AMBASSADOR'S TOUR D'HORIZON WITH GREEK MOD

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ATHENS 000236 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/19/2009 TAGS: GR MARR PREL AMB SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR'S TOUR D'HORIZON WITH GREEK MOD SPILIOTOPOULOS REF: ATHENS 179 Classified By: Amb. Charles P. Ries. Reasons 1.4(b/d) ¶1. (C) SUMMARY: In their introductory meeting on January 19, Greek Defense Minister Spiliotopoulos told the Ambassador that Greece was prepared to increase its presence in Afghanistan by deploying a Role 2 Medical Unit to Herat. Greece was not yet able to lift its caveat to allow Greek staff officers to participate in the NATO Training Mission in Iraq, but could participate in such a mission outside Iraq. Spiliotopoulos highlighted transformation of the Hellenic Armed Forces in the near term as a priority. He also assured Ambassador that defense procurement contracts, limited as they would be by Greece's severe economic constraints, would be transparent and fair. Spiliotopoulos plans to travel to Washington in April, and is interested in a meeting with SecDef. END SUMMARY. -------------- -------------- AFGHANISTAN -- GREECE WILL PROVIDE MEDICAL FACILITY -------------- -------------- ¶2. (C) In their first meeting on January 19, Spiliotopoulos told the Ambassador that the Greek Permrep to NATO had received instructions to announce Greece would increase its participation in ISAF with a Role 2 medical facility for Herat. -------------- -- GREECE WILLING TO TRAIN IRAQIS, BUT NOT IN IRAQ -------------- -- ¶3. (C) In response to Ambassador's question about Greek participation in Iraq, Spiliotopoulos reiterated reftel comments from MFA that Greece was not yet able to authorize its NATO/SHAPE officers to travel to Iraq as part of the NATO Training Mission-Iraq. Spiliotopoulos indicated, however, that Greece was prepared to support the goal of the NATO mission with trainers outside Iraq. Ambassador underscored the opportunity afforded by the January 30 elections in Iraq for the Iraqi people to govern themselves; these elections must succeed and must be reinforced by an improved security situation -- the point of the NATO mission. Ambassador acknowledged that coalition activities in Iraq were not popular in Greece, but NATO had nevertheless signed on to provide training, and Alliance cohesion must be preserved. ¶4. (C) Ambassador urged Spiliotopoulos to review its national caveats. Of the six NATO Allies still refusing to participate in the NATO mission, Greece should not be the last to reverse its position. (NOTE: The Dutch later told us that in their lunch with Spiliotopoulos after the Ambassador's meeting, Spiliotopoulos raised the NATO training mission, expressing some frustration that the U.S. was not satisfied with training outside Iraq. Greece, Spiliotopoulos told the Dutch, was fully prepared to train Iraqis "in Dubai." END NOTE.) ¶5. (C) Ambassador asked whether Greece would consider donating some of its Soviet-era "BMPs" (APCs) to Iraq as excess equipment. Spiliotopoulos claimed Greece was using these BMPs at the present time, but did have plans to replace them. Ambassador urged the MOD to review this issue, as the BMPs could materially assist security operations by Iraqis. -------------- TRANSFORMATION UNDERWAY, PROCUREMENT STALLED -------------- ¶6. (C) Spiliotopoulos, an enthusiastic proponent of transformation, briefed Ambassador on his plans to reduce the size of the Hellenic Armed Forces from 175,000 to 145,000, to focus on modernizing equipment (particularly C4I),and to prioritize interoperability and flexibility. Spiliotopoulos claimed that Greece would meet its transformation goals by the end of 2005. ¶7. (C) Pointing out that while Greece still spent more money that any other Ally on defense except (and because of) Turkey, Spiliotopoulos noted that defense spending had fallen from a high two years ago of 4.5 percent of GNP to roughly 2.9 percent of GNP. Greece's dire economic straits were affecting procurement, and Spiliotopoulos was facing a 40 percent decrease in procurement in 2005. This was the "only way" Greece could comply with the EU requirement of 3 percent deficit spending. Spiliotopoulos told Ambassador that the Prime Minister had decided to cut defense spending in order to salvage social programs. After 2008, he hoped, Greece would be able to increase procurement with an emphasis on fighter planes and frigates. For now, Spiliotopoulos claimed the MOD would only have money to pay off existing loans. ¶8. (C) Ambassador told Spiliotopoulos that Greece and the U.S. had enjoyed excellent defense cooperation in the past, and he looked forward to working on transformation and procurement issues together. Ambassador's main priority was to ensure a level playing field and a transparent process for contracts. ¶9. (C) Emphasizing the state-of-the-art equipment available from U.S. companies, Ambassador noted that the current exchange rate offered excellent value for Greece. Spiliotopoulos assured Ambassador that transparency in the procurement process was a chief goal. His staff was working on a revised legal framework for defense procurement to ensure transparency and to close all the loopholes in Greek legislation that had allowed previous questionable defense contracts to stand. Spiliotopoulos noted that some of the revised legal framework had been drawn from U.S. anti-corruption legislation. He assured Ambassador that his MOD would "stick to the rules of the game and the marketplace." -------------- --- FAMILY TIES DON'T EQUAL GOOD BILATERAL RELATIONS -------------- --- ¶10. (C) In a brief discussion of Turkey, Spiliotopoulos noted that while PM Karamanlis and Turkish PM Erdogan enjoyed good "family relations", these ties did not translate into improved bilateral relations, as recent incidents in the Aegean had demonstrated. Greece had fully and openly supported a date for the EU to begin accession negotiations with Turkey; unfortunately, he said, Turkey did not yet understand that its "unilateral" claims (airspace, continental shelf) were unacceptable. Turkey must respect international and European law. That said, he agreed the progress made to put Turkey on a European path should be seen as a path to reduce tensions in the Aegean. -------------- VISIT TO THE UNITED STATES -------------- ¶11. (C) At the conclusion of the meeting, MOD Diplomatic Advisor Bourliyannis briefed Ambassador on Spiliotopoulos's spring travel plans, highlighting a proposed April 10-12 visit to the U.S. and asking Ambassador to assist with a meeting between Spiliotopoulos and SecDef Rumsfeld. Spiliotopoulos, who noted he had enjoyed recalling fighter pilot days with SecDef, also mentioned that a meeting might be possible on the margins of NATO meetings in Nice or at Wehrkunde.