THE PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS OF EARLY ELECTIONS IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 006878 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/10/2025 TAGS: PGOV TU SUBJECT: THE PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS OF EARLY ELECTIONS IN TURKEY REF: A. 2003 ANKARA 004161 ¶B. ANKARA 004888 (U) Classified by A/DCM James Moore, 12968, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary. Turkey's ruling and pro-Islam Justice and Development Party (AKP) government is resisting opposition calls for early elections. Presidential politics are a major factor: parliament will elect Turkey,s next President in May 2007, and the term of the current parliament, dominated by AKP, does not expire until November 2007. Absent a major political crisis, AKP will stand pat. The secular opposition is desperate to avoid having an AKP-dominated parliament elect the next President. End Summary. AKP Resists Opposition Calls for Early Elections -------------- --- ¶2. (C) The Turkish parliament, elected to a five-year term in November 2002, is not required to go to new elections until November 2007 unless certain constitutional provisions are triggered. Since AKP controls an overwhelming majority of the seats in parliament (357 of 550),new elections are unlikely, unless there is a major forcing event or AKP,s leadership decides that holding early elections is to its advantage. ¶3. (C) PM Erdogan has repeatedly stated that there will not be early elections, a point that AKP MPs, including at senior and leadership levels, have reiterated to us. The PM,s statements, however, have not silenced AKP's opponents' calls for early elections. The loudest pro-early election voices come from secular academics and journalists, opposition party leaders and the secular state establishment. Elections, By the Numbers -------------- ¶4. (U) AKP won a landslide election in November 2002, when all but one other party failed to win enough votes to overcome the 10 percent threshold to enter parliament. The result was an exaggerated parliamentary seat advantage for AKP: with just 34 percent of the vote, AKP won 363 of 550 seats. The center-left Republican People's Party (CHP) also won a disproportionate share of seats: 178, nearly one-third -- despite only winning 19 percent of the vote. ¶5. (C) The center-right True Path Party (DYP) and the ultra-nationalistic National Action Party (MHP) both fell short of the threshold by less than two percentage points due in large part to the candidacy of charismatic billionaire Cem 
Uzan, whose Genc Party proved the spoiler, receiving 7 percent of the vote. Since the election, Uzan,s party has disintegrated. DYP and MHP are the likely beneficiaries of the Genc Party's decline. Were new elections were held today, more than two parties would likely cross the 10 percent electoral threshold and the number of AKP and CHP seats would decline. The Role of Presidential Politics -------------- ¶6. (U) Turkish President Ahmet Necdet Sezer,s seven-year term expires in May 2007 and he is not eligible for re-election. Turkey,s Constitution requires that the President be elected by a two-thirds majority of parliament (367 of 550) in the first or second round. If no one receives a two-thirds majority, then the winner can be selected by a majority (276 of 550) in the third round. If there is no third round winner, the top two candidates from the third round compete in a fourth round of majority voting. If a president is not elected in the fourth round, new parliamentary elections must be held. ¶7. (U) Currently with 357 of 550 seats in parliament, AKP is in a position to dominate this process. At very least, the party should be able to select its favored candidate by the third round. ¶8. (C) As May 2007 approaches, AKP,s opponents, spearheaded by CHP President Deniz Baykal, who see the Presidency as a secular pillar of the Turkish Republic and do not want a pro-Islam party to select the next President, will increase ANKARA 00006878 002 OF 003 the pressure on AKP to hold early elections. Secular journalists will redouble their efforts to dig up stories of AKP corruption and malfeasance. Opposition politicians will step up criticism of AKP,s domestic and foreign policies in their zeal to gain domestic advantage, a strategy (perhaps unintentional but irresponsible) designed to weaken AKP's hand, but which could have the byproduct of undermining Turkey,s EU membership process, IMF negotiations, or U.S.-Turkish relations. ¶9. (U) Baykal fired an initial volley after his unanimous reelection November 19 as CHP leader, stating publicly that a new parliament should elect the next President; parliament Speaker Arinc shot back the next day that the present parliament would elect the next President. Erdogan's Ambitions -------------- ¶10. (C) PM Erdogan is widely rumored to want to become President and his ambition enjoys wide support among AKP MPs. However, Erdogan,s rise to the Presidency may not be in AKP,s interest. In the 1990s, charismatic PMs Turgut Ozal and Suleyman Demirel were elected President, only to see their parties, effectiveness and popularity decline. Erdogan might well conclude that he needs to put his Presidential ambitions on the back burner in order to maintain AKP,s political dominance and promote AKP,s pro-Islam agenda. ¶11. (C) Moreover, under the current system, the Turkish PM is more powerful and influential than the President. Erdogan may not wish to become President unless he can push through constitutional amendments to strengthen the Presidency, a difficult feat in Turkey's current political climate. In such a case, Erdogan would be more inclined to remain PM, promote an AKP loyalist for the Presidency, then push through constitutional reforms to strengthen the Presidency, possibly assuming the office himself at a later date. Early Election Scenarios -------------- ¶12. (C) AKP currently has little incentive to hold early elections, since they would likely result in AKP losing dozens of seats, even if the party increased its actual share of the vote. There are three scenarios, however, under which AKP,s leadership could change its mind: -- AKP might decide to hold early elections if it assesses that an election would result in an increase in the number of AKP seats in parliament (Comment: Possible but unlikely. End Comment). AKP conducts extensive polling (REF B); the party currently expects to receive 40-45 percent of the vote and believes that two or three other parties could cross the 10 percent threshold. -- AKP might be forced to hold early elections in response to a shock to the political system resulting in a dramatic decrease in AKP,s popularity. This could be caused by an economic crisis, corruption or other scandals, an international relations crisis, or a political miscalculation that alienates a substantial faction of the party. Were AKP MPs to defect or threaten to defect to another party in large numbers, AKP,s leadership might call early elections in an effort to purge the defectors from parliament and fend off a later, more organized challenge. -- Even if AKP,s popularity holds, the prospect of the current AKP parliamentary majority electing the President could so alienate Turkey,s secular state establishment and opposition that AKP could feel compelled to hold early elections to renew its mandate and silence its critics. Under this scenario, even if AKP expected to lose some seats, it would go to elections as long as its leaders are confident they would win a parliamentary majority sufficient to elect the next President. ¶13. (C) Comment: Assuming a crisis does not push AKP to the polls, this parliament's longevity will be a reflection of how much Turkey has changed, both in terms of a parliament lasting an entire election cycle, and with regard to the leading role of a pro-Islam party. And, if the secular establishment fails in its efforts to press for new ANKARA 00006878 003 OF 003 elections, and if it -- and the military -- can stand back and allow a pro-Islam party to select one of their own as President and Head of State, that would truly be a sign of major change here. End Comment. MCELDOWNEY