HARD-LINE SUNNI ARAB GROUP URGES U.S. STAY IN IRAQ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BAGHDAD 002856 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/07/2025 TAGS: PGOV PTER KDEM IZ SUBJECT: HARD-LINE SUNNI ARAB GROUP URGES U.S. STAY IN IRAQ Classified By: Political Counselor Robert S. Ford. Reasons 1.4 (B) and (D). ¶1. (C) Summary. A Sunni Coalition that had gained prominence in the negotiations for government positions and Sunni participation in the constitutional drafting process lobbied visiting Senator Levin on July 5 for a continued presence of Coalition Forces. They complained bitterly of abuses allegedly committed by the Iraqi Security Forces while they also perceive the steady marginalization of Iraq's Sunni Arab community by the Shia/Kurdish majority. Two of Senator Levin's guests are on the Constitution Committee and they said they would push hard to see the constitution draft finished by August so that national elections can be held in December. However, they said it would be hard to find agreement on constitutional treatment of federalism, the role of religion and the state and the structure of the future state. They recommended resolution of these contentious issues be put off until later. (Our Shia and Kurdish contacts dismiss this idea, saying they will be able to reach a deal on the full set of constitution issues.) As groups like these Sunni hard-liners engage more on a political track, we find they are thinking more creatively - but not necessarily more realistically yet. End Summary. -------------- Participants -------------- ¶2. (SBU) List of participants: Dr. Saleh Mutlak, Middle Democratic Party and Spokesman for the National Dialogue Council, holds a PhD in Agricultural Economics from Aberdeen, Scotland; member of Constitution Committee. He is an Arab nationalist but left the Baath party 20 years ago. Dr. Makhmood Mashhadani, Salafist and medical doctor with the Ministry of Health; member of Constitution Committee. Sheikh Abdul Nassir Yousef Janabi, Secretary for the National Dialogue Council and Administrative Head of the Sufi Committee, holds a Masters in Sharia law. Dr. Fakhri Kaissy, Secretary of the Salafi Higher Committee for the issuance of Fatwas, Professor in the School of Dentistry. -------------- Constitution: Meeting August 15 Deadline -------------- ¶3. (C) National Dialogue and, now, Constitutional Drafting Committee members Drs. Saleh Mutlak and Makhmood Mashhadani both expressed their desire to meet the rapidly approaching constitution drafting deadline, if only to prevent an extension granting the current government more time in office. Mutlak highlighted that several complex issues require more time than the few remaining weeks, but nothing should delay the next elections. He proposed leaving the most contentious issues until a new Assembly is seated in January, producing -- instead -- a temporary constitution by August. He argued that the three most difficult issues: the system of government (i.e. presidential versus prime ministerial),federalism and the role of religion 'require more participation' by all groups. (Comment: By contrast, our Shia and Kurdish contacts, while acknowledging that these issues are contentious, think an agreement about even these issues is possible by August 15. End Comment.) -------------- -------------- Coalition Forces: Should We Stay or Should We Go? -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) Mutlak warned that if the Americans leave at this time, Iraq faced real danger from its neighbors. The presence of U.S. troops, he emphasized, was a source of pressure on their Sunni constituents, but the withdrawal of forces to bases outside the cities would mitigate this. Sheikh Abdul Nasser stated that the violence would not end 'as long as the Americans are here'; in his next breath, he said to withdraw now was a mistake. Mashhadani claimed that a complete withdrawal was contrary to U.S. national interests. Identifying himself as a part of the Salafist movement, he identified a dilemma: on the one hand, 'from a legal point of view and representing a religious community', Salafists cannot argue for a continued CF presence. Nonetheless, from a realistic perspective, he observed 'we need them'. He argued against setting a date for a complete pullout, claiming the U.S. had the 'moral responsibility' to secure the welfare of the Iraqi people. -------------- Preparing for an Eventual American Withdrawal -------------- ¶5. (C) Sheikh Abdul Nasser suggested the U.S. announce plans for an eventual withdrawal and make a 'token' withdrawal of 10,000 troops to convince the insurgents the U.S. was not here to stay. He said, however, that any complete withdrawal must be preceded by the conclusion of a U.S.-Iraqi security agreement, in which the U.S. commits to protecting Iraq against its neighbors. The way forward, according to Janabi, is for Sunni leaders to convince their constituents, based on a token withdrawal and signed security agreement, that the Americans only seek democracy in Iraq. Mashhadani said the signal (by the token withdrawal) that the U.S. intends to leave should be combined with serious negotiations with the insurgents. He recommended that over a gradual period of one or two years, the U.S. could continue to withdraw while standing up the Iraqi security Forces (ISF). -------------- Negotiating with Insurgents -------------- ¶6. (C) Mashhadani claimed that 80 percent of the resistance could be won over by serious ('without impediments') inclusion in the political process. Even elements of the remaining 20 percent could be enticed into ending the violence. Convincing the Sunni community to lay down their arms was hard, according to Mashhadani, due to their lack of access to media outlets. He said Sunni Arabs' have no newspaper, no satellite TV, no resources', while the Kurds and Shia basically have their own states and are using this position to solidify their gains. He said negotiating with the insurgents might surprise the U.S., in that they might ask the CF to stay. (Comment: It is not surprisingly that these hard-line Sunni Arabs would welcome direct negotiations between the U.S. and the insurgents. They also hope the U.S. will pressure the ITG on behalf of Sunni Arab grievances. By contrast, the National Assembly, dominated by Shia and Kurds, earlier this week denounced the idea of any negotiations with the "Baathist insurgents." End Comment.) -------------- Sunni Participation in Upcoming Elections -------------- ¶7. (C) Mutlak said the continued raids and detentions in Sunni Arab communities in Baghdad and throughout the triangle could adversely affect voter turnout among Sunni Arabs. He pressed for U.S. support of moderates, conceding some Shia were also moderates. Nonetheless, Mutlak observed that the Sunni face immense obstacles, noting they cannot get out to speak to their constituents and their cities are being hit everyday. Sheikh Abdul Nasser proposed delaying Saddam Hussein's trial until after the elections or transferring his case to the International Court of Criminal Justice, stating the former dictator still commands the support of over one million Iraqis. -------------- Sunni Paranoia: Doesn't Mean They're Not Out To Get Them -------------- ¶8. (C) Mashhadani noted that there are widening gaps between the Sunni community and the Americans, which are fomented by the expatriate Iraqis who currently run the government. Their goal, he opined, was to destroy the Sunni community. Mashhadani warned that if the U.S. left Iraq without 'restoring it to its original position,' America's enemies would fill these gaps. (Comment. Several of the group repeated this word 'eradication' during the conversation, a new term in our discussions with them. It highlights their feeling that they are in a tenuous position, as CF and ISF operations pressure Sunni Arab communities, 'Zarqawis' threaten them for their political activity and finally, and most significantly, they continue to be outwitted and outmaneuvered by the Shia/Kurdish majority in the game of politics. While they have their representation on the Constitutional Drafting Committee, it is not clear they will come up with a deal acceptable to them. End Comment.) -------------- The Rise of Sectarianism -------------- ¶9. (C) Mashhadani bemoaned the fact that since the fall of the regime, religion has become politicized. He said he has no disagreement with the 'Iraqi Shia,' that there had not existed a 'religious crisis' (sectarianism) until the end of the regime. Sheikh Abdul Nasser observed that 80-90 percent of the Arab World is Sunni, and that they are committed to protecting their Sunnis in Iraq. This, he claimed, was demonstrated by the influx of foreign fighters or jihadists into the country. He said these fellow Sunnis have concluded that the Shia aim to eradicate Iraqi Sunnis. (Comment: In fact, public statements from Mashadani and Janabi frequently inflame sectarian antagonisms here. End Comment.) -------------- Iraqi Security Forces -------------- ¶10. (C) Sheikh Abdul Nasser said that only a reconstituted Iraqi Army could prevent the 'excesses' perpetuated by the current Iraqi Army and Iraqi Police. He noted Sunnis hope that the Americans detain them -- rather than the ISF - because Americans are less likely to commit abuses. Mahmood claimed that the ISF has adopted Saddam's approach, 'go out and eradicate.' He claimed the ISF tortures detainees, citing the discovery of the bodies of former detainees with holes drilled by power tools. ¶11. (C) Comment. The National Dialogue is a relatively new faction in the murky and fractious Sunni political landscape. It rose to prominence during the prolonged maneuvering for Sunni inclusion the government, and most recently the Constitutional drafting process. In what should have been a victorious moment (at the same time as this meeting the Transitional National Assembly's Constitutional Drafting Committee was to have hosted their latest members Mutlak and Mashhadani to lunch) the National Dialogue appeared apprehensive about the future. Their hyperbole about Iraqi security forces notwithstanding, there are documented cases of hard- line opposition Sunni Arab imams being detained by men in security uniforms, tortured and murdered. In response, the Dialog Council members raised with Senator Levin an appeal for Coalition Forces not to withdraw and the desire to secure a security agreement. Mutlak, for one, has come 180 degrees on this point; six months ago he vehemently demanded the immediate withdrawal of CF. As their room to maneuver becomes steadily decreased, even Sunni Arabs like the Dialog Council are starting to think in more creative - if not always realistic - ways. End Comment. ¶12. (U) REO HILLA, REO BASRA, REO MOSUL, and REO KIRKUK, minimize considered. Satterfield