SCENESETTER FOR JAN.31-FEB.1 VISIT OF UNDER

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 000426 SIPDIS STATE PLEASE PASS TO EU/SE DOUG SILLIMAN, PM DAS KARA BUE E.O. 12958: DECL: 01/25/2029 TAGS: OVIP PREL MARR TU SUBJECT: SCENESETTER FOR JAN.31-FEB.1 VISIT OF UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY DOUG FEITH TO ANKARA SIPDIS REF: A. ANKARA 242 ¶B. ANKARA 356 Classified By: Ambassador Eric. S. Edelman, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (S) Summary: Your visit will extend a series of January visits by Deputy Secretary of State Armitage, NATO Supreme Allied Commander General Jones and Commander of Central Command General Abizaid, and will provide an opportunity to echo their pledge that the US will fight all forms of terrorism in Iraq and to confirm the Secretary of Defense's commitment to a strong security partnership between the US and Turkey. Turkish government and public unhappiness with the coalition effort in Iraq and the failure of the US to live up to perceived promises to combat the PKK threat in northern Iraq, together with Turkey's focus on achieving its EU membership aspirations, have created strains in a bilateral relationship that has not completely recovered from Turkey's March 1, 2003 vote against allowing a northern front for coalition efforts in Iraq, and the July 4, 2003 arrest of Turkish Special Forces near Suleymania. Despite these tensions, however, Turkey has remained supportive of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT),offering troops for Iraq, allowing the transport of fuel and humanitarian supplies to Iraq, refueling operations for both Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) and Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and troop transit from Iraq at Incirlik, accepting the command of ISAF VII in February, and establishing a Center of Excellence for the Defense Against Terrorism (COE-DAT). Turkey is poised to play an active role in the Proliferation Security Initiative and continues to encourage Iran to abandon its nuclear weapons ambitions. Military equipment sales suffered in 2004 with the cancellation of three tenders but these are being re-issued and US firms may participate. Turkey is also upgrading most of its F-16 fleet. End Summary. -------------- THE DOMESTIC SCENE -------------- ¶2. (C) You arrive in Turkey as we are recalibrating our bilateral engagement. Iraq-related issues will top your Turkish interlocutors' agendas. The GOT shares our goals of a stable, democratic, unified Iraq, but our intervention there is unpopular and has generated Turkish concerns over lack of US action against the PKK in northern Iraq, Kurdish separatism and designs on Kirkuk, and attacks against Turkish truck drivers. Bilateral relations were poisoned by grossly distorted media coverage of the Fallujah operation late last year. Turkey has given valuable help on Iraq; however, our security relationship is fragile. The EU's December decision to open accession negotiations with Turkey in October will help keep reform moving forward, but Turkey faces a long, difficult path to accession. ¶3. (S) Despite resentment and suspicion of AKP by the military and other elements of the secular elite, Erdogan appears unassailable; he has a two-thirds majority in parliament; he remains highly popular; his government continues to reform Turkey's political and social space -- at least on the books; and he has pursued an activist foreign policy. The only effective opposition is the military, and TGS Chief Ozkok is reluctant to take on the government publicly for fear of derailing Turkey's EU accession and thereby losing popular support for the military. Instead, his TGS has gone along with EU-mandated reforms which have reduced the military's institutional methods of applying political influence. The lack of a credible political opposition means the military lacks an important tool to effect change behind the scenes as well. ¶4. (U) The Turkish economy has recovered strongly from the financial crisis of 2000-2001 and is growing at an annual pace of around 8-9 percent. However, the recovery remains vulnerable due to a large current account deficit (about 5 percent of GDP) and a large debt with a short maturity structure. Unemployment and poverty remain high, and ordinary people have not felt much benefit from the overall macroeconomic improvement. Macroeconomic success has also bred a sense of complacency about the need to persist with difficult reforms, such as privatization, and reform of the banking, social security and tax systems, all of which are being addressed in a new three-year IMF standby program. ¶5. (U) Due to historic economic/political volatility and opaque regulatory/judicial systems, Turkey has long received less foreign direct investment than other countries of similar size and potential. Many in the Turkish elite are convinced that there will be a flood of foreign investment now that the EU has decided to open accession negotiations with Turkey in October 2005. However, this is unlikely to materialize unless more is done in the area of structural reform. In addition, there appears to be a lack of appreciation for the enormous challenges Turkey will shoulder in the accession negotiations, for the fact that EU accession will affect nearly aspect of their lives, and that it may in the end be quite costly for Turkey to comply with EU directives in environmental protection and other areas. -------------- Bilateral Relationship -------------- ¶6. (C) Over the last year, US relations with Turkey, which had not fully recovered from the March 2003 parliamentary vote against allowing the passage of the 4th ID into Iraq, and the July 2003 arrest and hooding of Turkish Special Forces near Suleymania, Iraq, slipped further. MFA Undersecretary Tuygan told the Ambassador January 18 that the only significant problem in Turkey-US relations was Iraq. In fact, regular reports of the death of Turkish truck drivers, a barrage of media disinformation about coalition operations in Tal Afar and Fallujah, anger over perceived US inaction against the PKK, and suspicions about US support for Kurdish designs on Kirkuk and separatism in northern Iraq -- fanned by statements by PM Erdogan and Foreign Minister Gul alleging excessive use of force and civilian casualties -- have whipped up already negative public opinion about the US. Last month, the government made some statements to try to alleviate the situation and the mission is making a concerted effort to encourage the government and media to speak on the basis of fact rather than fiction. However, the Turkish General Staff has remained silent and the negative perceptions -- in the press, among the public and within the ranks of the bureaucracy and military -- persist, making bilateral cooperation in all aspects of our relationship harder to effect than in the past. ¶7. (C) However, the EU decision on December 17 to begin accession negotiations with Turkey on Oct. 3, 2005, may have provided the starting point for a small, but perceptible positive shift in relations. While government officials still refrain from publicly supporting US policies or actions in Iraq, they have been adding less fuel to the fire. In meetings with DepSecState Armitage and General Abizaid, both Turkish government and military officials reaffirmed the importance of our bilateral relationship and called for close dialogue on issues of mutual interest. -------------- Iraq Dominates the Agenda -------------- ¶8. (S) You will arrive in Turkey one day after the Jan. 30 elections in Iraq. The Turkish government shares the goal of a unified, prosperous, democratic Iraq, at peace internally and with its neighbors, and has contributed to international pressure on the Sunnis to participate in the elections. However, the Turks worry about long-term US staying power in Iraq, that events there could spiral out of control, and that Ankara could be faced with either a Shia-dominated government that they assert will tilt dangerously toward Iran, an intensified movement toward an independent Kurdish state emanating from northern Iraq, or both. Turkish leaders will seek your assurance that the USG, and our military, remain committed to ensuring a stable -- and unified -- Iraq whatever the outcome of the elections. ¶9. (C) Ninety percent of the Turkish public opposed the effort to oust Saddam Hussein and sentiment against coalition operations in Iraq still runs deep. Most Turks get their information on events in Iraq from a press that is biased against the US-led effort and full of reporting based on unsubstantiated half-truths or lies, (much of it sourced from al-Jazeera or similarly biased sources) as well as a steady stream of reports on the kidnapping and killing of Turkish truck drivers (over 70 deaths as of January '05). Despite the presence of Turkish Liaison Officers (LNOs) assigned to Task Force Olympia (TFO) and MNF-I who received up-to-date reports on the October 2004 coalition action in Tal afar, both the Turkish public and government expressed outrage at the operation, based on false stories of civilian casualties and violent US treatment of residents. To address the misinformation, and in hopes that Turkish officials would do likewise, the mission established a system of providing periodic cleared information on coalition operations to Turkish government and military officials, and to the press. This effort may have contributed to Turkish military silence during the subsequent operation in Fallujah and the less vitriolic Turkish government response. Your visit will make an important contribution to this effort. ¶10. (C) Turning a corner?: The December death of five Turkish policemen enroute to Baghdad to take up security duties at the Turkish Embassy shocked the country. The Turkish government and military made a point to thank the US for the swift TFO response, including killing or capturing of some insurgents, aiding the wounded and repatriating the bodies of the policemen killed. Additionally, the Turkish military was quick to tell the mission that Turkish First Army Commander General Tolon's accusations of US responsibility did not reflect the Turkish General Staff position. Turkish press reporting on the incident was generally factual. The November establishment of trilateral (US/TU/IZ) talks on Turkish truck driver safety, with the participation of Multinational Force - Iraq (MNF-I),opened the door to cooperative information sharing and other efforts to support the drivers. -------------- PKK - Unfulfilled Promises and New Direction -------------- ¶11. (S) Turkish government and military leaders understand that responsibility for dealing with terrorists within Iraq's borders will increasingly pass to the Iraqis, and their agreement to host the Jan. 11 trilateral PKK talks was a positive sign that they will work together with the Iraqis on this shared problem. Still, they, and the public at large, remain bitter over their perception that the US has taken no steps in Iraq to fulfill President Bush's June 2004 pledge that that country will no longer be a base for terrorist operations against Turkey and they expect the US to remain engaged in the effort. Some in the military harbor the belief that the US acquiesces to (or supports) the PKK's presence in Iraq, continually citing unsubstantiated reports of US/PKK meetings. However, when pressed, they are unable to provide any names or specifics. (NOTE: We also know that the military uses our lack of action against PKK/Kongra-Gel to needle the current AK Government.) ¶12. (S) When confronted with this issue, you should make reference to the Jan. 11 trilateral talks where, with the US role in Iraq more one of facilitator than actor, the Turks and Iraqis focused on concrete steps to pave the way for actions against the PKK, including establishing an intelligence-sharing mechanism and holding a legal experts meeting after the Jan. 30 elections to discuss issues related to closure of PKK front offices and media outlets in northern Iraq and the handling of known PKK terrorists who are arrested. Septel we are providing suggestions on how to convey a more serious anti-PKK posture to the Turks, given our continuing inability to focus resources in Iraq on this problem. -------------- Global War on Terrorism -------------- ¶13. (C) Despite our policy differences, Turkey has provided valuable assistance and cooperation to GWOT. Ankara offered to send peacekeeping troops to Iraq in October 2003 (an offer we declined),approved the use of Incirlik Air Base for tankers to refuel aircraft on support missions for both OEF and OIF, authorized the transit of US troops on rotation from Iraq, and permits the transit of fuel, coalition supplies and humanitarian goods (from its inception until the end of CY04, over USD 2.5 billion in coalition sustainment and humanitarian assistance.) In addition to urging all Iraqis to participate in the Jan. 30 elections, Turkey is active in reconstruction efforts, including providing electricity for Iraq, and training in Turkey for Iraqi diplomats and (as its contribution to the NATO training mission) Iraqi Security Forces. Turkey will take command of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) VII in Afghanistan from February to August 2005, during which time it plans to contribute over 1,600 troops. Ankara is also ready to renew its offer to lead a Provincial Reconstruction Team in Afghanistan, but location is again proving to be a problem -- the GOT wants to take over a PRT in the north, while the Alliance needs PRTs elsewhere to fulfill ISAF expansion requirements. ¶14. (C) Beyond Afghanistan and Iraq, the US and Turkey coordinate military assistance to Georgia and Azerbaijan, improving their abilities to protect important energy transport routes. Turkey subscribes to every arms control arrangement it is eligible to join, including the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI),under which it is considering hosting an exercise in 2006. (We had hoped that the Turks would hold this in the Black Sea, especially given their own OAE-like Operation Black Sea Harmony and their leadership in focusing the BLACKSEAFOR organization on prevention of trafficking. However, they have been reluctant to facilitate non-littoral states' operations in the Black Sea and the PSI exercise looks likely to occur in the Mediterranean.) Ankara has also been supportive of international efforts to press Iran to meet its commitments to the IAEA, although they are more inclined to persuasion than coercion, fully backing the EU-3 dialogue. Turkey has also taken seriously information about Turks' involvement in the AQ Khan network and is moving toward prosecution of these individuals. ¶15. (U) The Turkish military's Partnership for Peace Training Center provides counterterrorism and other training to personnel from PfP partner countries. The military is establishing a NATO COE-DAT that will provide more specialized training opportunities for both NATO partner nations and Allies. They have also offered training at the COE-DAT as Ankara's contribution to NATO's Iraq training mission. -------------- CYPRUS and NATO/EU -------------- ¶16. (C) The European Union at the December 17 Summit agreed to open accession talks with Turkey in October, marking a major step forward in anchoring Turkey's future and in our strategic vision for Turkey and the region. However, before talks begin, the EU expects Turkey to sign a protocol extending the EU Association agreement to the 10 new EU members, including the Republic of Cyprus. Turkey is dissatisfied with the EU's handling of this issue, with several European leaders indicating publicly that extending the protocol would constitute recognition of the Republic of Cyprus. Moreover, Turkey sees the EU as failing to fulfill its pledge to ease the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots following their vote in favor of a settlement last April. As a result, Ankara is blocking Cyprus' entry into nonproliferation regimes that the EU desires to include all its members. Similarly, taking a legalistic view of North Atlantic council decisions related to Berlin Plus, the GOT is blocking Cyprus from participating in NATO-EU fora, effectively stymieing dialogue between the two organizations. While some Turkish officials recognize how keeping NATO and the EU apart hurts Turkey's interests, to date Cyprus policy has won out over alliance management considerations within the GOT. EDELMAN