ANBAR SECURITY CONFERENCE DRAWS STRONG SUNNI

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 004788 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/29/2015 TAGS: PGOV PTER PINS KDEM IZ SUBJECT: ANBAR SECURITY CONFERENCE DRAWS STRONG SUNNI PARTICIPATION; LOCAL LEADERS PUSH FOR ISF LEAD REF: BAGHDAD 4733 Classified By: ROBERT S. FORD, POLITICAL COUNSELOR FOR REASONS 1.4 (B),(D). ¶1. (C) Summary and Comment. During an unprecedented gathering on November 29th, leaders from Ramadi and elsewhere in Anbar province agreed to build Iraqi capacity to take over security in Anbar's cities. Nearly all of the assembled leaders encouraged Anbaris to join the ISF, but there were divided opinions on the optimal degree of "local content" in the Iraqi Army and Police. Several senior ISF commanders spoke frankly of the need to field an integrated (cross-sectarian) army and the necessity of support from the civilian population. An ex-Saddam era Army officer presented a detailed plan for future CF presence in populated areas that involved immediate reductions in CF security operations in the cities and eventual transfer of foreign troops to staging sites outside the cities. Local Sunni Endowment leader Sheikh Dhaher thrust the responsibility for security upon the Anbaris themselves. He disavowed Islam's relation to terrorism and emphasized that the terrorist's end-game is destruction. ¶2. (C) Summary and Comment (cont.) The group agreed to a follow up meeting on December 1, the same day the Independent Electoral Commission Iraq (IECI) will meet in Ramadi as part of its planned outreach. Following the meeting, Anbaris looking for immediate tangible proof of American "sincere intentions" in the form of easing of checkpoints or relaxing vehicle restrictions will most likely be disappointed. We need to emphasize greater Sunni involvement in the impending elections, while sustaining efforts to improve security conditions in the province gradually. Continued engagement will help clarify achievable goals as we reach out to Sunni Arab leaders. End Summary and Comment. ¶3. (C) Two-hundred Anbari technocrats, ex- military officers, tribal sheikhs, provincial officials and citizens braved terrorist threats to attend a conference on November 29 in Ramadi. Senior Iraqi Security Forces (ISF) commanders and CF commanders sat side by side with imams and senior provincial officials during a four and half hour session on establishing sufficient security to permit the withdrawal of the CF from Anbar's cities. 
¶4. (C) Governor Ma'moon Sami Rasheed (al Alwani) was primarily responsible for organizing the event, but the overwhelming turn-out was due at least in part to the support of the province's three most senior imams (reftel). Interim Provincial Police Chief Abdul Kareem again failed to appear in the capital. Fortunately, there were no terror attacks; three indirect fire attacks (mortars) struck harmlessly near the provincial council building and a possible VBIED attack was successfully averted. Building the ISF With the 'Sons of Anbar' -------------- ¶5. (C) Conferees heatedly debated whether Anbar natives should form the majority of recruits for the Iraqi Army units (and, less often mentioned, for the Iraqi Police) in the province. General Hekmet of the 7th Division, IA, himself a native of the western town of Ubaydi, observed that indigenous troops were savvier about the criminal elements in Anbar. Sheikh Anwar Kharbit stated, "Ramadi is not an island," and emphasized that raising ISF units from solely Sunni (or Ramadi'i) sources was not the solution. A lower ranking tribal sheikh, Nasir Abdul Kareem, preached, "Sunni and Shia need to put hand in hand to achieve peace and prosperity in Anbar." ¶6. (C) Ex-military officer Sabah Menfi al-Rawi dredged up the Minister of Defense's controversial quote "Anbar is a safehaven for terrorists," which others later interpreted as "Anbar is a terrorist province." Rawi postulated this statement proves the Ministries of Interior and Defense are involved in a conspiracy to marginalize the Sunni. His plea to reinstate the local former regime military officers (of which there are many, he asserted) held the audience's rapt attention. Debate on Solutions -------------- ¶7. (C) Rawi offered a committee of sheikhs headed by the governor to recruit and vet potential cadre for a "native defense force and police." Rawi suggested that "friction" resulting from the proximity of Coalition Forces and the local populace caused the "armed population" to engage the CF in combat, instead of fighting their real enemy, the insurgents. The forceful ex-officer proposed a series of restrictions on the CF, to include prohibitions on manning checkpoints, conducting raids and foot patrols, accessing the main highways, and leaving the bases unconditionally. Removing the CF to "staging places" outside Anbar's cities would lessen the psychological impact of Coalition troops on the populace. Brigadier General Hekmet noted that the 7th Division was still attempting to recruit an additional 2,000 soldiers from Anbar, which Rawi dismissed as "too little, too late." In the fiery exchange that followed, Rawi claimed Hekmet had been selected and later rejected for command of a unit that was recently deployed to Diyala. Hekmet taunted Rawi (who had admitted consulting with the last two Ministers of Defense),that "no one in Basra or Diyala went whining to the Minister, 'we must have a completely indigenous army.'" Pleading for the support of sheikhs and imams, Hekmet announced, "we are all Iraqi and we're all under occupation". Security and Economics -------------- ¶8. (C) Brigade Commander Colonel Haider of the 1st Division, IA (already stationed in Ramadi) spoke of the unemployed and halted projects. He expressed doubt an Anbar army could guarantee security, because security depends on more than the army; it depends on the civilian population, too. He asked the audience, "now that we have heard your views, what are we going to do?" The Assistant Division Commander, General Williams, reiterated that money and economic development only come with security and offered Falluja as a prime example. ¶9. (C) Sheikh Dhaher of the Anbar Sunni Endownment admonished, "Anbaris must assume responsibility." He suggested that even the Muslim Ulema Council agrees terrorism has nothing to do with Islam. He asked the audience, "What do terrorist attacks reap?" Answering his own query, he stated "destruction". (Comment: Overall our interlocutors do not complain about a disruptive impact of CF operations on economic activity. Far more common are emotional charges of improper treatment or displays of disrespect by troops. In the Anbari mindset (as in much of the Middle East),raiding or "Cordons and Knock" missions -- both of which involve intrusion into the home sanctuary -- are a form of disrespect. End Comment.) ¶10. (C) Participants (Head Table): Iraqi Security Forces: -------------- 7th Iraqi Army Division (due in Anbar in January) General Hekmet Special Police Commando ('Wolf Brigade') Commanding Officer (due in Ramadi in December) Abdul Salam 1st Iraqi Army (7th Brigade) Colonel Haider Provincial Government: -------------- Governor Ma'moon Sami Rasheed (al Alwani) Provincial Council Chairman Khudair Abdel Jabar Provincial Council Deputy Chairman (and Anbar IIP Secretary General) Dr. Abdelsalam al Ani Imams: -------------- Sheik Yassin Muflin al Hambadi of Hit Sheikh Dhaher Mohammed Awad Obaydi Sheikh Thamir Ibrahim Dharer al Assafi Coalition Forces: -------------- Assistant Division Commander General Williams 2BCT Commander Colonel Gronski 6th Civil Affairs Group Governate Support Team Col Burdine 3-7 Brigade Commander LtCol Turner 229 Brigade Commander LtCol Roggeman PP3 (Police Advisor) Major Rice 2MarDiv FAO Capt Aziz SET Officer Lane D. Bahl KHALILZAD