Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05BAGHDAD4435
2005-10-28 12:31:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  

TOP SHIA ISLAMIST LEADER SAYS UNIFIED ELECTION

Tags:  PGOV PHUM IZ 
pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004435 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHUM IZ
SUBJECT: TOP SHIA ISLAMIST LEADER SAYS UNIFIED ELECTION
SLATE DEAL DONE

Classified By: CHARGE DAVID SATTERFIELD, REASON 1.4 (B)
AND (D).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004435

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/28/2015
TAGS: PGOV PHUM IZ
SUBJECT: TOP SHIA ISLAMIST LEADER SAYS UNIFIED ELECTION
SLATE DEAL DONE

Classified By: CHARGE DAVID SATTERFIELD, REASON 1.4 (B)
AND (D).


1. (C) Summary: Senior SCIRI party leader Abdel Mehdi
told Charge midday October 28 that the unified Shia
Islamist party list for the December elections is nearly
ready. The coalition's leaders are rushing to finish the
bottom halves of the provincial election slates, and Abdel
Mehdi anticipated they would make (barely) the October 28
filing deadline. He said that Muqtada Sadr has pledged to
support the Shia Islamist coalition list. Ahmed Chalabi is
not on the list, and some prominent independents from the
Shia coalition in the transitional national assembly, such
as Ali ad-Debbagh, also are absent from the new list. The
coalition's platform calls for strengthening Iraqi security
forces so that "foreign military forces" can be withdrawn
from Iraq. It also urges establishment of regional
entities in central and southern Iraq. Abdel Mehdi doubted
that Ayatollah SISTANI would back this list, but that it
would be the biggest bloc in the future assembly with 100
seats or more in the 275 member assembly. The Kurds would
have no choice but to join with this Shia coalition to set
up the future government, a process that he thought would
go faster than the painful negotiations that established
the transitional government. End Summary.


--------------
Unified Shia Islamist List Almost Done
--------------


2. (C) Deputy President Adel Abdel Mehdi told Charge
October 28 midday that the unified Shia Islamist party
election lists was nearly finished. He said that the top
names for each provincial election slate were finalized,
and as Friday progressed the coalition's leaders were
finishing the bottom halves of the election list. (While
we were talking he received a call about the number eight
slot on the Basra list.) Abdel Mehdi expected to be
finished with the slates in time to meet the October 28
deadline, but he acknowledged it was very hard going.

--------------
Muqtada Sadr In
--------------


3. (C) The Deputy President confirmed that Muqtada Sadr
would support the coalition. He viewed this as a useful
element of a strategy to pull Sadrists out of street
violence and into the political process. He said a big

lesson from 2004 was that it is best to have open
communication with Sadr.

--------------
Chalabi, Independents Out
--------------


4. (C) Abdel Mehdi, a senior SCIRI party leader, said
that many persons lost out ("there were slaughterings") in
the process of building the new coalition. Notably, the
coalition would not include Deputy Prime Minister Ahmed
Chalabi. Abdel Mehdi said the coalition leadership invited
him in, but with only three seats. Chalabi had decided to
pursue his own list, and Abdel Mehdi thought it would be
better for Chalabi to underline his secular credentials
away from the Shia Islamist list. Abdel Mehdi said some
familiar independents, such as Ali ad-Dabbagh, also would
not be in the coalition, as well as some small Islamist
parties like the Islamic Action Organization. Parliament
Deputy Speaker Husayn Shahristani is in the coalition.

-------------- --------------
Platform OK on Coalition Forces, Urges Federalism
-------------- --------------


5. (C) Abdel Mehdi let us review briefly the draft
coalition election platform (three pages single-spaced in
Arabic). It pledged to strengthen the capabilities of the
Iraqi security forces so that foreign military forces,
necessary in the past, can be withdrawn. It also calls for
implementing CPA order 91 about qualifying members of
"armed groups that had fought the previous regime -
militias" into the security services. The platform calls
for rapid movement towards establishing regional entities
in the "center and south" of Iraq. It pledged to implement
article 58 of the transition law (about Kirkuk) and
"correction" of borders to end disputes among Iraqis.

--------------
Faster Stand Up of New Government ?
--------------


6. (C) Abdel Mehdi recognized that there was some
dissatisfaction with the performance of the Jafari
government, and this might reduce its strength. He also
stated that Ayatollah SISTANI would not back the list and
would stay out of the election race.


7. (C) Nonetheless, Abdel Mehdi anticipates that the Shia
Islamist coalition will win 100 seats or more. He expected
the coalition to be the largest bloc in the future national
assembly and that it would choose the next prime minister.
Acknowledging that he was a lead candidate, Abdel Mehdi
noted that current Prime Minister Jafari has not
relinquished the idea of staying in the job. Abdel Mehdi
doubted that Jafari could get the votes even within his own
Da'wa party, much less within the larger Shia Islamist
coalition. The coalition would likely choose its prime
ministerial nominee during the campaign, and Abdel Mehdi
predicted that negotiations about the future permanent
government could start even during the campaign. He
anticipated it would be an easier set of negotiations than
were the prolonged discussions in the spring of 2005
setting up the transitional government. The Kurds would
have no choice but to cut a deal with the Shia Islamist
coalition, he predicted. Abdel Mehdi didn't rule out
former Prime Minister Allawi playing a role in the
permanent government but not as prime minister.


8. (C) Charge said the U.S. had serious concerns about
whether a unified Shia Islamist list would not aggravate
the polarization within Iraqi society between Sunni Arabs,
Shia and Kurds as well as secularists and Islamists. He
urged Abdel Mehdi as a top leader of the coalition to find
ways to reach out even during the campaign to ease this
problem. Abdel Mehdi said the polarization is an unhappy
fact in Iraq now. The Shia Islamist coalition would have
to first tend to its base, but he acknowledged the utility
of reaching out earlier, not later. Charge also underlined
that the U.S. wants to see an effective, capable
government. We prefer no repeats of the problems that have
hurt ministries like Interior and Health. In specific,
there must not be party or militia control or perceived
control of ministries - especially the security ministries.
This meant Badr and the Mahdi Army need to stay out. Abdel
Mehdi pushed back hard initially, saying that there were
still too many Baathists in the ministries. He asked for
understanding that Iraq was still undergoing a
transformation from Sunni and Baathist rule. Charge
stressed that the issue was loyalty to the state and
professional competence. Abdel Mehdi accepted the point.
It was important for Shia and Kurds to be adequately
represented in the ministries, but - he said - the time for
constant purges of personnel was past - as the Alliance
platform document confirmed.

--------------
Comment
--------------


9. (C) Evidently self-satisfied, Abdel Mehdi acknowledged
that "two days ago we didn't know if we could achieve this
list." The impact of the list on the December 15 elections
and the next government will be significant. As we have
reported, the Kurds have assembled a unified list, and the
Sunni Arabs also have set up one major coalition list as
well. We will send a separate analysis of the factors
impelling Iraqi political forces to establish lists around
ethnic and sectarian lines.


Satterfield