C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 002782


E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/30/2025
TAGS: PREL PGOV IZ
SUBJECT: IRAQI OFFICILAS INCLINED TO TAKE A WAIT AND SEE
APPROACH TO NEW IRANIAN PRESIDENT

Classified By: Political Counselor Robert Ford.
Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (C) Summary. Our Iraqi interlocutors appear to
know little about new Iranian President Ahmadinejad
and are taking a "wait-and-see" approach to their
dealings with him. Undersecretary Bayati believes the
vote for Ahmadinejad was a vote of no confidence
against Iran's religious establishment, not a jab at
the United States. Bayati thinks the crucial item to
watch is Ahmadinejad's cabinet choices for a signal of
his true intent. Bayati believes most Iranians like
Americans and are eager to improve relations with
them, and that Ahmadinejad's statements that he sees
no need to work with the Americans may be bluff.
Interior Minister Bayan Jabr expressed disappointment
that Hashemi Rafsanjani lost the election. The Iraqi
leadership, including the Shia Islamists, do not know
Ahmadinejad and Jabr thinks that his SCIRI Shia
political party should dispatch a delegation quietly
to meet the new Iranian President. Looking over the
longer term, MFA Undersecretary Abbawi suggests
Ahmadinejad's election could set the stage for
political change in Iran if in the end he fails to
deliver on his campaign promises. Kurdish
interlocutors are disappointed that a man they
perceive to be a hardliner came to power. Above all,
our Shia and Kurdish contacts fear that Ahmadinejad
might seek to destabilize the emerging, but shaky,
political structure in Iraq. End Summary.

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NOT AN ANTI-USA VOTE
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2. (C) Foreign Ministry Undersecretary for Bilateral
Affairs Hamid Al-Bayati (SCIRI) told Poloffs June 29
that he knew little about Iran's new President, the
conservative former Tehran major Mahmoud Ahmadinejad.
To get a sense of where Ahmadinejad is headed, Bayati
said one should pay close attention to the composition
of his new cabinet. Bayati did not think that the
vote for Ahmadinejad and against Hashemi Rafsanjani
was a vote of no confidence against Iran's religious
establishment. Besides not wanting a religious man
for their President, Bayati said that Iranians voted
against Rafsanjani because he represented an
entrenched, and seemingly corrupt, establishment.

Even though Ahmadinejad has stated that there is no
need for relations with the United States, Biayati
opined that most Iranians are pro-American and would
like to improve relations with Americans.


3. (C) Over dinner June 28, Interior Minister Bayan
Jabr told PolCouns he was disappointed that Hashemi
Rafsanjani had lost the election. Jabr sighed that
the Iraqi leadership, including the Shia Islamists, do
not know Ahmadinejad. As a result, he said, no one
can predict what Ahmadinejad will want from its
relations with Iraq. The new president could
complicate Iraq's security problems if he chose, Jabr
observed, and the result would be doubly bad for Iraqi
Shi'a. Therefore, Jabr concluded, his SCIRI Shia
political party should dispatch a delegation quietly
to meet the new Iranian President. PolCouns noted
that normally a Foreign Ministry opens such quiet
contacts, but Jabr brushed this aside. First SCIRI
could lead with contacts, and if positive, then the
Foreign Ministry could follow up, he opined.

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SOCIAL CONFLICT COMING?
--------------


4. (C) Foreign Ministry Undersecretary for Policy
Planning Labeed Abbawi noted in a separate meeting on
June 29 that with the Iranian government dominated
entirely by conservatives, conditions are set for
political change through social conflict. Iranians
now enjoy greater social freedoms -- such as looser
dress codes and more mixing between the sexes -- and
new government efforts to reign in these freedoms
would raise the resentment against the Islamic rule,
opined Labeed. The loser in the Iranian presidential
election, Rafsanjani, is a opportunistic and corrupt
"snake", continued Labeed. Though Labeed knew little
about the new Iranian president, he predicted that he
would be unable to fulfill his campaign promise to
fight corruption. The United States, Labeed advised,
should not antagonize Alamdinejad, and give him no
opportunity to blame the US for his eventual failures.

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KURDS DO NOT KNOW HIM
--------------


5. (C) The Kurdish Regional Government (KRG)
representative to the Iraqi Transitional Government
(ITG) Dilshad Miran told us June 29 that the Kurds
have never met the new Iranian president and do not
have an official position yet on him. They are
disappointed, however, that such a perceived hardliner
came to power -- especially one who is supported by
the Iran Revolutionary Governing Council (IRGC).
Miran said they are eager to visit the new President
and so be able to make better judgments about his
positions on Kurds and the KRG.


6. (C) Comment: Our Baghdad Iraqi contacts,
including those in Da'wa and SCIRI were certain that
Rafsanjani - whom they knew well - would win. There
has been a pause in Baghdad this week as the Iraqi
political class weighs the implications of
Ahmadinejad's victory. It is entirely possible that
some of Iraq's Kurdish and Shia parties will make the
first quiet trips to Teheran to establish contact with
the Iranian president. Above all, what both our Shia
and Kurdish contacts fear that Ahmadinejad might seek
to destabilize the emerging, but shaky, political
structure in Iraq.


7. (U) REO HILLAH, REO BASRAH, REO MOSUL, and REO
KIRKUK, minimize considered.


Satterfield