SUSTAINING INTERCHANGE WITH TURKISH CYPRIOTS

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 006351 SIPDIS SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 10/18/2015 TAGS: PREL TU CY GR EU SUBJECT: SUSTAINING INTERCHANGE WITH TURKISH CYPRIOTS REF: A. NICOSIA 1617 ¶B. ATHENS 2647 ¶C. BRUSSELS 3756 (U) Classified by CDA Nancy McEldowney, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: In line with Embassies Nicosia and Athens ideas for a post-October 3 way forward on Cyprus, Embassy Ankara offers two suggestions: initiating a sustained interchange with Turkish Cypriot authorities in areas of unassailable U.S. interest; and offering financing assistance for companies seeking to develop projects on non-Greek Cypriot land or infrastructure in the north. We hesitate to predict that either of these would even begin to untie the Cyprus knot, but they could in small measure contribute to furthering the existing USG policy goals of ending Turkish Cypriot isolation, bolstering pro-solution forces in Turkey and the north, and continuing support for Turkey,s EU accession. "TRNC President" Talat,s October 28 visit to Washington could present a good opportunity to launch these initiatives. With October 3 behind us, the first crucial year in Turkey's EU accession process before us, and the UK and perhaps Russia considering new approaches to Cyprus, Talat's visit is a golden opportunity. End Summary. ¶2. (C) Athens and Nicosia have offered their views on the current Cyprus situation (refs A and B). We too see this issue as stalemated. Perhaps post October 3, we have a small window in which to start to make some progress. It strikes us as worth a try. ¶3. (C) In the aftermath of the April 2004 Cyprus referenda, the USG embarked on a policy of ending Turkish Cypriot isolation. The Turks genuinely and publicly appreciate USG efforts to date. Our efforts have done little to ease the sense here that Turkish Cypriots remain isolated and that Turkey has received little concrete reward for the political capital it spent on seeking settlement in 2004. Absent a signal of flexibility from the ROC, this limits Turkey's room for maneuver on Cyprus and contributes to the stalemate in overall settlement efforts. ¶4. (C) "TRNC President" Talat's visit to Washington and October 28 meeting with Secretary Rice is the USG's latest and most high-profile effort to reach out to Turkish Cypriots. In line with our policy of engagement, the USG could use Talat's visit as an opportunity to initiate regular, sustained Washington-based interchange with Turkish Cypriots. ¶5. (C) One possibility would be for the Secretary, during her October 28 meeting with Talat, to offer to begin regular contact with "TRNC" authorities in areas of unassailable U.S. interest, with an eye toward capacity building and training. Such areas include law enforcement, counterterrorism, counternarcotics, anti-terror finance, anti-money laundering, aviation safety, and maritime search and rescue. ¶6. (C) If this seems a useful approach, the Department could work to foster contacts between "TRNC" authorities and the FBI, DHS, Treasury, and the Coast Guard, and through the Southeastern Europe Cooperative Initiative (SECI) Center in Budapest. A companion idea would be for the USG to systematize mid-level contact between "TRNC" and USG authorities from outside the island by regular visits to the north. ¶7. (C) As seen from Ankara, sustained interchange from the U.S. could help ease Turkish Cypriot isolation; strengthen the hand of pro-settlement forces in Ankara and northern Cyprus; and furnish a road map for nations outside the EU to reach out to Turkish Cypriots. It could also do what the EU cannot (viz., the ROC-blocked trade and aid package to the north, promised in 2004),helping start to pave the way for a revival of the UN-brokered final settlement on Cyprus. And it could accomplish this within the bounds of existing U.S. policy, the ultimate goal of which is settlement. ¶8. (C) In the context of Talat's visit, the USG could also consider offering OPIC or TDA financing for projects in the north not involving Greek Cypriot land or infrastructure. This would, in small measure, contribute to closing the economic gap between the two sides of the island, preparing the ground for eventual reunification. MCELDOWNEY