THE ANBAR SECURITY COUNCIL: RECENT NEGOTIATIONS

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 004981

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/13/2015
TAGS: PGOV PTER PINS KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: THE ANBAR SECURITY COUNCIL: RECENT NEGOTIATIONS

REF: A. A) BAGHDAD 4733

B. B) BAGHDAD 4788

C. C) BAGHDAD 4830

D. D) BAGHDAD 4935

E. E) BAGHDAD 4915

Classified By: CLASSIFIED BY ROBERT S. FORD, POLITICAL COUNSELOR FOR RE
ASONS 1.4 (B) AND (D).


1. (C) Summary. This is a SET Ramadi cable. A recently
created council of influential Anbaris in Ramadi known
alternatively as the Ramadi or Anbar Security Council has
brought together local officials (from the professional or
technocratic class),ex-military officers, imams and tribal
sheikhs. MNF-I officers now meet this group regularly to
discuss security issues. For the most part, the group is a
successful forum for Coalition Forces and Anbaris alike.
Discussions are frank and productive. The members are
growing more sophisticated in their arguments and
positioning. The last meeting of the Council was closed-
door. Participants must now move beyond word to actions to
stand up the Anbar ISF. This cable traces the history of
the engagement, beginning with the release of a minor imam
and analyses the participants of each of the Council's
factions, in order of their relative weight within the
group. End Summary.


2. (C) Unprecedented progress in Sunni engagement marked
the last half of November and the first weeks of December
in the troubled province of Anbar. In retrospect, it
appears the November 13 release of Imam Sheikh Jalal to the
(informal) recognizance of the Governor and Sunni Endowment
head Sheikh Dhaher broke the dam and ushered the recent
period of frequent and high-level negotiations with a broad
and significant group of local influencers. A timeline of
significant events includes:

November 20: Senior Religious Leaders Resume Dialogue Begun
late July (Ref A)

-Anbar Sunni Endowment leader Sheikh Dhaher
-Muslim Ulema Council Sheikh Thamir

November 28: Conference Proposed by Imams Draws 200
Participants
-Designated Members Anbar Security Council (Ref B)

December 1: First Meeting of Anbar Security Council
-Received IECI representative (Ref C)

December 6: Anbar Military Council/ISF Commanders (Ref D)

December 8: Anbar Security Council (Ref E)
-Discussed Election Preparations

December 10: Anbar Security Council Holds Internal
Coordination Meeting
-Considered Proposals to include more Al Anbaris in the
7th IA Division
-Requested Further Details Re: Present Composition of 7th
Division


3. (C) As with most Sunni political operations, the field
is filled with contentious and distrustful rivals. A
summary of the factions follows:

--------------
Technocrats
--------------

Led by the Governor Ma'moon Sami al Rasheed al Alwani, the
technocrats -- loosely affiliated with the Iraqi Islamic
Party -- won a stark majority of the 2,800 votes cast in
the January 30 Provincial election. Governor Ma'moon is a
strong personality, equipped with meticulous attention to
detail and an engineer's penchant for technical solutions.
He consistently derides, in private, the relevance and
potency of tribal sheikhs, yet seems to have an easy
rapport with Anbar's religious leaders. His closest allies
on the Anbar Security Council appear to be Engineer Hamid
Abed Muhammed, a Ramadi City Council member (and the
governor's recent representative at IECI meetings in
Baghdad) and a local businessman, Sayid Hamid Mateh. At
the December 6 meeting, Sayid pressed for the re-opening of
several schools near the Huriya Police Station in Ramadi.
(Note. Iraqi Police abandoned the Huriya Police Station in
early November, shortly afterward the Public Order
Battalion (P.O.B.) took control of the premises. Parents
attribute the school's closure to the MoI unit's aggressive
defensive posture in the facility. End Note.) Sayid
stated he had organized a community group demanding wider
access to the schools; the group later met with CF and
P.O.B. commanders and largely resolved access issues. Dr.
Abed Muhammed al-Jumayli identified himself last session as
the secretary of the Council. He mentioned he was a
lecturer at the College Agriculture in east Ramadi and had
started an NGO to address environmental issues.

-------------- -
Iraqi Islamic Party Faction of the Technocrats
-------------- -


4. (C) Provincial Council Chairman Khidir Abdel Jabar Abaas
is criticized by some as weak and usually defers to
Ma'moon's lead. A deeply religious (he, unlike Ma'moon,
will excuse himself from a meeting to pray) and quiet man,
he proudly described his seven accomplished children, in
particular his daughter, who scored extremely high marks in
the college entrance exam last spring. He has failed to
induce the Provincial Council to meet of late, citing
logistical challenges and intimidation as barriers. His
deputy, Dr. Abdel Salam al-Ani only participated in the
kick-off conference on November 28. His absence in
subsequent meetings is puzzling, and may be to due to a
rivalry with the governor. A former dean of Anbar's
Medical School, al-Ani was shot in the stomach shortly
after liberation. He is brother to Deputy Minister of
Industry and Minerals, Mohammed, and told PolOff that 'the
American enemy' had shot their 80 year old father in Qaim
on November 23. Both Khidir and al-Ani openly acknowledge
their leadership roles in the IIP. Al-Ani notes that his
position as party leader made him the number one target for
the Zarqawi network.

--------------
Former Military Officers
--------------


5. (C) Anbar has no shortage of retired or dismissed
Saddam-era military officers. Anbar Security Council
member former General 'Sa'ab' (evidently his nom de guerre
-- aptly Arabic for 'difficult') al Rawi claims to
represent 6,500 Anbari former officers, including 60 former
generals. Anbar Sunni Endowment head Sheikh Dhaher
Mohammed Awad Obaydi recommended including ex-military
officials in the November 28 conference; he suggested that
Ma'moon identify and invite the officers for inclusion.
General Sa'ab immediately proved to be a vocal and
passionate proponent of the former regime military's role
in the new Iraq. He has attempted earlier negotiations,
and carries with him a document outlining the creation of
an Anbar Iraqi Army division that he claimed was endorsed
by former Minister of Defense Hazam Sha'alan. In December
8 meeting, the Council became less permissive of his
domination of earlier discussions. He may have served as a
convenient straw man for the most radical initial
negotiating position. Abd al-Ali and Muthar al-Qubaisy are
also ex-military. Sa'ab has been openly dismissive of al
Ali, the diminutive former artillery general. For example,
he suddenly disengaged when al-Ali broke into our
conversation, only to wave PolOff over afterward to speak
privately. Muthar, also a vociferous proponent of Anbari
ex-military representation in the Iraqi Security Forces, in
a sidebar, sought better security in the vicinity of Anbar
University where his wife is employed.

--------------
The Imams
--------------


6. (C) Sheikh Dhaher, complete with bullet wounds through
his shoulder from the attack in a mosque in July, has
participated actively in recent Provincial Reconstruction
and Development Council meetings, but only reported to the
December 8 Security Council meeting. He and Muslim Ulema
Council's Sheikh Thamir Ibrahim Dharer al Assafi,
originally shared a reasoned program for standing up
Anbar's Iraqi Police Force. Most recently, Dhaher
complained bitterly of the national Sunni Endowment's
leader's alleged announcement that the Anbar provincial
office of the religious administration would move from
Ramadi to Falluja. Dhaher said simply he'd quit if this
edict were enforced. Sheikh Thamir is the most interesting
participant to watch, extremely at ease with tall frame,
and-- often wearing a sardonic smile -- exudes influence.
His arguments are reasoned, if tinged with fear. He has
repeatedly raised the dangers they believe religious
leaders face from Zarqawi's operatives. The most senior of
the Anbari imams, the elderly Yassin Muslfin al-Hambadi of
Hit, has not participated since the November 28 meeting.

--------------
The Sheikhs
--------------


7. (C) Dapper and westernized Sheikh Anwar Kharbit is by
far the most active participant in recent Council meetings.
His mild and banal admonishments of the IECI or MoD
recruiting practices (with regard to the 7th division) are
often in support of Ma'moon's proclivities. Sheikh Hatem
Abd al Razzak, commands due respect for his position in the
tribal hierarchy, but either his youth (appears much
younger than his reported age of early 30's) or lack of
inspiration lead to his mute participation. Other senior
Ramadi sheikhs, including Adnan Khamees Almohana, appear to
bridle at Ma'moon's iron-fisted control over the Council's
agenda and period for comment. Ma'moon's own tribal
leader, Jumah Khalaf al-Ghaoud, has not returned since the
December 1 meeting. Sheikh Faisal Nijris al-Ghoud and
three minor Albu Nimr sheikhs joined the December 8 Council
belatedly, and, apparently, without invitation.


8. (C) Ma'moon seized the opportunity to chastise those
who conduct independent negotiations in Baghdad. This was
apparently a direct slap at Sheikh Faisal, who has
reportedly met with both the Minister of Defense and the
IECI to speak on behalf of Anbar. Sheikh Khalid Ibrahim
Najif (albu Jabil),also listed as a participant in the
MoD's outreach efforts, is more closely aligned with
Ma'moon and echoes the governor's position in the Council.
Dr. Nasir abd al Karim Mukhlif al-Fahdawi, is reputedly an
influential leader. He was appointed to the Council but has
not attended. He is currently in Amman.

--------------
Comment
--------------


9. (C) The Council's membership is fluid. On December 8,
there were a number of gate crashers. Several minor sheikhs
and grey-faced ex-military crowded into the governor's
office, although they were not allotted speaking time. For
the most part, the group is a successful forum for CF and
Anbaris alike. Discussions are frank and productive. The
members are growing more sophisticated in their arguments
and positioning. The last meeting of the Council was
closed-door. Participants must now move beyond word to
actions necessary to stand up the Anbar ISF. End Comment.
KHALILZAD