HARD-LINE SUNNI ARAB GROUP URGES U.S. STAY IN IRAQ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002856

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2025
TAGS: PGOV PTER KDEM IZ
SUBJECT: HARD-LINE SUNNI ARAB GROUP URGES U.S. STAY IN IRAQ

Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S. Ford.
Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D).


1. (C) Summary. A Sunni Coalition that had gained
prominence in the negotiations for government
positions and Sunni participation in the
constitutional drafting process lobbied visiting
Senator Levin on July 5 for a continued presence of
Coalition Forces. They complained bitterly of abuses
allegedly committed by the Iraqi Security Forces while
they also perceive the steady marginalization of
Iraq's Sunni Arab community by the Shia/Kurdish
majority. Two of Senator Levin's guests are on the
Constitution Committee and they said they would push
hard to see the constitution draft finished by August
so that national elections can be held in December.
However, they said it would be hard to find agreement
on constitutional treatment of federalism, the role of
religion and the state and the structure of the future
state. They recommended resolution of these
contentious issues be put off until later. (Our Shia
and Kurdish contacts dismiss this idea, saying they
will be able to reach a deal on the full set of
constitution issues.) As groups like these Sunni
hard-liners engage more on a political track, we find
they are thinking more creatively - but not
necessarily more realistically yet. End Summary.

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Participants
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2. (SBU) List of participants:

Dr. Saleh Mutlak, Middle Democratic Party and
Spokesman for the National Dialogue Council, holds a
PhD in Agricultural Economics from Aberdeen, Scotland;
member of Constitution Committee. He is an Arab
nationalist but left the Baath party 20 years ago.

Dr. Makhmood Mashhadani, Salafist and medical doctor
with the Ministry of Health; member of Constitution
Committee.

Sheikh Abdul Nassir Yousef Janabi, Secretary for the
National Dialogue Council and Administrative Head of
the Sufi Committee, holds a Masters in Sharia law.

Dr. Fakhri Kaissy, Secretary of the Salafi Higher
Committee for the issuance of Fatwas, Professor in the
School of Dentistry.

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Constitution: Meeting August 15 Deadline
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3. (C) National Dialogue and, now, Constitutional
Drafting Committee members Drs. Saleh Mutlak and
Makhmood Mashhadani both expressed their desire to
meet the rapidly approaching constitution drafting
deadline, if only to prevent an extension granting the
current government more time in office. Mutlak
highlighted that several complex issues require more
time than the few remaining weeks, but nothing should
delay the next elections. He proposed leaving the
most contentious issues until a new Assembly is seated
in January, producing -- instead -- a temporary
constitution by August. He argued that the three most
difficult issues: the system of government (i.e.
presidential versus prime ministerial),federalism and
the role of religion 'require more participation' by
all groups. (Comment: By contrast, our Shia and
Kurdish contacts, while acknowledging that these
issues are contentious, think an agreement about even
these issues is possible by August 15. End Comment.)

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Coalition Forces: Should We Stay or Should We Go?
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4. (C) Mutlak warned that if the Americans leave at
this time, Iraq faced real danger from its neighbors.
The presence of U.S. troops, he emphasized, was a
source of pressure on their Sunni constituents, but
the withdrawal of forces to bases outside the cities
would mitigate this. Sheikh Abdul Nasser stated that
the violence would not end 'as long as the Americans
are here'; in his next breath, he said to withdraw now
was a mistake. Mashhadani claimed that a complete
withdrawal was contrary to U.S. national interests.
Identifying himself as a part of the Salafist
movement, he identified a dilemma: on the one hand,
'from a legal point of view and representing a
religious community', Salafists cannot argue for a
continued CF presence. Nonetheless, from a realistic
perspective, he observed 'we need them'. He argued
against setting a date for a complete pullout,
claiming the U.S. had the 'moral responsibility' to
secure the welfare of the Iraqi people.

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Preparing for an Eventual American Withdrawal
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5. (C) Sheikh Abdul Nasser suggested the U.S.
announce plans for an eventual withdrawal and make a
'token' withdrawal of 10,000 troops to convince the
insurgents the U.S. was not here to stay. He said,
however, that any complete withdrawal must be preceded
by the conclusion of a U.S.-Iraqi security agreement,
in which the U.S. commits to protecting Iraq against
its neighbors. The way forward, according to Janabi,
is for Sunni leaders to convince their constituents,
based on a token withdrawal and signed security
agreement, that the Americans only seek democracy in
Iraq. Mashhadani said the signal (by the token
withdrawal) that the U.S. intends to leave should be
combined with serious negotiations with the
insurgents. He recommended that over a gradual period
of one or two years, the U.S. could continue to
withdraw while standing up the Iraqi security Forces
(ISF).

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Negotiating with Insurgents
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6. (C) Mashhadani claimed that 80 percent of the
resistance could be won over by serious ('without
impediments') inclusion in the political process.
Even elements of the remaining 20 percent could be
enticed into ending the violence. Convincing the
Sunni community to lay down their arms was hard,
according to Mashhadani, due to their lack of access
to media outlets. He said Sunni Arabs' have no
newspaper, no satellite TV, no resources', while the
Kurds and Shia basically have their own states and are
using this position to solidify their gains. He said
negotiating with the insurgents might surprise the
U.S., in that they might ask the CF to stay.
(Comment: It is not surprisingly that these hard-line
Sunni Arabs would welcome direct negotiations between
the U.S. and the insurgents. They also hope the U.S.
will pressure the ITG on behalf of Sunni Arab
grievances. By contrast, the National Assembly,
dominated by Shia and Kurds, earlier this week
denounced the idea of any negotiations with the
"Baathist insurgents." End Comment.)

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Sunni Participation in Upcoming Elections
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7. (C) Mutlak said the continued raids and detentions
in Sunni Arab communities in Baghdad and throughout
the triangle could adversely affect voter turnout
among Sunni Arabs. He pressed for U.S. support of
moderates, conceding some Shia were also moderates.
Nonetheless, Mutlak observed that the Sunni face
immense obstacles, noting they cannot get out to speak
to their constituents and their cities are being hit
everyday. Sheikh Abdul Nasser proposed delaying
Saddam Hussein's trial until after the elections or
transferring his case to the International Court of
Criminal Justice, stating the former dictator still
commands the support of over one million Iraqis.

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Sunni Paranoia:
Doesn't Mean They're Not Out To Get Them
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8. (C) Mashhadani noted that there are widening gaps
between the Sunni community and the Americans, which
are fomented by the expatriate Iraqis who currently
run the government. Their goal, he opined, was to
destroy the Sunni community. Mashhadani warned that
if the U.S. left Iraq without 'restoring it to its
original position,' America's enemies would fill these
gaps. (Comment. Several of the group repeated this
word 'eradication' during the conversation, a new term
in our discussions with them. It highlights their
feeling that they are in a tenuous position, as CF and
ISF operations pressure Sunni Arab communities,
'Zarqawis' threaten them for their political activity
and finally, and most significantly, they continue to
be outwitted and outmaneuvered by the Shia/Kurdish
majority in the game of politics. While they have
their representation on the Constitutional Drafting
Committee, it is not clear they will come up with a
deal acceptable to them. End Comment.)

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The Rise of Sectarianism
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9. (C) Mashhadani bemoaned the fact that since the
fall of the regime, religion has become politicized.
He said he has no disagreement with the 'Iraqi Shia,'
that there had not existed a 'religious crisis'
(sectarianism) until the end of the regime. Sheikh
Abdul Nasser observed that 80-90 percent of the Arab
World is Sunni, and that they are committed to
protecting their Sunnis in Iraq. This, he claimed,
was demonstrated by the influx of foreign fighters or
jihadists into the country. He said these fellow
Sunnis have concluded that the Shia aim to eradicate
Iraqi Sunnis. (Comment: In fact, public statements
from Mashadani and Janabi frequently inflame sectarian
antagonisms here. End Comment.)

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Iraqi Security Forces
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10. (C) Sheikh Abdul Nasser said that only a
reconstituted Iraqi Army could prevent the 'excesses'
perpetuated by the current Iraqi Army and Iraqi
Police. He noted Sunnis hope that the Americans
detain them -- rather than the ISF - because Americans
are less likely to commit abuses. Mahmood claimed
that the ISF has adopted Saddam's approach, 'go out
and eradicate.' He claimed the ISF tortures
detainees, citing the discovery of the bodies of
former detainees with holes drilled by power tools.


11. (C) Comment. The National Dialogue is a
relatively new faction in the murky and fractious
Sunni political landscape. It rose to prominence
during the prolonged maneuvering for Sunni inclusion
the government, and most recently the Constitutional
drafting process. In what should have been a
victorious moment (at the same time as this meeting
the Transitional National Assembly's Constitutional
Drafting Committee was to have hosted their latest
members Mutlak and Mashhadani to lunch) the National
Dialogue appeared apprehensive about the future.
Their hyperbole about Iraqi security forces
notwithstanding, there are documented cases of hard-
line opposition Sunni Arab imams being detained by men
in security uniforms, tortured and murdered. In
response, the Dialog Council members raised with
Senator Levin an appeal for Coalition Forces not to
withdraw and the desire to secure a security
agreement. Mutlak, for one, has come 180 degrees on
this point; six months ago he vehemently demanded the
immediate withdrawal of CF. As their room to maneuver
becomes steadily decreased, even Sunni Arabs like the
Dialog Council are starting to think in more creative
- if not always realistic - ways. End Comment.


12. (U) REO HILLA, REO BASRA, REO MOSUL, and REO
KIRKUK, minimize considered.


Satterfield