VIEW FROM ATHENS: MOVING FORWARD ON MINORITY

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 002759 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR EUR/SE E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/20/2015 TAGS: PGOV PREL PHUM OSCI HRIGHTS SUBJECT: VIEW FROM ATHENS: MOVING FORWARD ON MINORITY RIGHTS IN GREECE AND TURKEY REF: A. ANKARA 6316 ¶B. ATHENS 1962 (NOTAL) ¶C. ISTANBUL 1825 Classified By: Ambassador Charles P. Ries for reasons 1.4 b and d. ¶1. SUMMARY: Embassy Athens welcomes the ideas presented in ref A, and the possibility of progress on minority rights issues between Greece and Turkey. From our side, Ambassador pitched the Halki-Athens mosque connection in July (ref B), to no avail. Unfortunately, the Greeks see this (with some justification) not as a bilateral issue, but one which involves Turkey's obligations to the EU. With Turkey's accession negotiations now entering a new phase, the GoG will likely be even less interested in dealing with the issue bilaterally. The subject of Turkish teachers from Turkey, however, might be a goal to pursue, especially since the Ministry of Education has recently come up with a plan to teach Turkish to minority students in mainstream Greek public schools in Thrace. In any event, both sides need to come up with deliverables for PM Karamanlis' anticipated visit to Ankara and we should do our part in pushing them to think creatively. END SUMMARY. A New Mosque and Reopened Halki? -------------- ¶2. (C) Ref A idea of pairing the reopening of Halki under GoG sponsorship with opening of a mosque in Athens under GoT sponsorship seems logical to us. In fact, Ambassador raised it with Foreign Minister Molyviatis in July (ref B). The FM quickly dismissed the idea, arguing that Greece had promised a group of Arab states that it would allow them to open the mosque, while saying that Turkey is any case obligated to the EU, not to Greece, on the reopening of Halki. Molyviatis made clear that Halki was not a bilateral issue. Now that accession talks have opened with Turkey, Molyviatis and the GoG are probably even less willing to entertain the idea of working the issue bilaterally. Given this atmosphere, we doubt a joint approach by us to the Greek and Turkish governments would have much impact here. As the Education Minister Yiannakou was reported to have said Oct 20 in Istanbul, "respect of the Christian Orthodox believers' religious freedom and the unhindered operation of the Ecumenical Patriarchate as a religious institution comprise a primary condition for Turkey's European course." ¶3. (C) The above notwithstanding, we can and will continue to push the Greeks to make good on their promise to open a mosque in Athens, among other reasons because if they did so it might make it easier for the GOT to do the right thing on Halki. Athens is the only major capital in Europe without a mosque (the city's numerous Muslims worship in unofficial prayer rooms) and there has been no progress on construction, despite a 2000 law that provided a legal framework for one. The proposed location of the "Athens" mosque -- in a small exburban town (Peania) without a significant Muslim community (and on land designated for forest use) -- shows how divorced from reality the GoG can be when considering the spiritual welfare of the growing number of Muslims here. Turkish Teachers in Thrace -------------- ¶4. (C) Regarding education issues, we agree that we must look creatively at how we can help the two sides remove restrictions on their respective minorities. The problem is that the GoG does not see the two as comparable. GoG officials, including the Thrace MFA representative, have told us it is impossible to have mutual agreements or concessions on minority issues when there are not comparable minority populations. Regarding the specific issue of the need of Turkish language teachers, when we last raised this point with the Director of Minority Schools in Thrace, he intimated that since there is very limited need for Greek teachers in Turkey, there is little incentive to allow additional Turkish teachers into Thrace. Greeks see the introduction of teaching material and teachers as another effort to "control" the Muslim minority in Thrace, and have cited other examples of Turkey trying to "propagandize" the Muslim minority -- such as through unsanctioned after-school programs funded by the GOT and recent discussions of opening private schools. ¶5. (C) A possible goal to pursue that is in line with ref A comments is the Greek Ministry of Education's novel idea to provide Turkish language instruction in Greek public schools in Thrace. This would allow the 75 percent of secondary students from the Muslim minority who attend mainstream Greek public schools to have Turkish language instruction, perhaps taught by teachers from Turkey. This would be far more palatable to the GoG since these teachers would be administering to minority students already integrated into the Greek public school system. ¶6. (C) COMMENT: While we agree with Ankara a Halki-Athens mosque explicit linkage won't fly for either side, Greece and Turkey both need to focus on deliverables for an eventual visit of PM Karamanlis to Ankara. Karamanlis accepted PM Erdogan's invitation some time ago, had planned on visiting in late August, then both sides postponed to October, and now it is unclear when his travel will take place. When we broached the subject of deliverables with FM Molyviatis in July, we found a dearth of ideas (ref B). Now is the time to prod both sides into coming up with initiatives in anticipation of this visit -- the first by a Greek PM in over 40 years. Without referring to direct trade-offs, we should do our part behind the scenes by encouraging both sides to do the things they have promised to do anyway (Greece, to open a mosque in Athens; Turkey, to allow greater religious freedom (e.g., open Halki),as part of its EU commitments). Maybe we can get a virtuous circle going. END COMMENT. RIES