Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BAGHDAD4869
2005-12-06 19:18:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

MAYSAN POLITICAL LEADER DISCUSSES SHIA ELECTORAL

Tags:  PREL KDEM IZ 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004869 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2015
TAGS: PREL KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: MAYSAN POLITICAL LEADER DISCUSSES SHIA ELECTORAL
POLITICS

REF: BAGHDAD 4843

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT S. FORD, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B)
AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004869

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 12/06/2015
TAGS: PREL KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: MAYSAN POLITICAL LEADER DISCUSSES SHIA ELECTORAL
POLITICS

REF: BAGHDAD 4843

Classified By: POLITICAL COUNSELOR ROBERT S. FORD, FOR REASONS 1.4 (B)
AND (D).


1. (C) Summary: A prominent tribal leader from Maysan, who
won a TNA seat on the United Iraqi Alliance (UIA) list in
January and has decided to join Ali al-Dabbagh's party as a
candidate in this month's election, told poloff December 5
that there are no policy differences between the UIA and
Dabbagh's "Qualified Iraqis Party." The difference between
the two is "technical"; those with Dabbagh are perceived to
be independent of the main political parties on the UIA. He
said Dabbagh's team is prepared to join the UIA block in the
next government. He also confirmed reports that individual
Sadrists have joined Shia slates other than the UIA, and said
Muqtadah al-Sadr would not issue a statement in support of
the UIA. He claimed election fraud would be limited to the
actions of individuals, and downplayed reports of electoral
violence. (In a separate conversation December 5 with
Dabbagh, however, the party leader expressed genuine concern
about disruptive UIA electoral activities, which he fears
will undermine the credibility of the election.) Sharing
other views, Saadoun argued that the marjaiyah maintained
primary influence over the Shia south, stronger than the
tribes, and dismissed the electoral prospects of Iyad Allawi.
He said the security situation in Maysan had improved once
the Sadrists gained political power, and acknowledged
increased Iranian influence since 2004. End Summary.


2. (C) Shia Coalitions. Poloff met December 5 with Shaykh
Mohamed al-Saadoun, an al-Amarah resident and leader of the
Saadoun tribe. Saadoun, a UIA member of the current National
Assembly, said he had joined Ali al-Dabbagh's new party and
is the party's first candidate on Maysan's list. He
described the original UIA as 75 percent political party and
25 percent independent. For "technical reasons," the
independent members had joined Dabbagh's "Qualified Iraqis
Party" to run in the elections for the new government.
Poloff asked him to define independent; did he mean
independent from Iran? Saadoun clarified that Dabbagh's
group is independent from the political parties, but shares
the same political program. Dabbagh's party is prepared to
join the UIA in the new government, and Saadoun predicted

that the UIA would gain the largest share of Shia votes
because it is well-known, identified with SISTANI, and
dominates the media. But he predicted that Dabbagh's party
would do well with voters who seek a change from the dominant
Shia political parties, and predicted the Islamist Coalition
(a group of Karbala-based religious politicians) would also
pick up votes. Saadoun said Dabbagh had chosen individuals
like himself, who are personally prominent in their
communities, in the 16 provinces where the party is running.


3. (C) Leader more critical. List leader Dabagh has been
far more critical of the Shia alliance in separate private
conversations with poloff. He accused the UIA of tearing
down his campaign posters, and told poloff that the UIA has
hired cars fitted with loudspeakers to patrol the streets of
Karbala and make false announcements that Dabagh has
withdrawn his candidacy and now backs the "555" (UIA) slate.
Dabagh has rejected that notion in public. He told poloff
that he is trying to cast himself as a modern technocrat who
can solve problems with economic development. Still, he is
discouraged, and said he expects extensive fraud and
controversy after the elections. "I'm very worried by what
I'm seeing inside the (Shia) coalition," Dabagh told poloff.
Poloff replied that he was worried, too. Dabagh shot back,
"You haven't seen what I've seen. I'm ten times more worried
than you. I don't know what they're trying to build here."


4. (C) Sadr Role and Electoral Environment. Saadoun, who
was known to poloff to be sympathetic to Sadr in 2004,
confirmed that Sadrists are running on lists other than the
UIA, and said Muqtadah would not issue a statement in support
of the UIA. When asked if the fierce rivalry between
Sadrists and the Badr organization in Maysan (as in other
parts of the south) affected the campaign, he demurred,
implying they were cooperating for the sake of the election.
Asked to comment on the fact that an Allawi candidate in
Maysan had been murdered on November 30 following a campaign
event, Saadoun downplayed the incident, suggesting factors
other than politics could have led to the killing. He flatly
dismissed Allawi's prospects in the south and asserted Allawi
would fare poorly in Baghdad, as well. He also rejected
reported concerns about ballot-stuffing and other possible
forms of electoral fraud, stating that he expected there
would be incidents of individual fraud but not organized
interference in the campaign.


5. (C) Maysan politics. Saadoun, who played a helpful role
in responding to the violent 2004 Sadr insurgency in Maysan,
said stability in the province had increased following the
January 2005 elections, when Sadr gained 16 seats in the
provincial council, as well as the governor's seat and the
head of the provincial council. Once they gained a dominant
position in the political process, he explained, they ceased
fighting. He commented that the Sadrist leaders of 2005 are
older and better behaved than the radical youthful leaders of
2003-2004. Saadoun shared his view that the influence of
tribal leaders is waning in the face of competing religious
or political claims. But to Maysan's Shia, he argued, the
voice of the marjaiyah remained paramount. For example, he
said, if a marja' offers one view, and a tribal leader offers
a contradictory view, the members of the tribe are likely to
favor the marja'. Saadoun also predicted that Abu Hatem's
brother, former governor Riyadh al-Mohamedawi, would fail in
the upcoming elections due to his past poor performance. He
complained about the ongoing chaos that characterizes the
relationship between government entities in the provinces and
the national ministries in Baghdad, particularly the unclear
authorities of police chiefs.


6. (C) Comment: There was a noticeable shift in Saadoun's
exchange with poloff (who was assigned to Maysan in 2003-2004
and is well-known to Saadoun),from an open discussion to a
scripted dialogue once a TNA Sadr member sat down at the
table uninvited and joined the discussion. For example,
early in the conversation Saadoun spoke freely to poloff
about the tactical decisions among the various Shia parties
in arranging the coalitions, including the presence of
Sadrists on other lists, but moved to partisan statements
about Allawi's list and electoral fraud once joined by his
colleague. Saadoun also told poloff early in the
conversation that Iran's influence had increased in Maysan
since 2004, but when asked later to describe the forms of
influence, he claimed he had merely said there was an
increase in public awareness of the Iranian role. It appears
that Saadoun -- who was not an exile or mujahid in Iran like
many of Maysan's politicians affiliated with SCIRI, Badr, and
al-Dawa -- has decided to ally with Sadr, and that local
leaders like him are populating lists other than the UIA.
This may explain why he does not share the apprehension
expressed by Dabbagh about UIA conduct.
KHALILZAD