GEN BASBUG AND CHARGE DISCUSS IRAQ, PKK, BILATERAL

S E C R E T SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003954 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2025 TAGS: PREL MARR MOPS TU IZ IR SY PKK SUBJECT: GEN BASBUG AND CHARGE DISCUSS IRAQ, PKK, BILATERAL RELATIONS Classified By: Charge d'Affaires Nancy McEldowney for reasons 1.4 (b) a nd (d). ¶1. (S) Summary: Deputy TGS Chief GEN Ilker Basbug believes that MNF-I has a new order to "track and capture" PKK personnel in Iraq. (We are checking.) He thought this was a positive indication of US intentions towards the terrorist group. The Charge told Basbug she would have an answer soon to his request for more information on IEDs. Basbug accepted ODC-T Chief MajGen Sutton's offer to ask JAC Molesworth if they could evaluate the causes of the recent PKK violence. He quizzed CDA about where the differences between the US and Turkey over Syria lie; when she mentioned politicians' statements he dropped the subject. He was unsure of the impact of Ahmadinejad's election on Turkey-Iran relations, but did not believe Iran would walk away from the EU-3 negotiations. End summary. Bilateral Relations -------------- ¶2. (C) The Charge paid an initial call on DCHOD Gen Basbug on July 5. Recalling that the last High Level Defense Group (HLDG) meeting was in November 2003, Basbug encouraged the Charge to work with his successor (he expected to be reassigned in August) to hold another HLDG in the near future. The Charge agreed that these meetings were important. She noted that the cargo hub at Incirlik Air Base was working smoothly, and that both sides would need to ensure that cooperation at the local level continued after the changes in command expected at the base this summer. PKK: "Track and capture" and IEDs -------------- ¶3. (S) Basbug told the Charge that he had talked to VCJCS Gen Pace on June 30. He already knew about the fragmentary order "CENTCOM issued" two to three months earlier regarding the handling of PKK terrorists detained during normal coalition operations. However, during the call with Gen Pace, he said, the VCJCS "said something different." He recalled Gen Pace as saying that there had been a meeting of the intelligence community on the PKK and that there was a new "direct order" or "specific order" to US forces to collect information and conduct operations targeting the PKK -- "track and capture," was what Basbug said he heard. Basbug was heartened because this "indicates a positive intention" even though concrete results may require some more time. The Charge said that she had not seen this order, but undertook to look into it. ¶4. (C) Looking forward to the Washington visit by GOT Iraq Coordinator Osman Koruturk, the Charge noted that the US was also working on other tracks against the PKK, such as encouraging the Europeans to address front offices and sources of PKK finances and establishing a trilateral (US-TU-Iraq) intelligence sharing mechanism. ¶5. (C) The Charge recalled that the US still owed Basbug an answer to his request to Gen Pace in Washington for IED countermeasures. CHOD GEN Ozkok had also raised this with visiting USNAVEUR Commander and Joint Allied Forces Naples Commander ADM H.G.Ulrich (septel). Basbug recalled receiving a pamphlet on the subject. The Charge noted that the USG owed Turkey more on this score. She undertook to have a more satisfactory response "in a matter of days," noting that JCS and EUCOM staff were actively working it. (Note: A JCS team is expected in Ankara the week of July 17.) Basbug agreed that this was an important issue for the TGS. ¶6. (C) Returning to this subject later in the discussion, Basbug turned to ODC-T Chief MajGen Sutton and asked for his assessment "from a military point of view" of the reasons behind the increase in IEDs in Turkey. General Sutton reported that he had not seen any intelligence on the issue, but offered to ask JAC Molesworth for its assessment of whether the PKK has developed IED capability via direct links with the insurgents in Iraq or by simple observation of open sources. Basbug agreed. He and TGS/J3 LTG Metin Yavuz Yalcin expressed satisfaction with the functioning of the intelligence fusion cell EUCOM created in Ankara last year. ¶7. (C) The Charge asked Basbug for his assessment of what is causing the increased PKK violence in Turkey. He said TGS was still attempting to determine the answer. However, it was either an effort to keep the organization together ("terrorist organizations cannot survive without taking action") or represented a reconciliation of the PKK's previously divided leadership, with those advocating a more active/violent approach winning the day. Upon further reflection, he offered a third alternative: central control has weakened and individual cells are operating autonomously. CENTCOM/EUCOM Visit -------------- ¶8. (C) Basbug said that CENTCOM Commander GEN John Abizaid and EUCOM Commander Gen James Jones' expected visit in September "was another development." The Charge responded that their coming was positive and expressed the hope that the visit would produce tangible results. Basbug agreed, saying that something that could be shared with the public in Turkey would be important. He and the Charge agreed to share thoughts in the weeks ahead about how this might be achieved. Iraq/Syria/Iran -------------- ¶9. (C) Basbug asked about the current situation in Iraq, particularly regarding the constitution drafting process. The Charge reviewed the difficult issues to be faced, including how to define federalism, but noted the progress made in including Sunnis in the drafting committee. Basbug quizzed the Charge on the process, asking whether the US wanted an Iraq based on federalism (answer: yes),whether the central government would be strong or weak (answer: in control of security and resources),and whether Kirkuk's status would be "solved" in the constitution (answer: it will be "addressed"). ¶10. (C) The Charge recalled raising Syria with Turkish politicians, and relayed to Basbug continuing USG concern about differences in approach between Turkey and the US. Perhaps feigning surprise, he inquired about the differences. He asserted that Turkey shared the US goals of stopping Syrian or Syrian-based interference in Lebanon, Iraq and the Israeli-Palestinian issue. "Whenever we talk to Syria, we warn them that these are serious issues they must address." He asked why the US did not have a trilateral mechanism with Syria and Iraq to discuss border and other issues. The Charge responded that the real issue is Syrian actions and the need to press Damascus to take appropriate concrete measures. ¶11. (C) The Charge asked Basbug for his read on Mahmud Ahmadinejad. Basbug said it was not an easy question. He recalled that Rafsanjani had been a radical reformer when he was first elected and he is now a moderate. In fact, "we wish a more moderate man had been chosen," but one "can't second guess the Iranian people." Ahmadinejad was reportedly close to the religious hierarchy, but Turkey would need to make a proper assessment to draw real conclusions. The Charge noted concern at Ahmadinejad's remarks on the nuclear issue, but Basbug thought that Iran's nuclear program had widespread support and statements would not be significantly different if someone else had been elected. He also did not believe Ahmadinejad would walk away from the EU-3 process. Yet, he allowed that if Ahmadinejad reverted to "old strategies," he could impact (negatively) Turkey-Iran relations. He asked that when the USG has an assessment of him that we share it. MCELDOWNEY