wikileaks ico  Home papers ico  Cables mirror and Afghan War Diary privacy policy  Privacy
05BAGHDAD2437 2005-06-08 11:41:00 CONFIDENTIAL Embassy Baghdad
Cable title:  


pdf how-to read a cable
This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
					  C O N F I D E N T I A L BAGHDAD 002437 


E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/07/2015

Classified By: Deputy Chief of Mission David M. Satterfield
for reasons 1.4 (a), (b), and (d)

1. (C) SUMMARY: Charge Satterfield joined the Senior Advisor
to the Ministry of Interior in a May 30 dinner with the
Minister of Interior Baqr Jabr where they discussed: Middle
East and Iraqi political developments, the current security
operations in Baghdad, as well as police training programs
and human rights reform. The meeting proved a useful
interface to broadly review current Ministry of Interior
initiatives and learn how the Minister intends to advance
security in Baghdad and throughout country. END SUMMARY.

2. (C) Charge joined Mr. Casteel and the Minister of Interior
Baqr Jaber for a May 30 dinner at the Adnon Palace. The
Charge and Minister discussed the political reforms
throughout the Middle East, agreed the January Iraqi election
was the spark of change, and expressed the importance of
ensuring the next round of Iraqi elections are supported and
carried out in December 2005. The Charge and Minister also
agreed the Syrian government is a major obstacle to the
advancement of democracy in the region. At present, the
Syrians are only changing their words, but not their actions.
The Charge emphasized that while the highest officials of the
Syrian Government sorely crave international attention, the
international community must focus its attention at the lower
levels and only shift that attention once we begin to see
positive action.

3. (C) Jabr described his recent meeting with Masood Barzani,
President of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in Irbil
on May 20 as productive. Jabr conveyed he will continue to
assist the Kurdish forces where he can with equipment and
political support and stressed the central government must
show its support to the Kurdish region. He then added he is
a strong supporter of the Iraqi Transitional Government's
(ITG) President Jalal Talibani from the Patriotic Union of
Kurds (PUK) as they have worked together for the past twenty
years. However, he is not such an advocate of Mr. Barzani
who disappointed him in 1996 when he allied with Saddam
Hussien. This disappointment led Jabr to speak out publicly
against Barzani to the displeasure of SCIRI officials.

4. (C) Both Charge and Jabr agreed the operations currently
underway in Baghdad are proving successful. The results are a
product of better than expected coordination between MoI,
Ministry of Defense and Coalition forces. While admitting
there still remains a lot of work ahead, Jabr is pleased with
the progress and the ground swell of support from the Baghdad
citizenry. Jabr ended by mentioning that the number of IEDs
and VBIEDs are down over the past week and there have been
zero VBIED's over the past two days.

5. (C) Charge expressed the importance of building on this
coordination with the MoD at the upcoming European Union
conference in Brussels. It will be an ideal opportunity to
voice a unified Ministry of Interior MoI and MoD vision for
Iraq. Jabr agreed and stated he is attending the conference
because of its importance to the future Iraq both from a
security and diplomatic perspective.

6. (C) Jabr stated his priorities for the MoI are building
the intelligence structure, improving police training,
increasing the efficiency of the Ministry as an institution,
and bringing about fundamental human rights reform. (NOTE:
The Minister's passion for human rights reform is more
pronounced than any other of the four Minister's IRMO-MOI
advisers have worked with. This may rest with the fact that
Jabr and his immediate family emigrated from Iraq in 1982
after the regime of Saddam Hussein executed 12 family
members. The regime then executed his brother in 1996 to
further pressure Jabr to stop his political and media
activities. END NOTE)

7. (U) Minimize considered for REOs Basrah, Hillah, Kirkuk,
and Mosul.