Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ANKARA4965
2005-08-24 16:42:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

ACTION REQUEST: TURKEY CONCERNED THAT NEW

Tags:  PREL PGOV TU IZ 
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241642Z Aug 05
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004965 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU IZ
SUBJECT: ACTION REQUEST: TURKEY CONCERNED THAT NEW
CONSTITUTION WILL GIVE KURDS A GREEN LIGHT ON KIRKUK

REF: ANKARA 4873

Classified By: Acting DCM Timothy A. Betts for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 004965

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 08/23/2015
TAGS: PREL PGOV TU IZ
SUBJECT: ACTION REQUEST: TURKEY CONCERNED THAT NEW
CONSTITUTION WILL GIVE KURDS A GREEN LIGHT ON KIRKUK

REF: ANKARA 4873

Classified By: Acting DCM Timothy A. Betts for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).


1. (U) This is an action request--please see para. 7.


2. (C) Summary: Turkey believes the language on Kirkuk in the
Iraqi draft constitution will remove safeguards currently in
place in the TAL and give the Iraqi Kurds a "green light" to
press forward with making the province part of the KRA.
Turkey sees such a development (if true) as "explosive," and
asks that the U.S. use its influence to "restore balance" on
Kirkuk in the constitution. Post seeks clarification on the
current state of play on Kirkuk in the constitutional process
to pass to the Turks. End summary.


3. (C) On instructions from FonMin Gul, MFA Director General
for the Middle East Oguz Celikkol called in A/DCM Aug. 24 to
express Turkey's concerns about articles in the new Iraqi
constitution which reportedly remove "safeguards" which had
been present in the TAL which would prohibit Kirkuk from
becoming part of the KRA. Specifically, Celikkol referred to
Articles 149 and 152 of what he said was the current draft
constitution, and pointed out that they refer only to TAL
Article 58 and to para. a of TAL Article 53. The Turks are
particularly alarmed that para. c of Article 53 has been
removed; this para. specifically bars Kirkuk (and Baghdad)
provinces from becoming part of any regional grouping.
Additionally, according to Celikkol, the draft constitution
sets a low bar for demanding a provincial referendum on
joining a regional grouping: one-third of the members of a
provincial council or a petition signed by ten percent of a
province's population would be sufficient.


4. (C) Celikkol asserted that the draft constitution upsets
the previous balance hammered out within the TAL to protect
Kirkuk's special status. The Iraqi Kurdish groups will see
this outcome as a "green light" for their demand to take over
Kirkuk and make it part of the KRA. Many thousands of Kurds
have already moved into the province since 2003. This,
combined with the constitutional language, make it a fait
accompli that Kirkuk will come under Kurdish control, he
argued. Celikkol added that he understood that SISTANI had
issued a statement opposing Kirkuk's incorporation into the
KRA. If this is the case, and if the Sunnis were also to
oppose this, "the situation is explosive," he said.


5. (C) A/DCM asked if Turkey was also discussing its concerns
with the Iraqis. Celikkol responded that he understands that
the constitution is being hammered out by a very small circle
in Baghdad: SCIRI leader Hakim, KDP leader Barzani, and
Ambassador Khalilzad. Celikkol complained that there is no
easy ITG address in Baghdad with whom to speak about such
issues. He said Turkey does talk to Hakim in general terms
about Kirkuk, but has not discussed specific constitutional
language with him or the Shia. Discussing the issue with the
Kurds is "difficult." As for the Sunni Arabs, the Turks want
to concentrate their dialogue on encouraging them to
participate in the political process, not on specific Turkish
complaints. Turkey is asking the U.S. to use our influence
to keep safeguards in place on Kirkuk in the constitution.
If these safeguards are removed, Celikkol argued, it may
"unleash additional tensions and divisions in Iraq."


6. (C) A/DCM pointed out that we were being careful to ensure
that the constitutional process was an Iraqi process. Amb.
Khalilzad and our Embassy were working hard to promote
dialogue and bring the parties together, but if the language
the Turks are concerned about is agreed to by all sides, we
cannot change it. Noting that post has not seen a draft with
the kind of language the Turks have found, and that several
of Acting U/S Sensoy's earlier claims about the text to the
Charge had proven to be erroneous (reftel),A/DCM asked if
the text the Turks had obtained was authoritative. We
understood that there are many different draft texts in
circulation in Baghdad. Celikkol responded that it had come
from the Turkish Embassy in Baghdad, which was translating
the text it had received from Arabic to Turkish. He added
that the Turkish ambassador in Baghdad was talking to a
number of contacts, including members of the constitutional
drafting committee, so he felt confident that the text was
genuine. He added that if we can clarify whether the text is
authoritative, he would be grateful.


7. (C) Action request and comment: Request Washington or
Embassy Baghdad confirm our latest understanding of the state
of play on Kirkuk in the draft constitution so that we may
convey this to the Turks. We have encouraged the Turks to
discuss this issue with the Iraqis. While we cannot comment
on the impact the language on Kirkuk will have in Iraq,
Turkey will react negatively and harshly if the
constitutional language on Kirkuk is as the Turks claim.
MCELDOWNEY