Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ANKARA5978
2005-10-04 12:36:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKEY, THE MORNING AFTER

Tags:  PREL PGOV EU TU 
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041236Z Oct 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005978 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV EU TU
SUBJECT: TURKEY, THE MORNING AFTER

REF: A. ANKARA 5932


B. ANKARA 1730

C. ANKARA 1074

Classified by CDA Nancy McEldowney, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 005978 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 09/04/2015 TAGS: PREL PGOV EU TU SUBJECT: TURKEY, THE MORNING AFTER REF: A. ANKARA 5932 ¶B. ANKARA 1730 ¶C. ANKARA 1074 Classified by CDA Nancy McEldowney, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: The morning after Turkish FM Gul made his late-evening, oft-postponed flight to Luxembourg to officially open Turkey's EU accession negotiations, Turkish officials and media alike are hailing the step as an historic accomplishment. Last minute changes to the negotiating framework text allowed the Turks to reach consensus on two deal-breaker concerns and ease the national mood of wounded pride (ref A). Turkish officials have expressed their thanks to us for U.S. support; media have been overt in their praise. But the afterglow will be short, as Turkey faces a difficult road that will require hard work and profound changes in mentality. End Summary. Real Concerns, and A Tough Slog to Consensus -------------- ¶2. (C) In the run-up to the hard-won consensus on the evening of October 3, the Turks' twin concerns over "privileged partnership" and being forced to drop objections to Republic of Cyprus (ROC) membership in international organizations were real. Gaining internal consensus was a tough slog; the Turks' vows to walk away from negotiations over these issues were no bluff. The AKP government held its final deliberations at AKP party headquarters to include party leadership - a sign of the delicate internal political balance. ¶3. (C) "Privileged partnership" cuts to the heart of Turkey's nationalistic pride, denoting second-class citizenship and discrimination. For all their anti-EU rhetoric, most Turks desperately want to be seen as "good enough" to be part of Europe; "privileged partnership" was a shibboleth for even pro-EU Turks. ¶4. (C) The Cyprus issue, too, posed a dilemma. MFA officials worried that negotiations would cease if Turkey did not drop objections to Cypriot membership in NATO and other organizations or, in the words of a sleep-deprived MFA official, that the AKP government would fall if Turkey did drop its objections. Often uneasy AKP government-Turkish military relations were also certainly on their minds. ¶5. (C) Against the backdrop of news about back-and-forth negotiations that trickled in throughout the day, Erdogan and Gul successfully portrayed the final text as a victory both for Turkey and for Europe.
Reports of Austria's concession and of text changes eased the Turks' bruised pride that had prevailed in the days leading up to October 3. Erdogan and Gul Hail Beginning of Talks -------------- ¶6. (U) PM Erdogan hailed what he termed "a gigantic step in line with Turkey's historical mission." He called the beginning of negotiations "the most important stage in the ideals of our republic and the effort we made during the past 40 years." ¶7. (U) Speaking at an airport news conference just before taking off for Luxembourg, Gul called the beginning of negotiations an "historic point" and a "step toward a new era," adding, "all the leaders in the EU have supported Turkey." In a statesmanlike gesture, Gul noted that he had called opposition People's Republican Party leader Deniz Baykal, a fierce critic of Gul's AKP and the EU, to brief him on the details of the final framework text. Media Coverage, Transformed -------------- ¶8. (U) Media coverage, which on the morning of October 3 was uniformly defiant about EU "demands," transformed instantly into glowing headlines about Turkey's new EU vocation. Several leading dailies carried headlines portraying the final negotiating framework outcome as a Turkish "win." Even leftist daily "Cumhuriyet," recently the media's most strident anti-EU voice, settled for the tame headline of "Negotiations Begin." Public and Private Gratitude for U.S. Efforts -------------- ¶9. (U) The media also praised U.S efforts on Turkey's behalf. Leading television news channel NTV ran the story about Secretary Rice's conversation with PM Erdogan under the ticker "The U.S. Steps In." After falling sharply Monday morning, the beginning of the Turkish financial markets' rebound coincided with news of the Rice/Erdogan call. The call was also front page news in mass-circulation daily "Hurriyet," anti-EU "Cumhuriyet," and Islamist-leaning Zaman, under the headline "The U.S. Steps In: We Are On Your Side." Several media reports outlined U.S. efforts with Cyprus and other EU countries. ¶10. (C) Turkish officials have been effusive in their thanks for U.S. support. Several advisors to PM Erdogan called Charge immediately following the formal decision to go to Luxembourg and profusely thanked the U.S. for its efforts. An emotional MFA U/S Tuygan called Charge thereafter and expressed deep gratitude for years of U.S. support. Short Afterglow, A Hard Road Ahead -------------- ¶11. (C) Comment: The afterglow of October 3 will be short-lived. Turkey's leaders must now shift gears quickly and do the hard work to prepare Turkey, structurally and mentally, for the negotiation process. Turkey's EU General Secretariat needs to be re-organized and strengthened. SIPDIS Ministries need to set aside staff to work on the adoption of the 80,000-page EU aquis. Chief EU Negotiator Babacan must gather capable and experienced personnel. ¶12. (C) The mental transformations required of Turkey are profound. Turkey's leaders must make the public understand that there is hardly any give-and-take in EU "negotiations." To be successful, the Turks will have to swallow some pride; given Turkey's strong nationalism, this will be difficult and controversial. The government's hope is that, with October 3 behind them, much of the formal process can become regularized and slip under the radar screen of public scrutiny. The strident and unhelpful opposition is unlikely to allow that. ¶13. (C) The EU and Turkey navigated a similarly tortuous path last December at the Summit when the EU established the October 3 negotiation date. After the Summit, Turkey's reform efforts stalled and the GOT allowed its EU candidacy to drift politically (refs B,C). We will immediately engage with the GOT about their plans for the next stage and strongly urge them to move forward now, while the political mood is still fresh. End Comment. MCELDOWNEY

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