WATCH SALAH AD-DIN AND NINEWA PROVINCES TO

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 004200

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/11/2015
TAGS: PGOV PNAT PHUM IZ
SUBJECT: WATCH SALAH AD-DIN AND NINEWA PROVINCES TO
DETERMINE FATE OF THE DRAFT CONSTITUTION

REF: A. (A) BAGHDAD 3898

B. (B) BAGHDAD 4090

C. (C) BAGHDAD 4143

D. (D) MOSUL 149

E. (E) BAGHDAD 572

F. (F) KIRKUK 205

Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S. Ford for
Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) SUMMARY. A last-minute political compromise
to elicit Sunni Arab leader public expressions of
support for the Constitution could help ensure its
passage in the October 15 referendum. That deal
apparently is sealed. Were it to fall through, the
outcome of the referendum will probably be very close
in a couple of predominantly Sunni Arab provinces. If
three provinces see 2/3 of voters reject the draft, it
will fail as per the Transition Administrative Law.
Poll results and other data indicate that three
provinces - Anbar, Ninewa and Salah ad-Din - may vote
against the draft by sufficient margins to reach that
2/3 threshold. Polling, done well before the last-
minute constitution deal, suggests Anbar and Ninewa's
large Sunni Arab majorities will vote solidly against
the constitution. Ninewa's Kurdish minority appears
too small to stem the anti-constitution vote in Ninewa
alone. Salah ad-Din, a province with a Sunni Arab
majority and a significant Shia minority, would appear
to be the key swing province. Violence that targets
and intimidates Sunni "no" voters or Shia "yes" voters
could be decisive in moving the results a couple of
percentage in points in either direction. If public
backing for the constitution from Sunni Arab Islamist
leaders at the last minute swings a few percentage
points of the Sunni Arab vote, that too could be
decisive in keeping Ninewa and Salah ad-Din provinces
from reaching the 2/3 rejection threshold. End
Summary.

Poll Results Consistent
--------------


2. (C) Three statistically valid polls conducted
during September by the International Republican
Institute (IRI),INR, and the UN consistently show
that the no vote on the October 15 referendum is
significant in the heavily Sunni Arab populated areas
of Ninewa (ranging from 89 to 95 percent),Salah ad-
Din (from 64 to 77 percent) and Diyala (36 to 49
percent). No polling was conducted in Anbar province
for security reasons. If two-thirds of voters in
three or more provinces vote no in the referendum, the
Constitution will be defeated, triggering elections
for a new transitional government.

Anbar
--------------


3. (C) The only data available from the heavily Sunni
Arab Anbar province, where security considerations
prevent regular polling, comes from surveys conducted
by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) of
participants in constitutional outreach events in
September and October. Though non-scientific (the
sample is not unbiased),it does provide a measure of
the views of likely voters who have taken the time to
become more acquainted with the provisions of the
draft Constitution. Over 91 percent of 2,551 survey
respondents in Anbar planned to vote no, up from 84
percent of 1,317 respondents a week earlier.
Provincial and Baghdad contacts widely expect the
constitution to fail there.

Ninewa
--------------


4. (C) The results of all polls from Ninewa province
consistently show an overwhelming no vote among likely
referendum voters. The UN poll of very likely voters
in Mosul puts the no vote at over 95 percent; an INR
poll puts the no vote in the city at 92 percent.
IRI polling in the entire province puts the "no" vote
at 94 percent. INR puts the provincial "no" vote at 89
percent. Since there is a sizable Kurdish and
Christian minority in the province, the scale of the
"no" vote (ranging from 89-95 percent) raises
questions about bias in the sample size. The
unscientific NDI survey results show a more modest
(though still significant) no vote of 79 percent of
5,962 respondents, down from 81 percent of 1,799 a
week earlier.


5. (C) Only 17 percent of eligible voters turned out
for the January TNA elections that were generally
boycotted by the Sunnis (compared to turnouts of 92
percent and 84 percent respectively in the heavily
Kurdish provinces of Dohuk and Erbil). This suggests
that more than 80 percent of the voters in Ninewa may
be Sunni Arabs. If most Ninewa Sunni Arabs turn out
on October 15, and roughly 75 - 80 percent vote
against the draft, the outcome will be near and could
surpass the all-important 2/3 threshold. Our
Christian community contacts suggest the Christians
will vote against the draft too; if they do so in
large numbers they will help cancel out the Kurdish
"yes" vote (reftels C and D).


6. (C) There were credible charges of vote rigging and
other electoral irregularities in Ninewa province in
January. The Independent Electoral Commission of Iraq
(IECI) is using Iraqi security forces to help deliver
materials - just as it did in January when these
forces were accused of unscrupulous vote rigging (see
ref E). There is, therefore, the risk again of vote
fraud. Fuad Hussein, Chief of Staff to Kurdish
President Barzani, confidently told PolCouns October 9
that the pro-constitution camp will prevail in Ninewa.
PolCouns strongly cautioned Hussein against vote
irregularities such as those seen in January, urging
Hussain to help ensure the referendum is credible.
Hussein appeared unimpressed.

Salah ad-Din
--------------


7. (C) Polls show Salah ad-Din on the brink of a "no"
vote, which given the outlook in Anbar and Ninawa
could spell defeat for the Constitution. However, the
margin in Salah ad-Din is close enough to make the
province the key battleground in the referendum. The
UN poll of very likely voters in Tikrit in early
September showed 64 voting no with 26 percent
undecided. The IRI poll from mid-September indicated
that 66 percent would vote "no" in Salah ad-Din.
INR's poll from the third week in September put the no
vote at 77 percent for Salah ad-Din provinces and 49
percent for Tikrit/Baquba. There was a slight hint
that the number of persons planning to vote against
the constitution in Salah ad-Din was dropping in early
October: an unscientific NDI survey in October
indicated that 66 percent of 6,008 respondents would
vote against the draft, down from 74 percent of 3,983
respondents a week earlier. Only 29 percent of
eligible voters took part in the January 2005 TNA vote
indicating a sizable Sunni bloc in the province.

Diyala
--------------


8. (C) Poll results in Diyala, which show a no vote
ranging from 36 to 49 percent among very likely
voters, are still sufficiently high to warrant
attention. Only 33 percent of eligible voters turned
out in the January TNA election indicating that a
sizable Sunni electorate may be able to swing the
district into the no category, though likely not with
a sufficient margin to defeat the Constitution. The
IIP is campaigning hard in Diyala to mobilize a no
vote (reftel F).

Kurds Confident, Shia Apprehensive
--------------


9. (C) Kurdish leaders such as Fuad Hussein (para 6)
are publicly confident that the referendum will be
successful. However, Shia and Kurdish leaders have
expressed worry that carefully targeted terrorist
attacks will deter Shia voters from getting to the
polls (reftel B). Notably, they highlighted concerns
about Salah ad-Din. In response, the TNA passed a
since-reversed highly prejudicial resolution that
defined voters in such a way as to ensure approval of
the constitution. The incident underscored the
uncertainty, despite confident utterances, felt by the
Kurd/Shia governing coalition about the prospects of
voter intimidation in Salah ad-Din and other areas.


10. (C) Well-connected Shia politician Ali Debbagh
told PolCouns on October 10 that Grand Aytollah
SISTANI will issue a special statement to urge his
followers to vote yes in the referendum. The call has
been delayed because, as one Shia interlocutor put it,
"the Constitution is not yet finished."

Tipping the Balance - Turnout, Violence, Fraud
-------------- -


11. (C) Many Sunni leaders, especially from the
National Dialogue Group and the Iraqi Islamic Party
had gone public with their campaign urging voters to
reject the constitution. National advertising
campaigns, including newspaper ads and posters urging
a "no" vote are in full swing in many Sunni Arab
areas.


12. (C) The last minute political compromise to garner
Sunni Arab politicians' public support for the
Constitution could help chances of its passage in the
referendum. This would be particularly true if the
head of the Sunni Waqf instructed imams to publicly
express support for the compromise, something he has
privately indicated he may do if the Iraqi Islamic
Party also supports the draft. From the above polling
data, it appears that a swing of even a few percent in
the Sunni Arab vote could keep Salah ad-Din and Ninewa
from reaching the critical 2/3 "no" voter threshold.
Barring that, other factors could tip the balance.
Violence in the next few days in key Sunni cities such
as Tikrit, Samarra, and Mosul could constrain the
Sunni Arab voter turnout. Similarly, violence against
Shia - more likely - in Salah ad-Din towns such as
Balad, Bayji, Tuz Khurmato and Dijayl, and Diyala
towns like Balad Ruz, Baqubah, and Khalis could limit
the Shia "yes" vote turnout.
Khalilzad