TURKEY AND THE PKK: RAISING THE HEAT

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 004186 SIPDIS NOFORN E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/18/2025 TAGS: PTER PREL MOPS PGOV TU IZ EUN PKK SUBJECT: TURKEY AND THE PKK: RAISING THE HEAT REF: A. ANKARA 3954 ¶B. ANKARA 3456 ¶C. ANKARA 4183 (DAO ANKARA IIR) Classified By: CDA Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (a),(b),(d). Summary -------------- ¶1. (S/NF) Both the Turkish Deputy CHOD and MFA spokesman publicly confirmed July 19 that Turkey reserves the right to conduct cross-border operations against the PKK in northern Iraq. Additionally, the D/CHOD, GEN Ilker Basbug, reported that the U.S. has ordered the arrest (or capture) of key PKK leaders (ref a). The Turkish military has told us privately that the PKK is planning attacks--with KDP peshmerga assistance--against Turkish military positions in northern Iraq. The Special Forces commander for these Turkish forces asserted Turkey would retaliate not only against the PKK but against those peshmerga who assisted the PKK; a TGS senior officer told us, however, that TGS had not taken such a decision. End summary. Basbug: Cross-Border Ops Are Up to Us -------------- ¶2. (S) TGS Deputy CHOD GEN Ilker Basbug told the press July 19 that while the United States understands Turkey's concerns regarding the PKK's presence in northern Iraq, the USG has been indecisive. He added, however, that "the U.S. has given an order for the arrest/capture of the PKK leadership" in Iraq. (NOTE: The Turkish verb Basbug used can mean either "arrest" or "capture." END NOTE.) Early Turkish press stories reported that Basbug also indirectly answered CJCS GEN Myers July 14 comments (that Turkey must take up the question of cross-border operations with the ITG) by stating that Turkey has the right under international law to resort to such a step if necessary. Additionally, Basbug distinguished between "hot pursuit" into northern Iraq (to pursue PKK terrorists who commit crimes in Turkey) and a possible "cross-border operation" (presumably to attack PKK targets). "If Iraq does not do what is necessary," Basbug stated, "a cross-border operation would be justified." He noted that discussions with Iraq regarding the PKK are ongoing. ¶3. (S/NF) Basbug's comments on cross-border operations have come in the middle of a swirling press cycle on the PKK issue. The TGS leadership and PM Erdogan met for five hours July 1 to discuss the security situation in southeast Turkey. Subsequent to the meeting, and in reaction to a story �A;quoting an unnamed U.S. official as cautioning Turkey against any operations in Iraq, Erdogan has taken a harder public line on the PKK issue, telling the press July 13 that Turkey reserves the right to carry out operations against the PKK in Iraq if necessary. Deadly Bombings in Tourist Areas Add Fuel to the Fire -------------- -------------- ¶4. (C) While the Turkish press has steadily reported on military and PKK casualties in the southeast this spring and summer, terrorist bombings in the western Turkish resorts of Kusadasi (July 16) and Cesme (July 10) have drawn international attention, particularly the Kusadasi bombing, which killed five people. Turkish authorities believe both bombings were carried out by the Kurdistan Freedom Hawks, which the Turks assert is a PKK front group. Turks Privately Warn Us of Possible Conflict in Northern Iraq -------------- ¶5. (S) On July 16, the Commander of Turkish Special Forces in northern Iraq, BG Umut Kalender, called in the U.S. LNO to report intelligence that the PKK is planning to attack Turkish forces in Iraq on or after July 20. During the two-hour exchange, Kalender further stated that a "nephew" of Masoud Barzani met with PKK leadership in the past week and told the PKK that "they knew what they had to do," meaning it was time for the PKK to make these attacks. Kalender said there was ample evidence that the KDP supports the PKK, and that in the event of PKK attacks against Turkish positions in Iraq, Turkish forces would not only defend themselves but would also retaliate against KDP peshmerga who have assisted the PKK. Kalender held up a list of potential KDP targets (but did not allow the LNO to read it). ¶6. (S) Kalender went on to say that Turkish attempts to coordinate "hot pursuit" against the PKK in northern Iraq has not gone anywhere, and characterized recent USG statements as negative. According to Kalender, the PKK feel perfectly free to operate with impunity in northern Iraq. Kalender's staff made a point to tell the LNO how angry Kalender was at the intelligence he had received, and the staff followed up twice to be sure the LNO had reported his conversation with Kalender to Ankara. For a fuller report on this meeting, please see ref c. ¶7. (S) On July 19, Chief, ODC Turkey, Maj. Gen. Peter Sutton called on TGS Acting J3 Maj. Gen. Mehmet Eroz to follow up. ODC Chief explained that the LNO in Silopi had reported his conversation with Kalender, but we sought TGS's views on whether the intelligence Kalender cited was credible. Eroz responded that a KDP newspaper in Iraq had reported on a two-phase effort to remove Turkish troops from northern Iraq: a 50,000-signature petition, followed by hunger strikes and demonstrations near Turkish military sites. Additionally, Eroz stated that the Turks have learned that "a close relative" (NOTE: He did not say "nephew," as Kalender did. END NOTE.) of Masoud Barzani had held meetings with the PKK, and this relative had urged the PKK to prepare to attack Turkish outposts in northern Iraq. Eroz surmised that the PKK would pursue terrorist action if the peaceful means outlined in the KDP newspaper were to fail. (COMMENT: This would almost certainly push any attack beyond the July 20 date noted by BG Kalender. END COMMENT.) ¶8. (S) Eroz stated that he did not know if the intelligence report Kalender cited was reliable, but "it could be true." ODC Chief asked Eroz to confirm Kalender's statement that if the PKK attacked Turkish forces, Turkey would also retaliate against those who cooperated with the PKK. Eroz responded that Turkish forces would defend themselves, and then "commanders and generals" would evaluate any attack and determine an "appropriate response." Comment: Turks Again Seek to Transfer Pressure to Us -------------- -------------- ¶9. (S) As the military campaign in the southeast intensifies and now shifts to tourist areas, Turkey is once again feeling intense heat. In turn, the Turks are looking at the U.S., the EU, and--both grudgingly and to a lesser extent--at the Iraqis to try to relieve the pressure. On the EU front, Turkey can ill-afford to "take off the gloves" in the southeast (i.e., return to its heavy-handed 1980s and 1990s counterinsurgency tactics) for fear of alienating the Europeans; an uncoordinated cross-border operation into northern Iraq would likely have the same effect, especially as our chief coalition partner (the UK) holds the EU presidency. As we have said before, a Turkish military incursion into northern Iraq (except in the unlikely event of Iraqi and coalition agreement) would be a policy disaster for the GOT. It could be argued, though, that if pushed to exasperation by continued PKK attacks, AKP's lack of a coherent policy, and lack of U.S. action in northern Iraq, the military might at some point undertake such a move. ¶10. (S) This Mission has consistently argued since 2003 (most recently ref b),that there are significant, non-kinetic (or low-level kinetic) actions that we can take against the PKK in northern Iraq. (Additionally, we understand Washington is devising steps to cooperate with the Turks on diplomatic, intelligence, and law-enforcement steps we can take in Europe.) Steps in Iraq could include: shutting down PKK offices (or front party offices) in major Iraqi cities where there is already strong CF and/or ISF presence, as well as arresting senior PKK leaders when they emerge from the mountains and into major Iraqi cities in the north. We can alleviate the pressure on the Turks--and on our relationship--by agreeing to carry out missions such as these. Should this current press controversy continue and accelerate, the PKK issue will once again threaten to overshadow our increasingly constructive relationship on Iraq. End comment. ¶11. (U) Iraq REOs minimize considered. MCELDOWNEY