PUSHING FOR PROGRESS AGAINST PKK NETWORKS IN

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 006634 SIPDIS TREASURY FOR OTI - RLEBENSON NSC FOR MERKEL JUSTICE FOR OPDAT - JSILVERWOOD E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/09/2010 TAGS: KTFN PTER EFIN PGOV TU PKK SUBJECT: PUSHING FOR PROGRESS AGAINST PKK NETWORKS IN EUROPE REF: ANKARA 6448 Classified By: CDA Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4(b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Now that the Turks have given us their initial response to our list of PKK support groups in Europe, we should move quickly to the next phase of our strategy. We recommend that Washington send an interagency team to Ankara as soon as possible so that we can begin the process of compiling dossiers that contain sufficient evidence to compel law enforcement action by European governments. Given the weakness of the Turkish system, to be successful we are likely to require continued face to face engagement with the GOT and a lot of handholding. End Summary. -------------- Handholding Required -------------- ¶2. (C) We understand that Washington agencies are refining steps to be taken toward the goal of enhanced cooperation with Turkey against PKK networks in Europe. With the GOT having responded affirmatively to our offer, it is important to deliver quickly and concretely on the high-level commitments made by NSA Hadley and others. The success or failure of this effort will depend in large measure on input from the Turks, who will need to work with us to develop "dossiers" of illegal activities in Europe by PKK operatives sufficiently persuasive to induce EU law enforcement agencies to take enforcement action against these individuals. Given the weaknesses of the Turkish system, both with regard to interagency cooperation and the ability to put together strong, internationally-accepted case files, we expect this to be a long and labor-intensive process that will require detailed U.S. involvement. In addition to work in Washington, continued face to face engagement on the ground here in Turkey is likely to be required. -------------- Arrests Based on Criminal Activity -------------- ¶3. (C) In order to get European law enforcement agencies to make PKK arrests--whether for deportation, prosecution or extradition--the track record suggests that going after PKK officials for criminal activity in Europe has a better chance of success than arrests based on anti-terrorism laws or on crimes committed in Turkey. Even if the information provided by Turkey convinces law enforcement agencies to make arrests, in the past such information has failed to convince independent courts, or the courts have refused to extradite on human rights grounds. Though the Turks do not seem to have grasped the need to focus on criminal activity such as money-laundering, narcotics, human trafficking, and extortion, their poor track record using the terrorism card is telling. Moreover, evidence of criminal activity in Europe could trigger action by European law enforcement agencies without their needing to establish a link to terrorism. -------------- Terror Finance Designations -------------- ¶4. (C) As we work through the law enforcement effort, we should not neglect the potential offered by the use of anti-terrorism finance tools. Even if less of a headline grabber than arrests, designation of PKK individuals and front companies by EU members (and other countries) could have a disruptive impact of PKK finances. In some cases, it may also be easier to get the Europeans to designate than to arrest: the lower evidentiary standard, allowing the use of intelligence, sets the bar much lower for the required provision of information. Moreover, with the EU Clearinghouse having designated PKK and Kongra-Gel, merely establishing that individuals or companies are PKK-connected should logically be sufficient for them to be designated. In view of the fact that the Turks have no experience preparing Statements of Case, the U.S. may need to provide assistance here as well. MCELDOWNEY