ANBAR ELECTIONS PLANNING PROCEEDS SLOWLY BUT SURELY

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 004915

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/09/15
TAGS: PGOV KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: ANBAR ELECTIONS PLANNING PROCEEDS SLOWLY BUT SURELY

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT S. FORD, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B)
AND (D).


1. (C) The IECI, CF, and MOD met December 4 to finalize a
conceptual framework and to continue to work out the
operational details for holding elections in Anbar province.
In comparison to the October referendum, the likely outcome
will be a limited increase in polling sites (and some shifts
in location to respond to local preferences),and a modest
increase in the number of local polling employees, although
security concerns will prevent implementation of an expansive
plan. The IECI will also implement an informal policy of
permitting Anbar residents to vote at any polling center,
rather than insist voters must cast their ballots at sites
where their names are registered. This policy, which was
applied during the referendum, is designed to respond to
Sunni concerns that those persons displaced by fighting or
fearful of visiting certain locations have an opportunity to
vote.


2. (C) Prior to the meeting with CF, the IECI met the
evening of December 3 with the Minister of Defense, who
rejected an IECI proposal to ask tribes to provide security
for polling sites west of Ramadi. Defense Minister
al-Dulaimi reportedly insisted that the Iraqi Army be
responsible for security. IAF General Hikmat joined the
December 4 meeting between CF and IECI, offering additional
IAF if necessary. This exchange between the MOD and IECI
slowed down the planning. The IECI's chief of operations,
who has been consulting with Anbaris on security
arrangements, told General Hikmat that the principal problem
is the mistrust by Anbar residents of ISF. To alleviate this
tension, the IECI has proposed that unarmed tribal leaders be
present at polling sites in Fallujah and Ramadi.


3. (C) Given the MoD's position, the IECI has backed away
from its plan to allow tribes to provide security west of
Ramadi, in an arrangement similar to the model used
successfully in Falluja during the referendum. The IECI is
now seeking CF support to expand the number of sites it can
support in the west. The military is currently reviewing the
feasibility of adding more locations in the west, but CF
resources alone are insufficient to meet the IECI goal. With
regard to the city of Ramadi, the IECI also proposed a larger
number of sites than those locations already committed to by
CF. The military is reviewing the feasibility of this IECI
proposal for Ramadi; this proposal, which would require Quick
Response Force (QRF) support and the transport of election
materials to the additional sites, would increase CF exposure.


4. (C) Comment: IECI International Commissioner Craig
Jenness has advised the parties that some increase in
security risk is tolerable if the result facilitates Sunni
participation, but the ongoing difficulties of operating in
Anbar, IECI ineffectiveness, and the late introduction of MOD
views have undercut efforts to implement a bold plan.
Jenness told poloff he greatly appreciated the flexibility,
commitment, and patience of the Marines in supporting the
electoral process in Anbar. It is unfortunate that the MOD
rejected the result of the IECI's lengthy effort to negotiate
with Anbari tribes a satisfactory security arrangement for
western Anbar. But the tardy submission of the IECI plan to
the MOD left little room for maneuver. At this point, it is
hard to predict voter turn-out in Ramadi and western Anbar.
The good news is the strong interest in participation, but
ongoing operational limitations necessitate realistic
expectations for December 15. End Comment.
KHALILZAD