INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) PHYSICAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 003894 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/20/5015 TAGS: IZ KNNP PGOV PREL IAEA SUBJECT: INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY (IAEA) PHYSICAL INVENTORY VERIFICATION (PIV) OF THE TUWAITHA NUCLEAR MATERIALS STORAGE COMPLEX REF: A. STATE 151568 ¶B. STATE 167787 Classified By: Acting Counselor for Political-Military Affairs Evan G. Reade for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (U) An IAEA Safeguards team out of Vienna conducted their required safeguard physical inventory verification of the Tuwaitha nuclear materials storage facility from 17-18 September, in coordination with Iraqi Ministry of Science and Technology officials and scientists. The team consisted of five inspectors from the IAEA Department of Safeguards, accompanied by Alexander Riedy, Technology Integration Manager for the Nuclear Science and Technology Division of Oak Ridge National Laboratory. ¶2. (U) As directed by reftels, PolMilOff coordinated with MNF-I Corps Chemical Officers, UNAMI officials and MNF-I Liaison Officers to UNAMI to ensure that all security, transport and miscellaneous exigencies were taken care of. PolMilOff accompanied the inspection team and Mr. Riedy to the Tuwaitha Storage Complex to ensure that any unforeseen issues could be resolved. Poor planning by Iraqi officials from the Ministry of Science and Technology (MoST) made coordination difficult, especially because they were not prepared for the visit. ¶3. (C) Upon arrival at the storage facility, PolMilOff and the IAEA delegation discovered that the Iraqi government had placed 12-foot high concrete barriers around the two storage facilities, such that no one could enter. It was apparent that the Iraqi government had not properly maintained the facility, and had made no preparations for the IAEA inspection. Their failure to have machinery available to move the concrete barriers was a delay to the inspection. Additionally, their lack of upkeep of the facility was shown because several of the locks for the storage facility doors were rusted shut. MNF-I assets provided the generator, which powered lights still within the facility, because the Iraqis claimed that they had no resources for electricity to the site. ¶4. (C) In addition to verifying the inventory located at Location C, another goal of the inspection was to make progress toward ultimately transitioning control of the Tuwaitha storage facility to Iraqi officials. The Iraqi MoST delegation of 7 persons included personnel from the National Monitoring Directorate and the Hazardous Materials Directorate, as well as a photographer with a video camera. The seven gentlemen from MoST did very little in the way of interacting with the team, predominantly sitting off to the side in the shade and smoking cigarettes. At one point they decided to assist the IAEA team, but disregarded all safety precautions and did not dress in protective clothing. At the end of the inspection the head IAEA representative purposefully reprimanded the head of the MoST team for the general state of disrepair of the facility, as well for the unwillingness of the Iraqi officials to take part in the inspection. The head of the Iraqi MoST team protested that the general state of disrepair was not his fault as he had pushed for funding, but none had been received. ¶5. (U) The mission was a success despite the lack of assistance from the Iraqi MoST team, and the IAEA team was able to conduct their verification inspection, replace the seals to the facility and collect sufficient information for their mandatory report about the state of Iraq,s nuclear material in storage at the Tuwaitha storage facility. Satterfield