cabinet would be different from the process earlier
this year. He said that the Prime Minister-designate
should have a significant say in who the ministers would
be, because the PM would be responsible for his
government. He anticipated a push-and-pull between having
politicians in the cabinet and technocrats in the cabinet.
A technocrat himself, he favors having relatively more
technocrats, especially for the key service ministries.


5. (S) COMMENT. Yasseen acknowledges he is not a SCIRI
insider. While his loyalties are to 'Abd al-Mahdi (and to
a lesser extent to Pachachi, whom Yasseen described as his
mentor in Iraqi politics) it is noteworthy that he could
not identify a strategy how 'Abd al-Mahdi plans on winning
the UIA inside game to be the UIA nominee for Prime
Minister. By contrast, much of the convention wisdom in
Baghdad is that 'Abd al-Mahdi would be the UIA candidate
for Prime Minister. END COMMENT
KHALILZAD