FORMER EXILE SAYS REAL TEST TO COME WITH POST-

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 004790 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2015 TAGS: PGOV PNAT PHUM IZ SUBJECT: FORMER EXILE SAYS REAL TEST TO COME WITH POST- ELECTION PM SELECTION Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S. Ford for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Former Iraqi exile Saad Saleh Jabr predicted that the Sunni victors in the upcoming elections would ally with Iyad Allawi, providing the Kurds with a king-making position of supporting either Allawi or Adel Abdel Mahdi. He complained about Iranian "control" of key Iraqi factions and geography, and assessed the USG as incapable of thwarting either Iranian or Syrian interference in Iraq. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Poloffs met November 30 with Saad Saleh Jabr (whose father was a Shia prime minister under King Feisal II). Jabr, who was an active politician in exile during the Saddam years, shared his analysis of the upcoming Iraqi elections. He predicted that the four major parties -- Shia (Unified Coalition),Kurds (Kurdish Alliance),Sunni (Tawafuq Front),and Allawi (Iraqi National List) -- will each win between 40 to 65 seats. Under this scenario, the resulting rough balance among the four groups will affect the choice of a prime minister. Jabr expects the Sunni winners to ally with Allawi. The question will then be what the Kurds decide to do. Jabr believes that with a little nudge from the USG, the Kurds will back Allawi. If not, they will back SCIRI's Adel Abdel Mahdi. Jabr is certain Jafari will not remain Prime Minister. He predicted that support among the Shia for the Unified Coalition would drop significantly from January (where they gained a majority of votes). "The Shia masses may be illiterate but they are not dumb-dumbs," he said, observing that the Shia government under Prime Minister Ibrahim al-Jafari had failed to deliver services or otherwise improve the daily lives of most Iraqis. Jabr said Ayatollah al-Sistani would maintain his decision not to endorse any list, but worried that unsophisticated Shia would be misled into believing that Sistani supported the Unified Coalition, noting his picture has already been identified with the list. He confirmed the widely held expectation that the Sunni community would come out to vote in large numbers, and dismissed concerns about possible terrorist violence. ¶3. (C) Jabr strongly urged the USG to become involved in the formation of the new government. Poloffs stressed that the U.S. is committed to the right of the Iraqi people to choose their government and urged that Jabr watch the President's speech to be given later in the day. Jabr criticized the rationale for what he viewed as a "hands-off approach". "How can you say you're not involved with thousands of troops on the ground." He added, "Iran is involved, why not you?" He also emphasized the four-year time frame of the new government, which he argued underscores the need to get it right. Jabr said a primary concern of voters about the new cabinet will be whether the ministers are clean (i.e., not corrupt). He predicted Allawi would win support from the following camps: those who fear Iranian influence, those who are secular or distrust religiously aligned political parties, and those Shia disenchanted with Jafari's government. In a familiar lament, Jabr recounted that his father was a Shia and his mother a Sunni, implying voters like him who regretted the increase in sectarianism in Iraqi politics would support Allawi. Acknowledging the injustices done to the Shia by Saddam, he nonetheless argued this history did not excuse attempts by Shia leaders to exclude the Sunni community from Iraqi politics. ¶4. (C) Jabr expressed regret about complete Iranian "control" of Iraqi politicians and groups such as Abdel Aziz al-Hakim, Abdel Mahdi, and Badr Corps, and of southern Iraq, especially Basra. "Iranian presence couldn't be any stronger," he asserted. When asked to provide specific examples of Iranian control, he said "that is the stupidest question." He said the Iranians are "laughing at the Americans," and asserted the USG had no means of thwarting Iranian influence. He also shared his view that the USG could not affect Syrian behavior, either. "What can you do," he asked, "talk louder?" He noted that Iran pays many of these political leaders as well as "the top 15 clerics" inside Iraq. KHALILZAD