AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH MINDEF AL-DULIME

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003628

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2010
TAGS: MOPS PREL PTER PGOV KISL IZ
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S MEETING WITH MINDEF AL-DULIME

Classified By: AMBASSADOR ZALMAY KHALILZAD FOR REASONS 1.4 (b) AND (d).


1. (C) SUMMARY: The Ambassador, accompanied by A/DCM, met
with Iraqi MinDef Dulime on September 3. They discussed low
Sunni representation in the Iraqi Army, including pressure to
fire one of two Sunni division commanders. Also discussed
were efforts to enhance western security, with the idea of
using local tribes under MOD authority to augment security
operations. Dulime raised his long term goal of
standardizing Iraqi Army equipment -- ideally with U.S. gear
-- although for now he has to settle for cheaper Russian-type
weapons. He also recommended drawing in certain Iraqi
Islamic Party members to build Sunni support for the draft
constitution. END SUMMARY.


2. (C) In a cordial meeting at his residence on September 3,
the Ambassador, accompanied by A/DCM, met with Iraqi MinDef
Sadoun al-Dulime. Discussion began with Dulime dispelling a
rumor that he was to be replaced as MinDef, with him
confirming that his position was secure.

SHIA-DOMINATED MOD
--------------


3. (C) Discussion then turned to lack of Sunni representation
in the MOD. Dulime, a Sunni, confirmed the high proportion -
70 percent, he said - of Shia personnel in the Ministry,
including that four of ten division commanders are Shia
(three are Kurd, one is a Turcoman). He also confirmed that
he was under pressure from the PM to fire MG Mahmoud
al-Shamiri, Baghdad Division Commander and one of the two
Sunni division commanders. Shamiri was being fired because
he had relieved a Shia brigade commander and two Shia
battalion commanders, who were Islamists. These three were
replaced with Shia, but not Islamists. A SCIRI National
Assembly member, Jalal Al-Saghiri, had called repeatedly for
Shamiri's dismissal.


4. (C) Dulime lamented this action, stating that Shamiri is a
good officer and one of the few Sunnis in senior command. He
added that many Sunnis are eager to join the Iraq Army, but
lack of outreach as well as Shia discrimination prevent many
Sunnis from joining. Dulime and the Ambassador concurred
that better recruitment efforts must be made with the goal of
developing a professional army representative of all of
Iraq's groups -- without MOD and MOI being politicized.

TRIBES - HOW TO USE THEM
--------------


5. (C) Dulime discussed the security situation in western
Anbar province, again raising the idea of bringing local
tribes under MOD authority. He said he could muster up to
5000 individuals, but that one battalion and two companies
(approx. 1200 men) would suffice for now. The Iraqi Army
could supply field grade officers to command these units, he
noted. He particularly referred to the Kata'ib al Hamza
(KH),composed of members of several different western
tribes. The KH had fought against coalition forces in the
past, but avowed to him that they had made a mistake and that
Zarqawi was their real enemy. The Americans will one day
leave, they argued to Dulime; Zarqawi not only will remain,
but he will try to transform the tribes into religious
zealots. Dulime also repeated his confidence in the loyalty
of the Al Bu Mahal tribe, who are also desperate for support
in their efforts to combat Zarqawi units and other takfiris
in the west. Finally, Dulime stated that extremist Mohammad
Mahmud Abd al Latif recently told him that he and his
supporters also opposed the takfiris and Zarqawi affiliates.
While not formally loyalists, Abd al Latif had contributed to
opening registration centers in Ramadi and encouraged popular
participation in the national elections. Abd al Latif merits
attention in the fight against Zarqawi, Dulime concluded.


6. (C) Dulime stated that drawing in local armed tribes to
support government and Coalition security efforts would
effectively complement existing security. Their inclusion
directly under the security force apparatus at MOD would
diffuse any threat they might pose, while increasing security
against insurgents. He contrasted this effort with
authorizing armed militias, which he believed should remain
banned.

STANDARDIZATION OF EQUIPMENT
--------------


7. (C) Dulime said the Iraqi Army eventually should have a
standardized inventory of equipment -- preferably American.
He admitted that American weapons, vehicles, communications
equipment, etc., were very expensive, and he was glad MNSTC-I
was currently providing a lot of it. He regretted, however,
that for Iraq's own purchases, Baghdad had to depend on
cheaper equipment, especially from Eastern Europe. He agreed
that standardized inventories saved money and effort in the
long-run because of the simplicity of acquiring spare parts,
maintenance, tool kits, and training.
CONSTITUTION - GETTING SUNNI SUPPORT
--------------


8. (C) Ambassador said some Sunni Arabs are raising new ideas
to garner more Sunni support for the draft Constitution,
especially regarding Iraq's Arab identity. He mentioned in
particular the notion of alluding to Iraq's founding and
active role in the Arab League, and its commitment to the AL
charter. Dulime was not sure this would be sufficient, but
he indicated the Constitution was a good document, and worth
our efforts. He suggested working with Iraqi Islamic Party
leader Mohsen abd al Hamid, and the party's spiritual
advisor, Husama Tikriti.
Khalilzad