BUILDING A HOUSE ON SHIFTING SANDS--IRAN'S

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BAGHDAD 003015

SIPDIS

NOFORN

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2015
TAGS: PINS PREL MCAP MOPS PGOV IZ IR
SUBJECT: BUILDING A HOUSE ON SHIFTING SANDS--IRAN'S
INFLUENCE IN IRAQ'S CENTER-SOUTH

REF: A. QDIA IIR 6 847 0129 05

B. QDIA IIR 6 847 0125 05

C. QDIA IIR 6 847 0130 05

D. QTDX-315/37994-05

E. QDIA IIR 6 847 0056 05

F. QDIA IIR 6 847 0045 05

G. QTD 314/19304-04

H. QTD 314/32440-05

I. TD 315/31532-05

J. QDO TN 04-2236

K. QDIA IIR 6 847 2037 05

L. QDIA IIR 6 847 0104 05

M. QCIOC INFO PAPER 29 MAY 05

N. QDIA IIR 6 847 0036 05

O. QIIR 7 921 1204 05

P. QTD 314/33861-05

Q. QDIA IIR 6 847 0098 05

R. QDIA IIR 6 847 0099 05

S. QDIA IIR 6 847 0117 05

T. QTD 314/31456-05

U. QSCID IIR 6 110 0040 05

V. QSCID IIR 6 110 0132 05

W. QNGIC-1843-7026-05

X. QCIOC INFO PAPER 21 JUN 05

Y. QCIOC INFO PAPER 02 JUN 05

Z. QSCID IIR 6 110 0055 05

Classified By: Charge d' Affaires David M. Satterfield for reasons 1.4
(b)
and (d)


1. (S//NF) Summary. Despite the relative spirit of
democratic cooperation demonstrated by the Shia parties that
dominate the governing coalition in Iraq, some of these
parties and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps - Qods
Force (IRGC-QF),Iran's vanguard political and unconventional
warfare organization, are waging a multi-dimensional campaign
to shape the geopolitical dynamic in central and southern
Iraq. The operational thrusts of this campaign are to support
financially the dominance of pro-Iranian Shia political
parties at the national and provincial levels; consolidate
the authority of the Badr militia over the security
environment in specific regions of interest; promote an
extreme Shia-Islamic social order in the southernmost
provinces using intimidation and violence if necessary; and
develop the capability to disrupt, through force of arms, the
ability for Coalition Forces to master the security
situation. As the Sunni insurgency, responsible for the
preponderance of kinetic attacks, commands the attention of
the Coalition, the Shia-dominated regions appear deceptively
tranquil. But beneath this relative calm, benign surface,
exists a dark undercurrent of aggressive IRGC activity
detrimental to U.S. interests. Steps should continue to be
taken to mitigate IRGC activity in order to establish
democracy in Iraq on firmer ground. End Summary.

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A KINDER, GENTLER ISLAMIC REVOLUTION
--------------


2. (S//NF) The United Iraqi Alliance's (UIA) electoral
success and the formation of the Iraqi Transitional
Government (ITG) have given rise to significant anxiety about
possible Iranian-backed Shia-Islamist influence in the
government, particularly in the security services. Thus far,
the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
(SCIRI) has tempered the revolutionary agenda and proved
accommodating in both its political rhetoric and actions
within the ITG. For example, as anticipated in previous
reporting (REFTEL BAGHDAD 1403),at the national level, the
SCIRI, and more generally the UIA, has eschewed radical moves
within the security services. Minister of Interior Bayan
Jabr, a SCIRI party member with reportedly strong
associations to the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and
Security (MOIS),has conducted himself like a dedicated,
professional technocrat. Though accusations have been leveled
at him for purging Sunni officials from the ministry, it can
be argued that these actions served to streamline the
institution rather than effect any sectarian vendetta (REFTEL
BAGHDAD 2376). Similar restraint has been demonstrated in the
Ministry of Defense. (NOTE. In what may be a reversal of this
well-modulated trend, the ITG is now reported to be exploring
close, cooperative relationships with the MOIS and planning
to transform the office of the State Ministry of National
Security into a new Ministry. Patterned after the MOIS, it
would supplant the existing Iraqi National Intelligence
Service, viewed by the ITG as politically unreliable. REFTEL
BAGHDAD 3001. END NOTE.) (REF. A, B)


3. (S//NF) On the broader political front, SCIRI politicians
have openly disavowed the Iranian model of the Islamic
jurisprudent, 'velayat e-faqih,' as a model for Iraq and at
present espouse progressive democratic ideals sonorous to the
ears of Western diplomats (REFTEL 0312). Whether or not this
represents a genuine political reengineering of SCIRI's
Islamic revolutionary foundation or is a well-orchestrated
show of expediency, it appears to originate from within the
party rather than through the invisible hand of Tehran. That
SCIRI's policy decisions are motivated more by an internal
political calculus (and not by a foreign agenda which may or
may not be convergent) suggests progress in Iraq's democratic
consolidation.


4. (S//NF) Despite SCIRI's cooperative disposition, its
financial sponsorship by the IRGC-QF and other Iranian
sources has markedly degenerative consequences for the
process of democratization. In 2005, Iranian sources,
including the IRGC-QF, reportedly supported SCIRI and its
affiliates with approximately $100 million; $45 million was
specifically allocated to its militia arm, the Badr Corps,
which recast itself as a political party, the Badr
Organization, for participation in the January elections.
(COMMENT. This report will use the term 'Badr militia'. END
COMMENT.) The economic horsepower that SCIRI and its alliance
partners wield has effectively squelched more liberal,
secular voices within the Shia constituency. Shia moderate
politicians hoping to achieve some level of political
participation are now faced with the choice of either
compromising their ideals and allying themselves with
Iranian-backed parties or simply watching developments from
the sidelines (REFTEL BAGHDAD 2805). As SCIRI and its
partners "play the game" in line with U.S. interests,
unchecked IRGC-QF and other Iranian patronage ensures that
the Shia political spectrum is conclusively dominated by
political parties that are at least sympathetic, if not
entirely beholden, to their financial benefactors. (REF. A,
C, D)

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CHANGING OF THE GUARD - BADR SECURES THE PROVINCES
-------------- --------------


5. (S//NF) In contrast to the relative calm at the
national-level, trouble has been brewing in the provinces.
Almost immediately after their electoral victories, the new
SCIRI-dominated Provincial Councils moved to replace
non-partisan police chiefs in the region extending from the
Iranian border west through Wasit and Qadisiyah provinces to
the holy city of Najaf. This occurred with relative
efficiency in Qadisiyah, while in Najaf the governor used
Badr militia forces to install forcibly the favored
replacement (who was then killed, ironically enough, in the
associated gunfight; the deputy governor, a senior Badr
militia officer, later assumed the role of police
chief)(REFTEL BAGHDAD 1463). A tense situation remains in
Wasit where the police chief, despite consistent maneuvers by
the SCIRI-led provincial council to oust him, is standing
firm and refusing to vacate his post bolstered by a loyal and
formidable special police unit. While some degree of legal
ambiguity exists in such cases regarding the respective
authorities of the Provincial Councils (PCs) and the central
MOI under CPA Order 71, the prevailing opinion is that the
PCs (and to an extent the MOI) have transgressed the spirit
of the existing legislation (REFTEL BAGHDAD 2210). In
general, the overriding tone of the SCIRI-dominated PCs in
South-Central Iraq is one of defiant independence, and moves
to entrench Badr militia stalwarts into the local security
services have been scarcely concealed. (REF. E, F, G)


6. (S//NF) Beneath these maneuvers, which at least assume a
thin mantle of legitimacy, run efforts to expand the
non-official security role of the Badr militia, initially
conceived by the Iranians as an adjunct to the IRGC-QF
Ramazan Corps (responsible for unconventional warfare
operations in Iraq) and now designated as an independent
paramilitary organization within the IRGC-QF structure.
Collateral reporting indicates that SCIRI has sanctioned the
use of vehicular Badr militia patrols and checkpoints
throughout Baghdad to provide security in Shia majority
areas. Moreover, Al-Hakim has reportedly encouraged the
provincial leadership to utilize the Badr militia network to
facilitate more effective security operations and
security-related information sharing across provincial
jurisdictions, an aspect where local police forces are
notoriously weak. (REF. H, I, J)


7. (S//NF) The provincial governor in Najaf, in a probable
expansion of this trend, has inaugurated an ad-hoc 'special
police force' composed primarily of Badr militia personnel.
Also exploring militia-based security options, Minister of
State for National Security Abdul Kareem Al An'zi, a member
of the conservative Shia party Dawa-Tanzim, has chartered a
concept paper for the development of an 'armed neighborhood
watch' composed of private citizens responsible for security
and information gathering in their local communities who
would report to a secret police officer assigned to a
community-level area of responsibility. U.S. IRMO advisors
report that Interior Minister Bayan Jabr has proposed similar
mechanisms to enhance local security. On the one hand, these
could be considered reasonable actions in Iraq's volatile and
deadly environment. However, these deviations from a
developing rule -of law could possibly be more alarming given
the financial sponsorship and likely operational direction of
the Badr militia by the IRGC-QF. (COMMENT: Post is monitoring
SCIRI/Badr-dominated security forces to determine if they are
constraining legitimate political activity. So far, this has
not been detected on a serious scale. END COMMENT.) (REF. J,
K, L)

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MISSISSIPPI BURNING
--------------


8. (S//NF) A different dynamic operates in the steamy
wetlands of the southern Tigris-Euphrates Valley, where
Iranian supported groups like Sayyid Al-Shuhadah, Tha'rallah,
and 15 Sha'aban cultivate their passionate Islamist agenda.
Here, SCIRI does not categorically dominate. Amidst a
virulently anti-Ba'athist climate, the IRGC-QF surrogates vie
for political authority against more nationalist Shia
political parties such as Al-Fadillah and the Islamic Action
Party. (COMMENT. Al-Fadillah took the Basra governorship from
SCIRI in the recent elections, demonstrating that there are
other Shia Islamist alternatives that can compete. SCIRI's
association with Iran led many to vote against the groups
supported by Iran. END COMMENT) The machinations of SCIRI and
Badr to obtain influence are a comparatively well-tempered
sideshow to the back-alley violence and intimidation wielded
by the IRGC's more aggressive proxies.


9. (S//NF) The genesis of these groups is not altogether
clear. Reporting suggests that Sayyid Al-Shuhadah (Lord of
the Martyrs),was formed by a nucleus of Badr intelligence
operatives in the early 1990s and remained in relative
obscurity until the U.S. invasion. Either as a splinter group
of Sayyid Al-Shuhadah or with their organizational support,
Tha'rallah (Revenge of God) was later conceived, developing
their own uniquely radical character. 15 Sha'aban, named
after the inaugural day of the 1991 uprising, also emerged in
the early 1990s later to surface as a political group after
the fall of Saddam. Despite their hazy origins, these
organizations all share some basic characteristics: a popular
center of gravity in Basra with additional support bases in
the southern cities of Al-Amarah and Nasiriyah, nominal cover
as legitimate political organizations, an extreme Shia
Islamist agenda, a history of patronage from the IRGC-QF, and
a track record of militant activity since the arrival of
Coalition Forces. (REF. M, N, O, P,)


10. (S//NF) Though remaining largely in the shadows, Sayyid
Al-Shuhadah, has been widely reported to facilitate the
transfer of weapons and munitions across the Iranian border
into Iraq and to provide fiscal and logistical support to
more violently inclined groups such as Tha'rallah. Recent
collateral reporting suggests they may be abetting efforts to
assassinate political opponents targeted by IRGC, though
their principal overt activities revolve around the
development of Islamist student or cultural centers in Basra.
Under the fiery leadership of Sayyid Yousif Al Musawi,
Tha'rallah, renowned in the streets of Basra for its thuggery
and demagoguery, generated public attention with the armed,
temporary takeover of the local port of Khor Al-Zubair in
early March 2005 and Tha'rallah's threats to kill the port's
workers. More recently, it has been implicated in the
intimidation and assassination of Sunni Arabs in the southern
provinces and in ongoing attempts to penetrate and control
the Basra police forces. (REF. P, Q, R, S, T)


11. (S//NF) This activity has a distinctly Islamist,
pro-Iranian tenor, and is targeted at political opponents
that are, though Shia and Islamist in stripe, less supportive
of Iranian influence, and targeted more generally at the
population at large in order to project a sense of moral
authority and enforce a rigorously Islamic code of conduct.
Anecdotal reporting about the climate of intimidation and
repression in the southernmost provinces is increasing.
(REF. N)

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TARGETING AMERICANS - THE SHEIBANI NETWORK
--------------


12. (S//NF) Explosively-formed penetrator (EFP) charges,
with a directed metal diaphragm that dynamically transforms
upon detonation into an aerodynamic projectile traveling at
2000 meters per second, can punch through one side of an
armored vehicle and out the other with catastrophic
consequences to occupants inside. In recent months, this
advanced Improvised Explosive Device (IED) technology has
been identified in a growing number of deadly IED attacks
against Coalition Forces throughout southern Iraq. The use of
such devices appears to be expanding. Its introduction into
the Iraq theatre of operations has been directly linked to
the IRGC-backed network of Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani, a former
IRGC-QF agent and Badr intelligence chief. In its cellular
structure and operating methods, the network is reported to
be modeled after Lebanese Hizballah, itself an organization
historically known to be supported by the IRGC-QF. (COMMENT.
EFP technology has been widely used by Hizballah and its
Palestinian surrogates against the Israeli Army. END
COMMENT.) According to a former member of the organization,
Sheibani's organization receives training both in Iraq and
Iran, and Lebanese Hizballah instructors, using excerpts from
professionally developed Hizballah instructional videos, have
taught detailed construction and placement techniques for EFP
IEDs. Evidence also suggests close ties to other IRGC-QF
surrogates such as Sayyid Al-Shuhadah for operational and
logistical support. (REFS. J, U, V, W)


13. (S//NF) Since January 2004, the use of EFP technology
has resulted in an estimated 16 deaths and about 35 wounded
with a 200 percent increase in fatalities over the last
month. Though the overall numbers of IEP/EFP attacks have
been very low compared to those by other identified non-Shia
insurgent groups, the lethality of these attacks with their
capacity to defeat vehicle armor has been extremely high. It
is speculated that Sheibani's organization is only one of
several such IRGC-supported networks that are being
cultivated to maintain a latent capability to direct highly
lethal attacks on Coalition Forces when required. It is also
surmised that the ability to field EFP devices may have
spread to Sunni insurgent elements, and MNF-I is actively
targeting key leaders of Sheibani's elusive network who
transit frequently across the border between Iran and Iraq.
The devastating effects of EFPs on Coalition Forces indicate
that kinetic IRGC-QF activity in Iraq is not limited to
coercion or violence directed at indigenous political
opponents, but also involves a nascent capability and
demonstrated willingness to target American lives. (REFS. X,
Y, Z)

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CONCLUSIONS: COUNTERING THE MANY FACES OF THE IRGC
-------------- --------------


14. (S//NF) Beneath a relative calm, benign surface exists a
dark, menacing undercurrent of aggressive IRGC activity
inimical to U.S. interests in Iraq's center-south. As a
result, present efforts to promulgate democracy and the rule
-of law in Shia-majority areas face particular challenges:

- Iran's (including IRGC's) patronage of SCIRI, Badr, and
other pro-Iranian Shia groups erodes public confidence in the
political process by supplanting genuine public discourse
with Iranian-funded patronage, media propaganda, and bribery.

- The Badr militia's more aggressive activity in
center-south, particularly in Najaf, Karbala, and Qadissiyah
could suppress the restrained, quietist message of the Shia
Marja', typified by Ayatollah Al-SISTANI, that has largely
been a brake against radicalization of the Shia population at
large; overall, Badr's activity degrades the rule -of law.

- Attempts by more radical IRGC-supported groups in the
south to aggressively islamicize local communities undermine
efforts to develop a more civic-oriented, libertarian
political culture, and, if left unchecked, foster more
radical activity.

- Munitions and weapons trafficking supported by the IRGC
continues to be an explicit threat to Coalition Forces and
the ISF and compromises their ability to maintain positive
control of the security environment.


15. (S//NF) We need to continue the following steps to
mitigate these trends:

- Assure vigilance in monitoring the upcoming electoral
processes in the South and thwart any efforts to subvert or
distort them.

- Continue to oppose strenuously the existence of militia
organizations not under the control of the national authority.

- Extend U.S. sponsored democratization programs that
advocate participation, transparency, and accountability into
southern Iraq, not just in predominantly Sunni areas.

- Monitor carefully the eastern Iraqi border with Iran to
stem the illicit transit of people, weapons and ordnance, and
money.

- Demarche the Iranian government on the IRGC's
involvement in insurgent operations in Iraq, and maintain
Iraqi and regional pressure on Iran to live up to its stated
commitment to help ensure a secure and stable Iraq.


15. (U) REO BASRAH, REO HILLAH, REO MOSUL and REO KIRKUK
minimize considered.
Satterfield