C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BAGHDAD 003455

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2025
TAGS: IZ PGOV PHUM PINS
SUBJECT: PUSHING THE SHIA AND KURDS TO IMPROVE THE DRAFT
CONSTITUTION

REF: BAGHDAD 3449

Classified By: Pol Couns Robert Ford, reason 1.4 (b) and (d)


1. Summary: After a vigorous debate, Shia and Kurdish
political leaders agreed to consider changing the draft
constitution to fix our demand for clearly stated individual
freedom of religion and to clarify that there should be a
goal of no less than 25 percent representation of women in
the National Assembly, rather than a strict quota, as well as
textual changes on federalism and de-Baathification aimed at
garnering at least some Sunni Arab support. Deputy President
Abdel Mehdi and Kurdish leader Rowsch Shaways initially were
sanguine about having a Shia-Kurd constitution deal in hand;
they seemed uninterested in discussing anything further with
even Ayed Allawi's Iraqiya bloc (the third largest in the
National Assembly), much less the Sunni Arab negotiators.
After DCM pushed hard, they agreed to meet with the Sunni
Arabs on August 23 evening. Our initial readout of that
meeting was that the atmospherics were good but there were no
deals on anything in the text. We will track to make sure
the changes we want on religious freedom and women's
representation are put in the text on August 24 while we also
push again for Shia-Kurd engagement with the Sunni Arabs.
End Summary.



2. (C) DCM and poloffs called on Deputy President Abdel
Mehdi, National Assembly Constitution Committee Chair Shaykh
Humam al-Hamudi, Constitution Committee member Sherwan
Wa'ili, Deputy Prime Minister Rowsch Shaways and Constitution
Committee Vice Chair Fuad Masum (the first three Shia
Islamists, the latter two Kurds) August 23 to discuss
improvements to the draft of the Iraqi constitution. The
first issue of contention concerned which copy of the draft
represented the latest version. The DCM asked the Iraqi
interlocutors what draft they considered to be the final
draft. When none of our interlocutors was absolutely
certain, the DCM urged them strongly to get a definitive
draft ready as quickly as possible. They all agreed.
(Comment: The multiplicity of draft texts, and the total
breakdown of confidence between the Shia and Kurd drafters

has made updating and tracking the drafts exceptionally
difficult. End Comment.)

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Pushing for Individuals' Religious Freedom
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3. (C) DCM then urged the group in the strongest terms to
change the language in Section 2, article 41 to include
individual freedom of religion. (The article would then read
"Every individual has freedom of thought, conscience and
religion.") This language mattered to the President and the
Secretary, and the August 23 editorial in the New York Times

SIPDIS
showed it was reaching a broad American audience as well, he
underscored. After a moment of silence, Sherwan Wa'ili said
Islamic Law does not allow a Muslim to leave the Islamic
faith. DCM and poloff emphasized that this language was
found in international pacts, and Iraq could not hope to
pretend to be a leader on human rights without it. Abdel
Mehdi accepted the point and promised to take our proposal to
the Shia Coalition full leadership.


4. (C) DCM also raised the ambiguous language we had seen
concerning the quota reserved for women in the future
national assembly and recommended a technical fix to clarify
it. He also noted that the constitution needed to make clear
that the draft's guarantee of all human rights provided for
in international treaties had to be unconditional, as any
attempt to circumscribe these rights through provisions of
the constitution would constitute unilateral amendments to
Iraq'a treaty obligations, which is prohibited under
international law. Abdel Mehdi understood the improvements
and said they would try to get these approved also.

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Federalism: Worth Getting Sunni Support?
--------------


5. (C) DCM then raised the issue of federalism laid out in
section five. He highlighted the importance to the U.S. and
Iraq of broad support, including from the Sunni Arab
community, for the draft constitution. From our many
meetings with Sunni Arabs, he observed, it is obvious that
federalism is the most sensitive issue. The DCM noted that
simpler language in section five, devoid of all the detail,
would make it easier for Sunni Arab leaders to convince their
own constituencies. It was especially important, he
underlined, that the future national assembly have a role in
determining the shape of federalism in Arab parts of Iraq.
DCM suggested specific fixes to the section that might make
it more palatable to at least some Sunni Arabs.


6. (C) Abdel Mehdi pushed back hard: the Sunni Arabs were
impossible to deal with, and changing one part of the draft
constitution might look easy but would cause dissatisfaction
in the Shia community. DCM agreed that the Sunni Arab
negotiators were hard to work with, but that was not a good
reason for the Shia and Kurds to have avoided meeting them
until almost too late in the process. We also noted that
Shia and Kurdish credibility among the Sunni Arabs, never
high, had plummeted; the Sunni Arabs noticed that U.S.
diplomats met them more often than their fellow Shia and Kurd
negotiators. Above all, DCM underscored, the draft
constitution should have some measure of Sunni Arab support.
Abdel Mehdi asked whether we could guarantee that support.
DCM responded that while we could not guarantee support, if
the Shia and Kurds made no effort to meet some core Sunni
Arab demands we could guarantee the Sunni Arabs would not
support the constitution.


7. (C) Kurdish leader Rowsch Shaways remained apparently
unmoved and said the draft constitution deal was structured
such that changing one section could unravel the deal in
other parts. Abdel Mehdi then emphasized that the Shia
Coalition leaders want the right to set up one or more
regional entities like the one the Kurds have. PolCouns
noted that we have stressed the Sunni Arabs must acknowledge
the right of governorates to join into regional entities even
if the actual implementation is delayed. Abdel Mehdi swept
this aside. The next national assembly is an "unknown" in
terms of who would dominate it. Ultimately, however, he and
Rowsch agreed to take the language back to their leaders.

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De-Baathification Language Not Necessary
--------------


8. (C) Lastly, DCM urged that the language in section 6,
article 145 about the continued operation of the
de-Baathification commission be removed. The commission is
already working, he noted, and its operations do not depend
in any way on the constitution. Sunni Arabs have highlighted
to us, however, that this article is provocative to Sunni
Arabs seeking language that instead promotes national
reconciliation. We suggested alternate language that calls
for the Iraqi judicial system to punish those responsible for
crimes committed against the Iraqi people during the previous
regime in accordance with Iraqi law. Abdel Mehdi argued that
elements in the Shia community would not support the
constitution without such language. DCM said there was less
a question about support for the constitution among the Shia
community than among the Sunni Arab community.

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Comment
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9. (C) None of the Shia and Kurds appeared interested in
engaging even Ayed Allawi's Iraqiya group, the National
Assembly's third-largest bloc, on refinements to the draft
constitution, much less engaging with the Sunni Arabs.
Instead, they appear to have concluded that they control the
National Assembly now and can take the text to the referendum
where they are certain the Sunni Arabs cannot muster a
two-thirds vote in three governorates to block its passage.
After the Ambassador weighed in to Abdel Mehdi with a phone
call, the Shia Islamist Deputy President agreed to host a
group of the Sunni Arabs to dinner August 23. Shia
independent Ali Debbagh, also at the dinner, told PolCouns
late August 23 that the atmospherics were good, but no deals
were reached. Sunni Arab negotiator Salah Mutlak said the
initial discussions were unpleasant but as the dinner wore on
the atmosphere improved and by the end the Shia and Sunni
Arabs had agreed on much. He concluded that the two sides
are "not far" apart on agreed language on federalism. We
have heard such kinds of optimism before only to see apparent
deals founder, and the gaps this time appear to be very wide.
We will be vigorously tracking both the textual changes and
the discussions between the Shia, Kurds and Sunni Arabs on
August 24.
Khalilzad