Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BAGHDAD4790
2005-11-30 18:05:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

FORMER EXILE SAYS REAL TEST TO COME WITH POST-

Tags:  PGOV PNAT PHUM IZ 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 004790 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2015
TAGS: PGOV PNAT PHUM IZ
SUBJECT: FORMER EXILE SAYS REAL TEST TO COME WITH POST-
ELECTION PM SELECTION

Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S.
Ford for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 004790

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2015
TAGS: PGOV PNAT PHUM IZ
SUBJECT: FORMER EXILE SAYS REAL TEST TO COME WITH POST-
ELECTION PM SELECTION

Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S.
Ford for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary: Former Iraqi exile Saad Saleh Jabr
predicted that the Sunni victors in the upcoming
elections would ally with Iyad Allawi, providing the
Kurds with a king-making position of supporting either
Allawi or Adel Abdel Mahdi. He complained about
Iranian "control" of key Iraqi factions and geography,
and assessed the USG as incapable of thwarting either
Iranian or Syrian interference in Iraq. End Summary.


2. (C) Poloffs met November 30 with Saad Saleh Jabr
(whose father was a Shia prime minister under King
Feisal II). Jabr, who was an active politician in
exile during the Saddam years, shared his analysis of
the upcoming Iraqi elections. He predicted that the
four major parties -- Shia (Unified Coalition),Kurds
(Kurdish Alliance),Sunni (Tawafuq Front),and Allawi
(Iraqi National List) -- will each win between 40 to
65 seats. Under this scenario, the resulting rough
balance among the four groups will affect the choice
of a prime minister. Jabr expects the Sunni winners
to ally with Allawi. The question will then be what
the Kurds decide to do. Jabr believes that with a
little nudge from the USG, the Kurds will back
Allawi. If not, they will back SCIRI's Adel Abdel
Mahdi. Jabr is certain Jafari will not remain
Prime Minister. He predicted that support among the
Shia for the Unified Coalition would drop
significantly from January (where they gained a
majority of votes). "The Shia masses may be
illiterate but they are not dumb-dumbs," he said,
observing that the Shia government under Prime
Minister Ibrahim al-Jafari had failed to deliver
services or otherwise improve the daily lives of most
Iraqis. Jabr said Ayatollah al-SISTANI would maintain
his decision not to endorse any list, but worried that
unsophisticated Shia would be misled into believing
that SISTANI supported the Unified Coalition, noting
his picture has already been identified with the
list. He confirmed the widely held expectation that
the Sunni community would come out to vote in large
numbers, and dismissed concerns about possible
terrorist violence.


3. (C) Jabr strongly urged the USG to become involved
in the formation of the new government. Poloffs
stressed that the U.S. is committed to the right of
the Iraqi people to choose their government and urged
that Jabr watch the President's speech to be given
later in the day. Jabr criticized the rationale for
what he viewed as a "hands-off approach". "How can
you say you're not involved with thousands of troops
on the ground." He added, "Iran is involved, why not
you?" He also emphasized the four-year time frame of
the new government, which he argued underscores the
need to get it right. Jabr said a primary concern of
voters about the new cabinet will be whether the
ministers are clean (i.e., not corrupt). He predicted
Allawi would win support from the following camps:
those who fear Iranian influence, those who are
secular or distrust religiously aligned political
parties, and those Shia disenchanted with Jafari's
government. In a familiar lament, Jabr recounted that
his father was a Shia and his mother a Sunni, implying
voters like him who regretted the increase in
sectarianism in Iraqi politics would support Allawi.
Acknowledging the injustices done to the Shia by
Saddam, he nonetheless argued this history did not
excuse attempts by Shia leaders to exclude the Sunni
community from Iraqi politics.


4. (C) Jabr expressed regret about complete Iranian
"control" of Iraqi politicians and groups such as
Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, Abdel Mahdi, and Badr Corps, and
of southern Iraq, especially Basra. "Iranian presence
couldn't be any stronger," he asserted. When asked to
provide specific examples of Iranian control, he said
"that is the stupidest question." He said the
Iranians are "laughing at the Americans," and asserted
the USG had no means of thwarting Iranian influence.
He also shared his view that the USG could not affect
Syrian behavior, either. "What can you do," he asked,
"talk louder?" He noted that Iran pays many of these
political leaders as well as "the top 15 clerics"
inside Iraq.
KHALILZAD