TURKEY 2005-2006 INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 007400 SIPDIS DEPARTMENT FOR INL, EUR/SE JUSTICE FOR OIA, AFMLS, AND NDDS TREASURY FOR FINCEN DEA FOR OILS AND OFFICE OF DIVERSION CONTROL E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: SNAR TU SUBJECT: TURKEY 2005-2006 INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS CONTROL STRATEGY REPORT, VOLUME II REF: STATE 210691 ¶1. The following is Embassy Ankara's submission of Part II of the International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Money Laundering and Financial crimes. ¶2. BEGIN TEXT OF REPORT. TURKEY Turkey is an important regional financial center, particularly for Central Asia and the Caucasus, as well as for the Middle East and Eastern Europe. Turkey is not an offshore financial center. It continues to be a major transit route for Southwest Asian opiates moving to Europe. However, local narcotics-trafficking organizations are reportedly responsible for only a small portion of the total funds laundered in Turkey. A substantial percentage of money laundering that takes place in Turkey appears to involve tax evasion. There is a large unregistered economy in Turkey. Though by definition hard to estimate, as much as 50 percent of the economy may be unregistered. Since tax evasion is such a large problem, the Government of Turkey (GOT) in 2005 passed a tax administration reform law with the goal of improving tax collection. There is no significant black market for smuggled goods in Turkey. There are 21 free trade zones operating in Turkey, but there is no evidence that they are being used in trade- based money laundering schemes or terrorist financing operations. The GOT closely controls access to the free trade zones. Money laundering takes place in both banks and non-bank financial institutions. Money laundering methods in Turkey include: the cross-border smuggling of currency; bank transfers into and out of the country; and the purchase of high value items such as real estate, gold, and luxury automobiles. It is believed that Turkish- based traffickers transfer money to pay narcotics suppliers in Pakistan and Afghanistan reportedly through alternative remittance systems. The funds are transferred to accounts in the United Arab Emirates, Pakistan, and other Middle Eastern countries. The money is then paid to the Pakistani and Afghan traffickers. Turkey criminalized money laundering in 1996 for a wide range of predicate offenses. Whoever commits a money laundering offense shall be sentenced to imprisonment from two to five years and is subject to asset forfeiture provisions and a fine of double the amount of the money laundered. Subsequent to passage of the 1996 money laundering law, the Council of Ministers passed a set of regulations that require the filing of suspicious transaction reports (STRs),customer identification, and the maintenance of records for five years. These regulations apply to banks and a wide range of non-bank financial institutions, including insurance firms and jewelry dealers. In 2004, the GOT enacted additional anti-money laundering legislation. The GOT also enacted a new criminal law and a new criminal procedures law. The new Criminal Law, which took effect in June 2005, broadly defines money laundering to include as predicate offenses all crimes punishable by one year's imprisonment. Previously, Turkey's anti-money laundering law comprised a list of specific predicate offenses. A new Criminal Procedures Law, which also came into effect in June 2005, will facilitate asset forfeiture. In July 2001, the Ministry of Finance issued a banking regulation circular requiring all banks, including the Central Bank, securities companies, post office banks, and Islamic finance houses to record tax identity information for all customers opening new accounts, applying for checkbooks, or cashing checks. The circular also requires foreign exchange bureaus to sign contracts with their clients. The Ministry of Finance also issued a circular mandating that a tax identity number be used in all financial transactions as of September 1, 2001. The circular applies to all Turkish banks and to branches of foreign banks operating in Turkey, as well as to other financial entities and property registration offices. These requirements are intended to increase the Government's ability to track suspicious financial transactions. Turkey does not have secrecy laws that prevent disclosure of client and ownership information to bank supervisors and law enforcement officials. According to anti-money laundering law Article 5, public institutions, individuals, and corporate bodies must submit information and documents as well as adequate supporting information upon the request of Turkey's Financial Crimes Investigation Board (MASAK) or other authorities specified in Article 3 of the law. Corporate bodies and individuals may not claim protection provided by privacy provisions in order to avoid submitting the requested items. Generally speaking, Turkey does not have foreign exchange restrictions. However, Turkey does have cross- border currency reporting requirements. Except for payments for imports, invisible transactions and capital exports, banks and special finance institutions must inform authorities, within 30 days, about transfers abroad exceeding $50,000 or its equivalent in foreign currency notes (including transfers from foreign exchange deposits). Travelers may take up to $5,000 or its equivalent in foreign currency notes out of the country. The Banking Regulatory and Supervisory Agency (BRSA) conducts anti-money laundering compliance reviews at banks under authority delegated from MASAK. The Banking Law passed in 2005 was designed to strengthen bank supervision. The 1996 anti-money laundering law establishes MASAK, which falls under the umbrella of the Ministry of Finance. MASAK, which became operational in 1997, serves as Turkey's Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU), receiving, analyzing, and referring STRs for investigation. MASAK has a pivotal role between the financial community, on the one hand, and Turkish law enforcement, investigators, and judiciary, on the other. MASAK's training and equipment needs are being addressed by a European Union accession project, which is expected to end in June 2006. Under current law, MASAK has three functions: regulatory, financial intelligence, and investigative. In November, 2005, the Turkish Government submitted to Parliament a new law under which the agency would cede its investigative function to public prosecutors, while retaining its regulatory and financial intelligence roles. The proposed law would reorganize MASAK along functional lines, explicitly criminalize the financing of terrorism, and provide "safe harbor" immunity to filers of suspicious transaction reports. The law also expands the definition of parties subject to reporting requirements to art dealers, pension funds, exchange houses, jewelry stores, notaries, sports clubs, and real estate companies and defines sanctions for failure to comply with reporting requirements. The law is currently under review in Parliament, and passage is expected in 2006. The number of STRs being filed is quite low, even taking into consideration the fact that many commercial transactions are paid in cash. In 2004, 289 STRs were filed. From January to November 2005, 266 STRs were filed. A possible reason for this is the lack of safe harbor protection for bankers and other filers of STRs. According to MASAK statistics, since its inception, the agency has pursued more than 2100 money laundering cases, but, as of July 2005 only eight had resulted in a conviction. Factors contributing to this low conviction rate include the fact that Turkey's police, prosecutors, judges, and investigators could still benefit from additional training in dealing with financial crimes, better coordination among law enforcement agencies and better coordination between the courts that prosecute the predicate offenses and the courts that prosecute money laundering cases. Most of the cases involve non-narcotics criminal actions or tax evasion; roughly 30 percent are narcotics related. Until the revised MASAK law is in place, terrorist financing is not explicitly defined as a criminal offense by Turkish law. Various laws with provisions that can currently be used to punish the financing of terrorism include Articles 220, 314, and 315 of the Turkish Penal Code, which prohibit assistance in any form to a criminal organization or to any organization which acts to influence public services; media; proceedings of bids, concessions, and licenses; or to gain votes, by using or threatening violence. General Communiqu No. 3 requires that a special type of STR be filed by financial institutions in cases of suspected terrorist financing. The GOT distributes the UNSCR 1267 Sanctions Committee's consolidated list to interested GOT agencies and financial institutions. Another area of vulnerability in the area of terrorist financing is the GOT's loose supervision of non-profit organizations. The General Director of Foundations (GDF) issues licenses for charities and oversees them. The GDF requires charities to verify and prove their funding sources and to have bylaws. Charities are audited by the GDF and are subject to being shut down if they act outside the bylaws. The GDF keeps a central registry of charities. However, the GOT does not have other oversight mechanisms, such as requiring the publication of annual reports or periodic reporting to competent authorities. Alternative remittance systems are illegal in Turkey-only banks and authorized money transfer companies are permitted to transfer funds. However, there is anecdotal evidence that alternative remittance systems exist. The Council of Ministers promulgated a decree (2001/2483) to freeze all the funds and financial assets of individuals and organizations included on the UNSCR 1267 Sanctions Committee's consolidated list. The tools currently available under Turkish law for locating, freezing, seizing, and confiscating terrorist assets are cumbersome, limited, and not particularly effective. For example, there is no legal mechanism to freeze the assets of terrorists not on the consolidated list. According to MASAK statistics, no assets connected to terrorist organizations or terrorist activities were frozen in 2005. Turkey also has in place a system for identifying, tracing, freezing, and seizing assets that are not related to terrorism, although Turkish law allows for only criminal forfeiture not for the administrative freezing of assets. The anti-money laundering law, Article 7, provides for the confiscation of all property and assets (including derived income or returns) that are the proceeds of a money laundering predicate offense (soon to be expanded to crimes punishable by one year imprisonment),once the defendant is convicted. The law allows for the confiscation of the equivalent value of direct proceeds that could not be seized. Instrumentalities of money laundering can be confiscated under the law. In addition to the anti- money laundering law, Article 54 and 55 of the Criminal Code provides for post-conviction seizure and confiscation of the proceeds of crimes. The defendant, however, must own the property subject to forfeiture. Legitimate businesses can be seized if used to launder drug money, support terrorist activity, or are otherwise related to other criminal proceeds. Property or its value that is confiscated is transferred to the Treasury. The government enforces existing drug-related asset seizure and forfeiture laws. MASAK, the Turkish National Police, and the Courts are the government entities responsible for tracing, seizing and freezing assets. According to Article 9 of the anti-money laundering law, the Court of Peace-a minor arbitration court for petty offenses-has the authority to issue an order to freeze funds held in banks and non-bank financial institutions as well as other assets, and to hold the assets in custody during the preliminary investigation. During the trial phase, the presiding court has freezing authority. Public Prosecutors may freeze assets in cases where it is necessary to avoid delay. The Public Prosecutors' Office notifies the Court of Peace about the decision within 24 hours. The Court of Peace has 24 hours to decide whether to approve the action. There is no time limit on freezes. There is no provision in Turkish law for the sharing of seized assets with other countries. The GOT cooperates closely with the United States and with its neighbors in the Southeast Europe Cooperation Initiative (SECI). Turkey and the United States have a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty (MLAT) and cooperate closely on narcotics and money laundering investigations. Turkey is a member of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) and the Egmont Group. Turkey is a party to the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the UN International Convention for Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime. Turkey has signed and ratified the COE Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure, and Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime, and it will come into force on February 1, 2005. Turkey has signed, but not yet ratified, the UN Convention against Corruption. In December 2005, the General Assembly's Foreign Affairs Committee adopted a draft law ratifying this convention. Implementation efforts on UN anti-financial crime conventions are weak, and Turkey is not believed to be in full conformity with the FATF's Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing. The MASAK law will partially, but not completely, bring Turkey into compliance with these Special Recommendations. WILSON