ACTION REQUEST: TF FREEDOM AND TF WARRIOR LNO TO

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003963

SIPDIS

NOFORN

DIA FOR DIRECTOR VADM JACOBY FROM CHARGE

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/23/2025
TAGS: MARR MOPS PREL PINS TU IZ
SUBJECT: ACTION REQUEST: TF FREEDOM AND TF WARRIOR LNO TO
TURKISH MILITARY IN NORTHERN IRAQ


Classified By: CDA Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b),(c),and (d).


1. (S/NF) Summary: Embassy seeks urgent DIA assistance in
filling the position of Liaison Officer to the Turkish
Special Forces in Northern Iraq. This position is vital in
order to collect intel on the Turks' plans and intentions for
Iraq, for crisis management, and for helping us pass
real-time, accurate information on developments in northern
Iraq to the Turks so that they can base their policies on
fact, not fiction. We cannot afford to have our Defense
Attache Office fill this billet indefinitely; to do so would
endanger the mil-to-mil relationship we have worked so hard
to rebuild after 2003. End summary.


2. (S/NF) Embassy Ankara requests urgent DIA assistance to
fill an empty billet of significant importance to U.S.
efforts in Iraq. Since 2003, DIA has assigned a liaison
officer to serve as the bridge between the northern MNF-I
commands--Task Force Freedom (TFF) and Task Force Warrior
(TFW)--and the Turkish forces in northern Iraq. Turkey has
maintained a 1500-troop presence in northern Iraq, ostensibly
to monitor the activities of the Turkish Kurdish separatist
group, the PKK. The LNO lives at the Turkish SF Brigade HQ
in the border town of Silopi, Turkey, but travels frequently
throughout TFF and TFW's AOR. We have identified some Turkey
FAOs who would be excellent candidates to fill this position,
but their commands have not permitted them to fill the billet.


3. (S/NF) This position was created as a direct result of the
July 4, 2003 incident at Suleimaniyah, where U.S. forces
detained Turkish SF who were planning to assassinate the
mayor of Kirkuk and a Turkman politician. This incident--in
which Turkish soldiers were shown in the press bound and
bagged as they were transported to Baghdad--caused a huge
rift in U.S.-Turkish relations, especially on the mil-to-mil
side, from which both sides are still recovering. The
primary mission of the LNO, therefore, is to collect as much
information as possible on the plans and intentions of the
Turkish SF in order to head off such incidents in the future.
The two main incumbents in the position have been Turkey
FAOs who have used their language skills to great effect,
building trust with the SF up to and including the one-star
commander. It is vital that we maintain this position so we
can continue to keep an eye on our (sometimes difficult) ally.


4. (S/NF) It has proven effective to have the LNO move freely
between Iraq and Turkey. He frequently visits the TU SF
outposts in northern Iraq, building relationships but also
tacitly reminding the Turks that we are keeping an eye on
their movements. In 2004, the Turks neglected to inform us
that they had moved some small regular army units just inside
the Iraqi border to watch for PKK infiltrators. Our LNO
discovered this by spotting the outpost and politely--but
insistently--demanding access. This incident embarrassed the
Turks into "remembering" to inform us of all/all their
deployments in Iraq.


5. (S/NF) But the LNO's mission goes well beyond collection.
For this Embassy--indeed for the USG's mission to keep the
Turks positively engaged with the new Iraq--this LNO position
is crucial. First, the LNO has proved indispensable in times
of crisis. In December 2004, insurgents in Mosul attacked a
convoy of Turkish National Police officers on their way to
provide security at the Turkish Embassy in Baghdad. This
incident caused a sensation in Turkey: all the country's top
leaders attended the officers' funeral. CF engaged the
insurgents and collected the dead and wounded. Yet without
our LNO, it would have been impossible to provide real-time
updates to the GOT on events, coordinate moving the Turkish
KIA to the border and the Turkish WIA back home. His actions
and information ensured the stories that appeared in the
Turkish media implying CF did nothing to help the Turks were
effectively countered by GOT officials. The LNO played a
similar role in Sept. 2004 in assisting with a U.S. military
medivac of a Turkish Red Crescent worker who was seriously
wounded in an insurgent attack in Iraq.


6. (S/NF) Second, the LNO has served as a vital information
link between the Embassy and TFF and TFW. Events in northern
Iraq--such as in Kirkuk and the northwest Ninewah province
city of Talafar (which has a large Turkmen population)--are
of great interest to the Turks. Unfortunately, the Turks'
intelligence and press sources in Iraq are poor, and their
intel assets often provide them false or highly exaggerated
information. This misinformation dominated the front pages
of Turkish newspapers during Sept. 2004 coalition
counterinsurgency operations in Talafar. The GOT lacked good
information and so did the Turkish press, which grossly
exaggerated the level of destruction in the city. Events
reached a head mid-month when the Turkish Foreign Minister
threatened to cease all cooperation with us on Iraq over
Talafar. It was only when the LNO was able to get direct,
real-time, releasable battle updates from TFF that we were
able to calm the GOT.


7. (S/NF) With counterinsurgency operations again in full
swing in Talafar--and with the controversy surrounding the
future of Kirkuk--the LNO continues to provide us with
real-time updates on the situation in northern Iraq. We are
able to pass this to the Turkish military and the government,
both of which are much better informed and can now make
decisions based on accurate information, not overblown press
reports. We believe this information flow has been a
significant part of the GOT's decidedly more constructive
policy toward Iraq in 2005.


8. (S/NF) We want to counter one argument that some may make
about the importance of this position, and that is that the
Turks themselves have LNOs in Talafar, Kirkuk, and Mosul.
They do, but the Turks have proven to be notoriously poor at
sharing information outside their direct chain of command.
Their LNOs report up to the J3 in TGS, but the information
they gain almost never goes to other military staff
directorates, and certainly never outside the Turkish
military to interested parties, such as the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs. Not having the U.S. LNO in place will allow
the Turks to pass important information only through their
narrow funnel, and we will not achieve our aim.


9. (S/NF) When we have experienced staffing gaps for this
position, the Embassy's Defense Attache Office has been
compelled to send one of its attaches to fill in. This comes
at a time when DAO is already spread thin: the Assistant ARMA
(a Turkey FAO) is serving a six-month TDY in Afghanistan. We
are facing significant gaps between the departing and
arriving Navy and Marine Attaches. The DATT is Air Force,
and both he and the Asst Air Force Attache carry significant
C-12 flight responsibilities in addition to their regular
work.


10. (S/NF) For the foreseeable future, post's ARMA will fill
the LNO slot. Yet this comes at a time when we are working
especially hard to repair the very damage to our mil-to-mil
relationship--especially Army-to-Army--caused in part by the
Suleimaniyah incident. Beginning last summer, the ARMA's
main diplomatic effort has been to restore U.S.-Turkish
mil-to-mil relations to a pre 2003 level. ARMA has
successfully coordinated a visit by the Turkish Land Forces
Commander to last year's CEA, followed by USAREUR Commander
GEN Bell's CPV to Turkey. ARMA is currently working a
reciprocal CPV by the TLFC to GEN Bell. In addition to all
the coordination necessary to put these important counterpart
visits into place, there is the potential this fall for a CPV
invite from the Turkish TRADOC Commander (GEN Kocman) to the
incoming U.S. TRADOC Commander. At this time, we do not know
how the ARMA can complete his chief mission here if he must
continue to fill in as the LNO.


11. (C/NF) The bottom line for this Embassy is that we simply
must fill this billet--soon--if we are to achieve our
objectives of keeping the Turks positively engaged in
supporting the new Iraq and of furthering U.S.-Turkey
mil-to-mil relations.
MCELDOWNEY