CHARGE MEETING WITH UNAMI SRSG QAZI: SUNNI OUTREACH

C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 002509

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/13/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS KDEM KISL IZ UN
SUBJECT: CHARGE MEETING WITH UNAMI SRSG QAZI: SUNNI OUTREACH
REF: BAGHDAD 2480

Classified By: Charge d'Affaires James F. Jeffrey for reasons
1.4 (b) and (d)


1. (C) Charge had a long one-on-one exchange with UNAMI SRSG,
Ambassador Ashraf Qazi, on June 14. The main subject was
aspects of Sunni outreach, both the immediate problem and the
longer-term aspects of the Sunni insurgency. Charge
explained our position on the Constitutional Commission in
considerable detail, urging Qazi to support, including the
total of 17 Sunni Arab members in an expanded Commission.
Qazi played his cards close to his chest, but indicated he
would meet later today with Sunni leaders and suggested that
he would try to be helpful. He did not challenge the
premises of our position.


2. (C) Qazi did go on at length about the difficulties
dealing with the Sunnis here, and their failure to recognize
that they are facing a fundamentally changed Iraq. He
appears to think highly of many of the Shia political
leaders, and compares the Sunnis with the Muslim population
of South Asia, which simply could not grasp that they were no
longer the ruling class--until the denouement of the
Pakistan-India split. Still, he lamented that no Shia
leader, including the Grand Ayatollah Ali al-SISTANI, has won
the mantle of "spokesperson for the entire population," a
problem that haunted Gandhi as well.


3. (C) Obviously fishing for concessions for the Sunnis, Qazi
asked about MNF-I accepting a "timeline" for withdrawal.
Charge explained in detail why this was tantamount to
declaring us an illegal occupation, would lose the point that
Coalition forces are in Iraq for a purpose, and would
demoralize our allies. We were ready to agree to a gradual
pullback of forces as part of a condition-based strategy; as
those goals for which we are fighting would be achieved, such
as standup of Iraqi forces and/or a drop in levels of
violence, we could carry such a strategy out.


4. (C) Qazi kept coming back to the "timetable" idea
(COMMENT: In fairness, it is much loved by Sunni Arabs of all
stripes. Kurds hate the idea, and the Shia are torn between
their minds--keep the Coalition here, and their hearts--out
with the foreigners. END COMMENT) He asked if there were
some way to "meld" both a timetable and a set of conditions.
Charge pointed out that this would only be a disguised
timetable, that all including American citizens would see
through immediately.


5. (C) COMMENT: There is no telling what Qazi will discuss
with the Sunni Arabs, but he is well disposed towards us and
goes into any Middle Eastern negotiation or debate with his
eyes wide open. He is feeling some heat from New York, as he
complained in particular of the strong ties that senior UN
officials Brahimi and Benomar still maintain with Iraqi
figures. END COMMENT
Jeffrey