TNA MEMBER QASSIM DAOUD ON THE REFERENDUM,

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 004305

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/17/2015
TAGS: PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: TNA MEMBER QASSIM DAOUD ON THE REFERENDUM,
COALITION BUILDING FOR THE ELECTION

REF: BAGHDAD 4270

Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S. Ford
for Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D)


1. (C) SUMMARY: Political positioning to build
coalitions for the December election has begun in
earnest, and fears of significant Sunni Arab or Shia
Islamist gains in December may have led to a thaw
between former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi and TNA
Constitution Committee member and former ally Qassim
Daoud. Daoud still appears to be leaning toward an
alliance with SCIRI, however, in the hopes that he
would be a moderating, secular influence. Daoud
reported on the rumors of various alliances, and
indicated his own campaign had started with a planned
meeting with SISTANI on October 19. Daoud also
pressed for an extension on the October 21 deadline
for registering coalitions, but PolOffs cautioned that
drawing out the election process would be difficult.
END SUMMARY.


2. (C) On October 17, PolOffs met with Constitution
Committee member Qassim Daoud to discuss the
referendum and coalition jockeying for the December 15
election. Daoud stated that he was comfortable with
either a yes or no result in the referendum: if yes,
Iraq would have a constitution; if no, the Sunni Arabs
will have seen that the political process works. At
any rate, he said, the Sunni Arabs are determined to
participate in the election in December.

--------------
(U) An Audience with SISTANI
--------------


3. (C) Daoud mentioned that he was leaving Baghdad
tomorrow to meet with Ayatollah Ali SISTANI in Najaf.
SISTANI's son, Muhammad Ridha SISTANI, had called
Daoud to arrange the meeting. The Sunni Arabs and the
Shia in Iraq would be in conflict for the next fifteen
years at least, Daoud claimed, and therefore SISTANI
would continue to have a significant role in Iraqi
politics. When pressed, Daoud claimed SISTANI had
told him before the referendum that the last time
SISTANI intervened it was on behalf of all Iraqis
(Comment: This is likely a reference to SISTANI's
endorsement of the unified Shia list. End Comment.)
However, such intervention was against the code of the
marja'iyat and at great personal cost. SISTANI stated
that he was not willing to sacrifice his honor as a
member of the marja'iyat again.

--------------
(U) Coalition Building is Underway
--------------


4. (C) Turning to coalition building, Daoud mentioned
that former Prime Minister and ally Ayad Allawi had
called him recently to arrange a reconciliation dinner
this week. Daoud appeared happy at the prospect for
resuming their personal relationship, but stated that
he could never work with Allawi again: "One does not
work with Ayad, one can only work for him and I will
not work for him again." He told us that he could
never understand Allawi's reluctance to work with
SISTANI, claiming one would need "a village of
psychologists" to understand this form of political
suicide. Daoud cautioned us that the failures of
Prime Minister Ja'afari's administration would not
bolster Allawi's standing with the public.


5. (C) He reported that the most interesting recent
rumor he had heard was Dawa's proposed alliance with
Muqtada al-Sadr. Daoud predicted it wouldn't last
long, as al-Sadr was extremely unpredictable. Sadr's
people had come to see Daoud last Thursday, and
allegedly tried to woo him away from SISTANI. When
asked about the possibility of the two Kurdish parties
(the PUK and KDP) merging into one for the elections,
Daoud shrugged and said that Talabani was negotiating
with other parties to ensure that he would retain his
post as President. It would be difficult for Talabani
to go back to Sulymaniyah after this, Daoud claimed,
and KDP leader Masud Barzani would never willingly
share power with PUK leader Talabani in the north.
(Comment: REO Kirkuk reports that all parties assure
us KDP and PUK will definitely run together in
December, probably in alliance with Allawi. Barzani
will have to share power with PUK if he wants to have
any say over the Sulaymaniyah part of Kurdistan
Region. End Comment.)


6. (C) For his part, Daoud said that Dawa, Fadilah,
Hussein al-Sharistani, Ali al-Dabbagh, and SCIRI had
come to him offering alliances with his moderate
secular party. He reiterated his intention to ally
with SCIRI, stating that Vice-President Adil Abd al-
Madhi was the best choice to be the next Prime
Minister. PolOffs questioned Daoud on how he planned
to maintain his small party's moderate identity, and
he claimed that SCIRI was the most moderate and
liberal party in Iraq. He was less upbeat, however,
on the issue of SCIRI's relationship with Iran and
admitted that this was a problem. Daoud claimed not
to have talked about specific portfolios in a
potential alliance with SCIRI, but later disclosed
that he wanted a pan-security oversight role, similar
to that of the U.S. Homeland Security director, with
oversight over the Ministries of Defense, Interior,
National Security and Intelligence.


7. (C) When PolOffs mentioned SCIRI's and Fadilah's
scheduled participation in Allawi's conference,
however, Daoud claimed that Nadim al-Jabiri did not
really speak for Fadilah (see ref). As for SCIRI,
Daoud claimed to have an understanding with SCIRI
leader Abd al-Aziz al-Hakim.


--------------
(U) Seeking An Extension
--------------


8. (C) Finally, Daoud pressed for an extension to the
October 21 deadline for registering political parties
and coalitions. Claiming that there was no time to
properly investigate coalition opportunities during
the constitution negotiations and the referendum,
Daoud complained that a week was not enough time to
finalize the delicate negotiations that coalition
building required. PolOffs cautioned that the
timeline would be difficult to change much. The U.S.
strongly supported the December 15 election date, they
noted.

--------------
(U) Comment
--------------


9. (C) Daoud is a reliable conduit on the various
rumors and relationships of Iraqi politics, and his
policy of engaging with all sides gives him access to
a wide range of information on all sides. The
possibility of reconciliation between Allawi and
Daoud is an encouraging sign that the moderate
liberals may not be hopelessly fractured. Daoud's
pride prevents him allying with Allawi, however, and
he seems to have grasped onto SCIRI as a way of
gaining a ministerial post. It is doubtful that he
could moderate SCIRI as he claims, and it appears that
in his more honest moments he is truly concerned about
being linked to a party that has such close ties to
Iran.
Satterfield