IRAQI NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR DISCUSSES NEXT

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 004980

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/12/2015
TAGS: PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR DISCUSSES NEXT
GOVERNMENT, ELECTION OUTCOMES


Classified By: AMBASSADOR ZALMAY KHALILZAD FOR REASONS
1.4 (a),(b),(d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: At a private luncheon hosted by the
Ambassador at his residence on December 9, Iraqi
National Security Advisor Dr. Mowaffak al-Rubaie
shared his concerns about USG plans for the future of
Iraq, urged the Ambassador to play an active role in
assuring the "right" people are chosen to form the
next government, made predictions about the outcome of
the national election to be held on December 15, and
agreed with the Ambassador's suggestion that Grand
Ayatollah Ali al-SISTANI urge other leaders to join
him in agreeing to a "National Pact" of ten or fifteen
non-political pronouncements common to all factions in
the country. The Ambassador assured Rubaie that the
USG is not planning behind the backs of the Iraqis
for the future of this country. Rubaie and the
Ambassador discussed the proper mix of "political" vs.
"technocrat" ministerial appointments for the next
government, agreeing that it is critical that the new
government be formed of competent individuals who will
rise above party or sectarian imperatives to put the
interests of the nation first. Rubaie predicted that
a new government will not be formed until mid-April,
to which the Ambassador replied that the Iraqis
will have to do much better than that. Rubaie
believes that former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi
damaged his election prospects with an ill-conceived
and poorly timed visit to Najaf, which ended in an
embarrassing and dangerous melee. He predicted
Allawi's party will be lucky to win 20 seats. He
believes the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) will be
the beneficiary of Allawi's loss and will garner 120
to perhaps more than 130 seats in the new assembly.
END SUMMARY.

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PLANNING WITHOUT US?
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2. (C) Rubaie told the Ambassador that he is concerned
because he has heard that there are various committees
in the Embassy that are making plans, revising the
strategy for the future of Iraq. Ambassador replied
that there is no talk of "revising" strategy but that
various groups in the Embassy are constantly planning
the way ahead. He briefed Rubaie on work dealing with
the coming transition. Three principles govern our
approach to the transition: the next government must
be formed more quickly that the last one; the new
government must be diverse in its composition and must
be effective, made up not just of politicians but also
of competent people with the experience and managerial
ability to run their ministries (particularly the key
ministries); and steps must be taken to assure the new
government has a good "launch" by achieving tangible
and positive results in the first one hundred days.
"Isn't this something you should do in cooperation
with us?" asked Rubaie. "Most definitely," replied
the Ambassador, "But at this stage it is only
brainstorming, and our Iraqi colleagues are reoccupied
with campaigning for the election. Once the election
is over we will definitely work together on these
issues."


3. (C) The Ambassador also described to Rubaie the
work being done at the Embassy in cooperation with the
British on Sunni outreach. We are considering with
whom we should be engaging, what really matters to the
Sunnis, what can reasonably be offered to them, and in
what sequence we should engage our interlocutors on
these issues. Rubaie said this sounded more like what
he had heard about, as it involves reaching out to the
insurgency. He asked no further questions about this
initiative.

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THINKING ABOUT THE NEXT GOVERNMENT
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4. (C) Rubaie said he sees the composition of the next
government as an essential issue for the USG, and he
urged the Ambassador to take an active role in
determining who the next ministers will be. Speaking
of the period directly following the return of
sovereignty, Rubaie complained that the Embassy took a
hands-off attitude about the decisions made by the
Iraqi government in the name of not impinging upon
Iraqi sovereignty. It is not enough, Rubaie urged,
for the Embassy to take a traditional diplomatic
"observe and report" stance. Rather, the Embassy must
protect the interests of the USG by assuring the next
government will be an effective one that can
consolidate the gains made to date and continue to
move forward with even more effectiveness. The
Ambassador agreed and said that his approach has
always been to act as a facilitator but not impose
ideas or solutions upon the Iraqis. Rubaie said
this was entirely appropriate.


5. (C) Rubaie warned that many people want the new
government to be in the same image as the current one
-- that is, ministries divided along sectarian party
lines. The election victors will want to pick
"political" ministers. He recommended that the
Ambassador press for the appointment of "technocrat"
ministers, assuring that the key ministries are given
to people with the knowledge, skills, and aptitude to
succeed. Most importantly, the prime minister must be
a competent, efficient individual who will be a strong
leader committed to continued close consultation with
the USG. Rubaie believes that, if the next government
is similar to the current one, it will not be able to
make clear decisions and will be brought down by the
end of next year. The Ambassador agreed that it is
imperative that the key ministers have the technical
competence required to run their ministries. Rubaie
urged that the U.S. not limit its focus to the
appointment of ministers but that we also exercise a
"veto power" over top tier officials in key ministries
who have the power to wield considerable unchecked
authority. Rubaie predicted it will take until mid-
April for the new government to be formed. Ambassador
replied that the Iraqis would have to do much better
than that or critical momentum will be lost.

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ELECTION PREDICTIONS
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6. (C) Ambassador asked Rubaie if he had any elections
predictions. Rubaie said he thinks that the two main
contenders for Prime Minister will be Prime Minister
Ja'afari and Vice President Adil Abdel-Mahdi but that
both will be weakened by the struggle to gain the top
spot and a compromise candidate (read Rubaie himself)
will emerge and be victorious. No one believes
Ja'afari is competent enough to continue as Prime
Minister, but he will fight for it tooth and nail.
On the other hand, Adil is not much of a fighter and
could concede early, Rubaie opined. On the
distribution of seats in the assembly, Rubaie said
that last week he would have predicted the UIA would
win 100 to 120 seats. Now he believes they will
garner at least 120 and maybe even more than 130.
There are two reasons for this shift. First,
SISTANI has told his deputies that he supports the
UIA; so, although he will not lend an official or
public endorsement, his people will be working to
steer the vote to the UIA. Second, Rubaie believes
that former prime minister Ayad Allawi's disastrous
trip to the Imam Ali Shrine in Najaf, where he was
forced to flee, shoeless, by an angry and unruly mob,
will cost him votes. Allawi is calling the attack on
him an assassination attempt, but no one believes him,
Rubaie asserted, and this has cost him credibility
points with the voters. He will now be lucky to get
20 seats, and he will need at least 30 to assure
himself a Vice Presidency. His loss will be Deputy
Prime Minister Chalabi's gain. Rubaie fears
that, if Allawi wins fewer than 20 seats, he will
retire from politics, and this would be a loss for
Iraq. Rubaie believes that the Kurdish vote is the
easiest to predict, while Allawi's is the most
difficult. The Iranians also will play a decisive
roll behind the scenes to affect the outcome of the
election.

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A NATIONAL PACT
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7. (C) Ambassador sounded Rubaie on his views of
trying to get SISTANI to call for or broker a
"national pact," whereby an intersectarian group of
Iraqi leaders would promulgate ten or fifteen general,
non-political principles upon which all Iraqis can
agree. The Ambassador told Rubaie that this will be a
tough election, and the struggles that will ensue as
the government is formed also could lead to frayed
relationships. Something will need to be done to
bring the people back together, and there is no one
better than SISTANI, who is a "father of the nation"
figure, to promote a reconciliation. Rubaie agreed
that this would be a good idea and agreed to float it
to SISTANI. Rubaie, who has played a role as a key
Embassy interlocutor with SISTANI, asked the
Ambassador if he'd had any direct contact with SISTANI
or was communicating with him through other sources.
The Ambassador assured Rubaie that we only
communicate with SISTANI through him.

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COMMENT
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8. (C) Rubaie clearly wishes to reinforce his
relationship with the Embassy and is maneuvering to
assure he will retain a position of influence in the
new government. He harbors illusions that perhaps he
will be the "compromise candidate" who emerges as the
next Prime Minister and clearly sees himself as one of
the competent, efficient "technocrats" most qualified
to lead a key ministry. As a result, he's trying to
assure himself that the Embassy will push for him to
fill a key position over other hopefuls who are more
politically well-connected. Rubaie also fears that
perhaps he is beginning to be marginalized by the
Embassy. Hence his concerns that we are plotting
strategy for Iraq without talking to him or dealing
directly with SISTANI when, in the past, he has been
our principal interlocutor with this key religious
figure. END COMMENT

KHALILZAD