ANBAR ELECTIONS PLANNING PROCEEDS SLOWLY BUT SURELY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004918

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/2015
TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: ANBAR ELECTIONS PLANNING PROCEEDS SLOWLY BUT SURELY

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT S. FORD, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B)
AND (D)


1. (C) The IECI, MNF-I, and MoD met December 4 at IECI
Baghdad headquarters to define the operational plan for
holding elections in Anbar province; details continue to be
worked. The MoD rejected an IECI plan to use tribes to
provide security in western Anbar. A Special Police Commando
Brigade has been introduced into Ramadi to provide Iraqi
security support to polling centers in the city. (MNF-I
Comment: The Special Police Commando Brigade has been
introduced mainly to support counterinsurgency operations.
The earliest they could get there was coincident with the
election. They will help with election, but the election was
not the reason for the brigade's deployment. End Comment.)
The non-secure environment has challenged efforts to
implement a more ambitious plan designed to encourage and
facilitate greater Sunni voter turnout. In comparison to the
operations plan for the October referendum, the likely
outcome for December 15 in Anbar will be a limited increase
in polling sites (and some shifts in location to respond to
local preferences),and a modest increase in the number of
local polling employees. The IECI will also implement an
informal policy to permit Anbar residents to vote at any
polling center rather than insist voters must cast their
ballots at sites where their names are registered. This
policy, which was also applied during the referendum, is
designed to respond to Sunni concerns and ensure that those
persons displaced by fighting, or fearful of visiting certain
locations, have an opportunity to vote.


2. (C) General Hikmat of the IAF also joined the December 4
meeting. The IECI's Chief Operations Officer, Dr. Ali
Abdul-Jabbar, who has been consulting with Anbaris on
security arrangements, told General Hikmat that the principal
problem is the mistrust by Anbar residents of ISF. Yet on
December 3 the Minister of Defense met with the IECI and
rejected the commission's proposal for tribes to provide
security for polling sites west of Ramadi, an arrangement
similar to the model used successfully in Falluja during the
referendum. Defense Minister al-Dulaimi reportedly insisted
that the Iraqi Army be responsible for security. Unable to
get permissions for tribal security, the IECI sought MNF-I
support to expand the number of sites in the West. MNF-I is
currently reviewing the feasibility of adding more locations
in the West, but MNF-I resources alone are insufficient to
meet the IECI goal. Because MNF-I must transport poll
workers out West, the IECI will use staff from Baghdad in
this area, rather than from Anbar (hiring, training, and
vetting staff from Anbar was deemed not feasible). (MNF-I
Comment: We will be supporting about 8 new sites in addition
to the 31 previously agreed to. The blame should not be
placed on MoD but on poor IECI planning for Al Anbar.
Presence of the ISF in the referendum was not why the people
did not vote. They didn't vote because the Imans told them
not to and because of intimidation. End Comment.)


3. (C) With regard to the city of Ramadi, the IECI proposed
a larger number of sites than those locations already
committed to by MNF-I that the military is currently
reviewing. This proposal, which would require Quick Response
Force (QRF) support and the transport of election materials
to the additional sites, would increase MNF-I exposure. The
MoI has also sent the Wolf Brigade to Ramadi to fill in gaps
in local police and supplement Iraqi security on December 15.
In a step designed to alleviate tension between Anbaris and
the ISF, the IECI has arranged for unarmed tribal leaders be
present at polling sites in Fallujah and Ramadi. The IECI is
also working with local leaders to arrange for local staff to
manage the polls in the two cities. (MNF-I Comment: The
Wolf Brigade is also in Al-Anbar for other reasons and
arrived in time to support the election. MNF-I has always
planned to transport materials and workers -- and is awaiting
the IECI's word on where this should be done. End Comment.)



4. (C) Comment: IECI International Commissioner Craig
Jenness has advised all sides that some increase in security
risk is tolerable if the effort results in facilitating Sunni
participation. However, the difficulties of operating in
Anbar (e.g., no cell phones and limited vehicular movement),
the organizational immaturity of the IECI, the late
introduction of MoD views, and the forced reliance on MoI
imports have undercut efforts to implement a bold plan. It
is unfortunate that the MoD could not accept the result of
the IECI's lengthy effort to negotiate with Anbari tribes a
satisfactory security arrangement for western Anbar. But the
tardy submission of the IECI plan to the MoD left little room
for maneuver. If the Commission had approached the Ministry
in October, better planning might have been possible. At
this point, it is hard to predict voter turn-out in Ramadi
and western Anbar. The good news is the strong interest in
participation, but ongoing security problems and
corresponding responses necessitate realistic expectations
for December 15. Jenness told poloff he greatly appreciated
the flexibility, commitment, and patience of the Marines in
supporting the electoral process in Anbar. End Comment.
KHALILZAD