NOV. 8 CAUCASUS WORKING GROUP MEETING IN ANKARA

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 006846 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/18/2015 TAGS: PREL MARR MASS TU AJ AM GG KZ RS SUBJECT: NOV. 8 CAUCASUS WORKING GROUP MEETING IN ANKARA REF: A. 04 ANKARA 7044 ¶B. ANKARA 6768 Classified By: Counselor for Political-Military Affairs Timothy A. Bett s for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (C) During Nov. 8 Caucasus Working Group discussions, the U.S. and Turkey shared assessments of the strategic situation in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The U.S. side briefed on the Caspian Guard program, and urged the Turks to participate in the upgrade of Nasosnaya Airbase in Azerbaijan, to host a Marshall Center conference on enhancing Azeri-Kazakh security cooperation, and to participate in the South Caucasus Clearinghouse. Turkey requested the U.S. coordinate more closely on equipment transfers. End summary. ¶2. (C) On November 8, the Turkish General Staff (TGS) hosted bilateral Caucasus Working Group talks in Ankara. The U.S. delegation was led by OSD Principal Director for Eurasia Scott Schless. Turkey was represented by TGS J5 Chief of Strategy and Force Planning MG Serdar Savas. Unlike the last CWG meeting in Dec. 2004, the Turkish MFA was represented. Schless and Savas agreed that Turkish and U.S. interests and policies in the region remain quite close, and that senior-level dialogue on the Caucasus and Central Asia should continue. ¶3. (C) In his opening statement, MG Savas expressed concern that weak economies in the Caucasus and Central Asia make it that much harder to solve regional problems. Additionally, Central Asian countries are vulnerable to Islamic extremism, and Georgia faces a special threat from infiltrating Chechen terrorists. According to Savas, security for energy projects (such as the BTC pipeline) is "essential." He added the (for Turkey, obligatory) point that Armenian genocide claims hurt Turkey-Armenia relations, and "hurt our efforts to bring peace to the region." ¶4. (C) Schless noted that since the first CWG in 1999, it has become even clearer that Turkey and the U.S. share many common policy objectives in the region. Additionally, Turkey and the U.S. are the two countries most active and involved in the Caucasus and Central Asia. The U.S. remains most concerned about the Russian role in the region, energy security, and frozen conflicts. Schless noted that Azerbaijan is a "country of priority" for OSD; for its part, Georgia is eager to join the Alliance, and the U.S. wants to assist the GOG to be in the best position when it comes time for NATO to make future enlargement decisions. Assessment of the Region -------------- ¶5. (C) Schless pointed out that the ongoing Nagorno-Karabakh conflict keeps the U.S. from fully realizing full cooperation with Azerbaijan. Despite the Minsk Group's best efforts, we have been unsuccessful in solving the dispute to date. That said, the two presidents met in May and August and reached agreement on some issues. Schless added that Turkey -- with its uniquely close relationship to Azerbaijan -- may be able help move the process along. Additionally, the prospect of opening Turkey's border with Armenia might give Yerevan an incentive to be more flexible in making a deal. ¶6. (C) Savas responded emotionally to this subject: he averred that 1.3 million Azeris have been displaced and still face a desperate situation. "This (situation) is not frozen for them," he stated. He noted that U.S. policy toward the region stressed democratization, human rights, free markets, and not changing borders by force, and asked that this standard be applied to Armenia as well. The MFA representative, Department Head for the Caucasus Suleyman Gokce, took a more positive approach, urging that we take advantage of the window of opportunity from now until Armenian elections in early 2007. He added that the onus is now on Armenia to act responsibly. ¶7. (C) Turning to Russia's role in the region, Savas believed that Moscow had been hurt by the popular revolutions in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan; in turn, this might compel the Russians to be more realistic in dealing with Nagorno-Karabakh. Turkey seeks to help the countries in the ANKARA 00006846 002 OF 003 region be fully independent. Given both Russian and Iranian designs in the region, this is critically important. However, Savas added, the very fact that these countries' militaries use Russian equipment is just one example of how hard it is to break Russian influence. Schless replied that we share Turkey's view: Establishing fully independent nations in this region is at the heart of U.S. policy. ¶8. (C) Turning to Georgia, Schless reviewed President Saakashvili's proposal for the international community to help solve the South Ossetia conflict. The United States is concerned that events there could spin out of control, for example the "independence day" celebrations and the subsequent mortar firings on Sept. 20. He noted that the USG urged the OSCE to take an active role to reduce tensions. ¶9. (C) MFA's Gokce noted the Oct. 8 Georgian parliamentary resolution asking the GOG to "take all necessary steps" to engage with all parties to solve South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and expressed concern that such a move might provoke the Russians. Gokce said that the GOT had advised the GOG not to provoke Moscow unnecessarily. Schless added that the main U.S. message has been the need to settle these issues peacefully. While the U.S. has counseled the Georgians not to be impulsive, putting some pressure on Russia "is not necessarily a bad thing." The Turkish delegation noted that while Turkey wanted to assist Georgia's military, the GOT hoped the GOG would not use the military to solve its internal problems. Schless agreed: The main goal in building up Georgia's military was for it to play a useful role in international coalitions. ¶10. (C) Schless characterized Abkhazia as "the most frozen" of the regional conflicts, especially given the extent of Russian interference. Unfortunately, Russia has not been able to move away from a "zero sum" mentality and understand how stable border areas are in its own best interest. For its part, Georgia must find a way to attract local support in the area. Savas agreed. (NOTE: We reported ref b on Senior Adviser for Eurasia Mann's meetings with Turkish MFA officials the same day on South Ossetia and Abkhazia. END NOTE.) Caspian Guard -------------- ¶11. (C) EUCOM Azerbaijan Desk Officer LTC Scott Sweetser briefed the Caspian Guard program and security assistance to Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan. Over the next 6 years, the USG is planning to spend $130 million for counterterrorism, counterproliferation, and counter-trafficking efforts. Our main priorities are airspace and maritime surveillance, national-level command and control, and enhancing the militaries' and coast guards' ability to respond to a crisis. The U.S. side invited Turkey to consider participating with us in providing upgrades to Nasosnaya Air Base in Azerbaijan, and also to consider hosting in April 2006 a George C. Marshall Center conference on bilateral Azeri-Kazakh security cooperation. (NOTE: Later Savas said that Turkey will consider the first issue, but he asked that we direct the conference proposal to the Turkish MFA. MFA officials asked that the proposal be fleshed out further before we formally approach them. END NOTE.) ¶12. (C) Savas responded that Turkey enthusiastically supports Caspian Guard as a concrete measure in the GWOT. He believed that the assistance we have provided to Azerbaijan under this program has contributed to security for the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline project, obviously of great importance to Turkey. Savas asked if Russia had objected to Caspian Guard; the EUCOM briefer responded that we had heard no complaints above the 0-6 level. Central Asia -------------- ¶13. (C) Schless stated that Central Asia is in a time of flux, with political, religious, and economic sources of instability. Russia and China are promoting competing models of governance, while the U.S. continues to support independence, democratic reforms, good governance, and free markets. The flow of drugs into and through the region from Afghanistan threatens to "rot away" any progress we might make. Schless asked Savas for his view on the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which seems to be taking an even ANKARA 00006846 003 OF 003 more forthrightly negative stance toward the west. ¶14. (C) Savas agreed with the U.S. assessment, but added that radical Islam is a growing negative influence in Central Asia. It is partly for this reason that Turkey has continued to encourage the Central Asian governments to maintain strong relations with the west and with NATO institutions. Schless noted that in the past, Uzbekistan had been more willing to stand up to Russia and China, but now that U.S.-Uzbek relations have soured, Karimov may be more willing to cooperate with Moscow and Beijing. Thus Kazakhstan becomes all the more important; luckily, Kazakhstan's natural resources give it an edge in maintaining its independence. Savas added that the people in Turkmenistan share western values but are stifled by their government. Turkey will engage with Shanghai Cooperation Organization members. Security Cooperation -------------- ¶15. (C) Both Turkey and the U.S. briefed on our security cooperation programs in Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan. During the briefs, the Turks noted that both countries provided similar items -- such as radios -- to the Georgians. TGS argued that the U.S. and Turkish sides should seek to coordinate these donations more efficiently, perhaps with an eye toward reducing potential maintenance issues later on for the equipment. The U.S. side urged Turkey to participate more fully in the South Caucasus Clearinghouse meetings. Both sides agreed to consider each other's requests. Schless closed the meeting by inviting Savas to Washington for the next CWG. ¶16. (U) Mr. Schless has cleared this cable. MCELDOWNEY