BUILDING A HOUSE ON SHIFTING SANDS--IRAN'S

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 05 BAGHDAD 003015 SIPDIS NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/19/2015 TAGS: PINS PREL MCAP MOPS PGOV IZ IR SUBJECT: BUILDING A HOUSE ON SHIFTING SANDS--IRAN'S INFLUENCE IN IRAQ'S CENTER-SOUTH REF: A. QDIA IIR 6 847 0129 05 ¶B. QDIA IIR 6 847 0125 05 ¶C. QDIA IIR 6 847 0130 05 ¶D. QTDX-315/37994-05 ¶E. QDIA IIR 6 847 0056 05 ¶F. QDIA IIR 6 847 0045 05 ¶G. QTD 314/19304-04 ¶H. QTD 314/32440-05 ¶I. TD 315/31532-05 ¶J. QDO TN 04-2236 ¶K. QDIA IIR 6 847 2037 05 ¶L. QDIA IIR 6 847 0104 05 ¶M. QCIOC INFO PAPER 29 MAY 05 ¶N. QDIA IIR 6 847 0036 05 ¶O. QIIR 7 921 1204 05 ¶P. QTD 314/33861-05 ¶Q. QDIA IIR 6 847 0098 05 ¶R. QDIA IIR 6 847 0099 05 ¶S. QDIA IIR 6 847 0117 05 ¶T. QTD 314/31456-05 ¶U. QSCID IIR 6 110 0040 05 ¶V. QSCID IIR 6 110 0132 05 ¶W. QNGIC-1843-7026-05 ¶X. QCIOC INFO PAPER 21 JUN 05 ¶Y. QCIOC INFO PAPER 02 JUN 05 ¶Z. QSCID IIR 6 110 0055 05 Classified By: Charge d' Affaires David M. Satterfield for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d) ¶1. (S//NF) Summary. Despite the relative spirit of democratic cooperation demonstrated by the Shia parties that dominate the governing coalition in Iraq, some of these parties and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps - Qods Force (IRGC-QF),Iran's vanguard political and unconventional warfare organization, are waging a multi-dimensional campaign to shape the geopolitical dynamic in central and southern Iraq. The operational thrusts of this campaign are to support financially the dominance of pro-Iranian Shia political parties at the national and provincial levels; consolidate the authority of the Badr militia over the security environment in specific regions of interest; promote an extreme Shia-Islamic social order in the southernmost provinces using intimidation and violence if necessary; and develop the capability to disrupt, through force of arms, the ability for Coalition Forces to master the security situation. As the Sunni insurgency, responsible for the preponderance of kinetic attacks, commands the attention of the Coalition, the Shia-dominated regions appear deceptively tranquil. But beneath this relative calm, benign surface, exists a dark undercurrent of aggressive IRGC activity detrimental to U.S. interests. Steps should continue to be taken to mitigate IRGC activity in order to establish democracy in Iraq on firmer ground. End Summary. -------------- A KINDER, GENTLER ISLAMIC REVOLUTION -------------- ¶2. (S//NF) The United Iraqi Alliance's (UIA) electoral success and the formation of the Iraqi Transitional Government (ITG) have given rise to significant anxiety about possible Iranian-backed Shia-Islamist influence in the government, particularly in the security services. Thus far, the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) has tempered the revolutionary agenda and proved accommodating in both its political rhetoric and actions within the ITG. For example, as anticipated in previous reporting (REFTEL BAGHDAD 1403),at the national level, the SCIRI, and more generally the UIA, has eschewed radical moves within the security services. Minister of Interior Bayan Jabr, a SCIRI party member with reportedly strong associations to the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS),has conducted himself like a dedicated, professional technocrat. Though accusations have been leveled at him for purging Sunni officials from the ministry, it can be argued that these actions served to streamline the institution rather than effect any sectarian vendetta (REFTEL BAGHDAD 2376). Similar restraint has been demonstrated in the Ministry of Defense. (NOTE. In what may be a reversal of this well-modulated trend, the ITG is now reported to be exploring close, cooperative relationships with the MOIS and planning to transform the office of the State Ministry of National Security into a new Ministry. Patterned after the MOIS, it would supplant the existing Iraqi National Intelligence Service, viewed by the ITG as politically unreliable. REFTEL BAGHDAD 3001. END NOTE.) (REF. A, B) ¶3. (S//NF) On the broader political front, SCIRI politicians have openly disavowed the Iranian model of the Islamic jurisprudent, 'velayat e-faqih,' as a model for Iraq and at present espouse progressive democratic ideals sonorous to the ears of Western diplomats (REFTEL 0312). Whether or not this represents a genuine political reengineering of SCIRI's Islamic revolutionary foundation or is a well-orchestrated show of expediency, it appears to originate from within the party rather than through the invisible hand of Tehran. That SCIRI's policy decisions are motivated more by an internal political calculus (and not by a foreign agenda which may or may not be convergent) suggests progress in Iraq's democratic consolidation. ¶4. (S//NF) Despite SCIRI's cooperative disposition, its financial sponsorship by the IRGC-QF and other Iranian sources has markedly degenerative consequences for the process of democratization. In 2005, Iranian sources, including the IRGC-QF, reportedly supported SCIRI and its affiliates with approximately $100 million; $45 million was specifically allocated to its militia arm, the Badr Corps, which recast itself as a political party, the Badr Organization, for participation in the January elections. (COMMENT. This report will use the term 'Badr militia'. END COMMENT.) The economic horsepower that SCIRI and its alliance partners wield has effectively squelched more liberal, secular voices within the Shia constituency. Shia moderate politicians hoping to achieve some level of political participation are now faced with the choice of either compromising their ideals and allying themselves with Iranian-backed parties or simply watching developments from the sidelines (REFTEL BAGHDAD 2805). As SCIRI and its partners "play the game" in line with U.S. interests, unchecked IRGC-QF and other Iranian patronage ensures that the Shia political spectrum is conclusively dominated by political parties that are at least sympathetic, if not entirely beholden, to their financial benefactors. (REF. A, C, D) -------------- -------------- CHANGING OF THE GUARD - BADR SECURES THE PROVINCES -------------- -------------- ¶5. (S//NF) In contrast to the relative calm at the national-level, trouble has been brewing in the provinces. Almost immediately after their electoral victories, the new SCIRI-dominated Provincial Councils moved to replace non-partisan police chiefs in the region extending from the Iranian border west through Wasit and Qadisiyah provinces to the holy city of Najaf. This occurred with relative efficiency in Qadisiyah, while in Najaf the governor used Badr militia forces to install forcibly the favored replacement (who was then killed, ironically enough, in the associated gunfight; the deputy governor, a senior Badr militia officer, later assumed the role of police chief)(REFTEL BAGHDAD 1463). A tense situation remains in Wasit where the police chief, despite consistent maneuvers by the SCIRI-led provincial council to oust him, is standing firm and refusing to vacate his post bolstered by a loyal and formidable special police unit. While some degree of legal ambiguity exists in such cases regarding the respective authorities of the Provincial Councils (PCs) and the central MOI under CPA Order 71, the prevailing opinion is that the PCs (and to an extent the MOI) have transgressed the spirit of the existing legislation (REFTEL BAGHDAD 2210). In general, the overriding tone of the SCIRI-dominated PCs in South-Central Iraq is one of defiant independence, and moves to entrench Badr militia stalwarts into the local security services have been scarcely concealed. (REF. E, F, G) ¶6. (S//NF) Beneath these maneuvers, which at least assume a thin mantle of legitimacy, run efforts to expand the non-official security role of the Badr militia, initially conceived by the Iranians as an adjunct to the IRGC-QF Ramazan Corps (responsible for unconventional warfare operations in Iraq) and now designated as an independent paramilitary organization within the IRGC-QF structure. Collateral reporting indicates that SCIRI has sanctioned the use of vehicular Badr militia patrols and checkpoints throughout Baghdad to provide security in Shia majority areas. Moreover, Al-Hakim has reportedly encouraged the provincial leadership to utilize the Badr militia network to facilitate more effective security operations and security-related information sharing across provincial jurisdictions, an aspect where local police forces are notoriously weak. (REF. H, I, J) ¶7. (S//NF) The provincial governor in Najaf, in a probable expansion of this trend, has inaugurated an ad-hoc 'special police force' composed primarily of Badr militia personnel. Also exploring militia-based security options, Minister of State for National Security Abdul Kareem Al An'zi, a member of the conservative Shia party Dawa-Tanzim, has chartered a concept paper for the development of an 'armed neighborhood watch' composed of private citizens responsible for security and information gathering in their local communities who would report to a secret police officer assigned to a community-level area of responsibility. U.S. IRMO advisors report that Interior Minister Bayan Jabr has proposed similar mechanisms to enhance local security. On the one hand, these could be considered reasonable actions in Iraq's volatile and deadly environment. However, these deviations from a developing rule -of law could possibly be more alarming given the financial sponsorship and likely operational direction of the Badr militia by the IRGC-QF. (COMMENT: Post is monitoring SCIRI/Badr-dominated security forces to determine if they are constraining legitimate political activity. So far, this has not been detected on a serious scale. END COMMENT.) (REF. J, K, L) -------------- MISSISSIPPI BURNING -------------- ¶8. (S//NF) A different dynamic operates in the steamy wetlands of the southern Tigris-Euphrates Valley, where Iranian supported groups like Sayyid Al-Shuhadah, Tha'rallah, and 15 Sha'aban cultivate their passionate Islamist agenda. Here, SCIRI does not categorically dominate. Amidst a virulently anti-Ba'athist climate, the IRGC-QF surrogates vie for political authority against more nationalist Shia political parties such as Al-Fadillah and the Islamic Action Party. (COMMENT. Al-Fadillah took the Basra governorship from SCIRI in the recent elections, demonstrating that there are other Shia Islamist alternatives that can compete. SCIRI's association with Iran led many to vote against the groups supported by Iran. END COMMENT) The machinations of SCIRI and Badr to obtain influence are a comparatively well-tempered sideshow to the back-alley violence and intimidation wielded by the IRGC's more aggressive proxies. ¶9. (S//NF) The genesis of these groups is not altogether clear. Reporting suggests that Sayyid Al-Shuhadah (Lord of the Martyrs),was formed by a nucleus of Badr intelligence operatives in the early 1990s and remained in relative obscurity until the U.S. invasion. Either as a splinter group of Sayyid Al-Shuhadah or with their organizational support, Tha'rallah (Revenge of God) was later conceived, developing their own uniquely radical character. 15 Sha'aban, named after the inaugural day of the 1991 uprising, also emerged in the early 1990s later to surface as a political group after the fall of Saddam. Despite their hazy origins, these organizations all share some basic characteristics: a popular center of gravity in Basra with additional support bases in the southern cities of Al-Amarah and Nasiriyah, nominal cover as legitimate political organizations, an extreme Shia Islamist agenda, a history of patronage from the IRGC-QF, and a track record of militant activity since the arrival of Coalition Forces. (REF. M, N, O, P,) ¶10. (S//NF) Though remaining largely in the shadows, Sayyid Al-Shuhadah, has been widely reported to facilitate the transfer of weapons and munitions across the Iranian border into Iraq and to provide fiscal and logistical support to more violently inclined groups such as Tha'rallah. Recent collateral reporting suggests they may be abetting efforts to assassinate political opponents targeted by IRGC, though their principal overt activities revolve around the development of Islamist student or cultural centers in Basra. Under the fiery leadership of Sayyid Yousif Al Musawi, Tha'rallah, renowned in the streets of Basra for its thuggery and demagoguery, generated public attention with the armed, temporary takeover of the local port of Khor Al-Zubair in early March 2005 and Tha'rallah's threats to kill the port's workers. More recently, it has been implicated in the intimidation and assassination of Sunni Arabs in the southern provinces and in ongoing attempts to penetrate and control the Basra police forces. (REF. P, Q, R, S, T) ¶11. (S//NF) This activity has a distinctly Islamist, pro-Iranian tenor, and is targeted at political opponents that are, though Shia and Islamist in stripe, less supportive of Iranian influence, and targeted more generally at the population at large in order to project a sense of moral authority and enforce a rigorously Islamic code of conduct. Anecdotal reporting about the climate of intimidation and repression in the southernmost provinces is increasing. (REF. N) -------------- TARGETING AMERICANS - THE SHEIBANI NETWORK -------------- ¶12. (S//NF) Explosively-formed penetrator (EFP) charges, with a directed metal diaphragm that dynamically transforms upon detonation into an aerodynamic projectile traveling at 2000 meters per second, can punch through one side of an armored vehicle and out the other with catastrophic consequences to occupants inside. In recent months, this advanced Improvised Explosive Device (IED) technology has been identified in a growing number of deadly IED attacks against Coalition Forces throughout southern Iraq. The use of such devices appears to be expanding. Its introduction into the Iraq theatre of operations has been directly linked to the IRGC-backed network of Abu Mustafa al-Sheibani, a former IRGC-QF agent and Badr intelligence chief. In its cellular structure and operating methods, the network is reported to be modeled after Lebanese Hizballah, itself an organization historically known to be supported by the IRGC-QF. (COMMENT. EFP technology has been widely used by Hizballah and its Palestinian surrogates against the Israeli Army. END COMMENT.) According to a former member of the organization, Sheibani's organization receives training both in Iraq and Iran, and Lebanese Hizballah instructors, using excerpts from professionally developed Hizballah instructional videos, have taught detailed construction and placement techniques for EFP IEDs. Evidence also suggests close ties to other IRGC-QF surrogates such as Sayyid Al-Shuhadah for operational and logistical support. (REFS. J, U, V, W) ¶13. (S//NF) Since January 2004, the use of EFP technology has resulted in an estimated 16 deaths and about 35 wounded with a 200 percent increase in fatalities over the last month. Though the overall numbers of IEP/EFP attacks have been very low compared to those by other identified non-Shia insurgent groups, the lethality of these attacks with their capacity to defeat vehicle armor has been extremely high. It is speculated that Sheibani's organization is only one of several such IRGC-supported networks that are being cultivated to maintain a latent capability to direct highly lethal attacks on Coalition Forces when required. It is also surmised that the ability to field EFP devices may have spread to Sunni insurgent elements, and MNF-I is actively targeting key leaders of Sheibani's elusive network who transit frequently across the border between Iran and Iraq. The devastating effects of EFPs on Coalition Forces indicate that kinetic IRGC-QF activity in Iraq is not limited to coercion or violence directed at indigenous political opponents, but also involves a nascent capability and demonstrated willingness to target American lives. (REFS. X, Y, Z) -------------- -------------- CONCLUSIONS: COUNTERING THE MANY FACES OF THE IRGC -------------- -------------- ¶14. (S//NF) Beneath a relative calm, benign surface exists a dark, menacing undercurrent of aggressive IRGC activity inimical to U.S. interests in Iraq's center-south. As a result, present efforts to promulgate democracy and the rule -of law in Shia-majority areas face particular challenges: - Iran's (including IRGC's) patronage of SCIRI, Badr, and other pro-Iranian Shia groups erodes public confidence in the political process by supplanting genuine public discourse with Iranian-funded patronage, media propaganda, and bribery. - The Badr militia's more aggressive activity in center-south, particularly in Najaf, Karbala, and Qadissiyah could suppress the restrained, quietist message of the Shia Marja', typified by Ayatollah Al-Sistani, that has largely been a brake against radicalization of the Shia population at large; overall, Badr's activity degrades the rule -of law. - Attempts by more radical IRGC-supported groups in the south to aggressively islamicize local communities undermine efforts to develop a more civic-oriented, libertarian political culture, and, if left unchecked, foster more radical activity. - Munitions and weapons trafficking supported by the IRGC continues to be an explicit threat to Coalition Forces and the ISF and compromises their ability to maintain positive control of the security environment. ¶15. (S//NF) We need to continue the following steps to mitigate these trends: - Assure vigilance in monitoring the upcoming electoral processes in the South and thwart any efforts to subvert or distort them. - Continue to oppose strenuously the existence of militia organizations not under the control of the national authority. - Extend U.S. sponsored democratization programs that advocate participation, transparency, and accountability into southern Iraq, not just in predominantly Sunni areas. - Monitor carefully the eastern Iraqi border with Iran to stem the illicit transit of people, weapons and ordnance, and money. - Demarche the Iranian government on the IRGC's involvement in insurgent operations in Iraq, and maintain Iraqi and regional pressure on Iran to live up to its stated commitment to help ensure a secure and stable Iraq. ¶15. (U) REO BASRAH, REO HILLAH, REO MOSUL and REO KIRKUK minimize considered. Satterfield