Identifier
Created
Classification
Origin
05ANKARA3890
2005-07-06 16:29:00
CONFIDENTIAL
Embassy Ankara
Cable title:  

TURKEY WILL ISSUE CYPRUS NON-RECOGNITION

Tags:  PREL CY TU EU 
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This record is a partial extract of the original cable. The full text of the original cable is not available.
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003890 

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2015
TAGS: PREL CY TU EU
SUBJECT: TURKEY WILL ISSUE CYPRUS NON-RECOGNITION
DECLARATION

REF: A. ANKARA 427


B. ANKARA 879

C. ANKARA 1856

D. ANKARA 3558

E. BRUSSELS 2533

F. 1 JULY 2005 SCOTT/MARCIEL/SKINNER E-MAILS

(U) Classified by A/DCM James Moore, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4
(b) and (d).

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 003890 SIPDIS E.O. 12958: DECL: 07/06/2015 TAGS: PREL CY TU EU SUBJECT: TURKEY WILL ISSUE CYPRUS NON-RECOGNITION DECLARATION REF: A. ANKARA 427 ¶B. ANKARA 879 ¶C. ANKARA 1856 ¶D. ANKARA 3558 ¶E. BRUSSELS 2533 ¶F. 1 JULY 2005 SCOTT/MARCIEL/SKINNER E-MAILS (U) Classified by A/DCM James Moore, E.O. 12958, reasons 1.4 (b) and (d). ¶1. (C) Summary: Turkey is determined to issue a written declaration that extending the Ankara Agreement to the ten new EU members does not constitute recognition of the Republic of Cyprus (ROC). Domestic criticism that it does constitute recognition is pushing the Turks toward tougher non-recognition language, posing the risk that member states or the Commission will question whether Turkey has fulfilled the EU requirement to extend the Agreement. This could possibly block the opening of negotiations. As of July 5, the Turks had not shared their proposed non-recognition declaration text with anyone, not even the UK. We urged the MFA to do so, and to use the most moderate language possible. Turkey and some member states are also at odds about the modalities for extending the Agreement. End Summary. Turks Firm On Written Declaration -------------- ¶2. (C) The Turkish MFA continues to firmly state that Turkey will soon extend the Ankara Agreement to the ten new members, including the ROC. The MFA is equally firm that Turkey will issue a written declaration that their extending the Ankara Agreement to the 10 new EU members does not constitute recognition of the ROC (refs a, b, c, d). ¶3. (C) Given continuing domestic criticism that it does constitute recognition, we see little chance Turkey can be persuaded otherwise. Northeastern Mediterranean Affairs A/DDG Bilman called the idea of no declaration "impossible." He claims he is getting "hate letters" over Turkey's commitment to extend the Agreement to the ROC. Bilman likewise dismissed the idea of an oral declaration, saying it will have "no meaning." UK Embassy PolChief Miller says a minority of member states hope for an oral declaration. ¶4. (C) Bilman says the Turks are looking for "legal certainty" that extending the Agreement cannot be construed as recognition. The MFA has consulted with several international lawyers (not Turks, according to Bilman) about what language will guarantee that. European Commission Ankara Political Head Dawson and Miller think the Turks ar
e wrong on the law, saying that Commission and UK lawyers agree that recognition cannot occur without Turkey actively intending it. However, according to Dawson, the Turks continue to believe they can be "tricked" into recognition. ¶5. (C) Despite earlier statements, it now appears the Turks are prepared to live without EU acknowledgment of their non-recognition declaration. Bilman acknowledged this was Turkey's "original position," but said he was not sure "if this (EU acknowledgment) will happen." He then dropped the point. Turks, EU Have Not Discussed Specific Language -------------- - ¶6. (C) Bilman, Miller and Dawson confirm Turkey has so far not shared its proposed text with the Commission, nor even with the UK, its strongest EU supporter. Miller tells us the UK has asked to see the text before the Turks give it to the Commission, but had not seen it as of July 5. Dawson said the Commission has not discussed specific language because it does not want to encourage a Turkish declaration, and because the Turks are reluctant to share the text. UK Ambassador Westmacott has spoken to MFA U/S Tuygan and Deputy U/S Apakan regarding the text. They promised his ideas will be taken into account. We urged Bilman to consider at least sharing the text with the UK; he said he would consider this but was non-committal. ¶7. (C) Acknowledging this is an issue for Turkey and the EU to resolve, we also urged A/DDG Bilman to use moderate language in the declaration, the minimum possible to achieve Turkey's aims. Bilman replied that several EU diplomats here have urged the same thing, but none has told him what language would be acceptable or unacceptable. Per ref e, we suggested that, as a starting point, stating that the protocol does not change Turkey's position would be preferable to stating that Turkey does not recognize the ROC and only recognizes the "TRNC." ¶8. (C) Bilman recalled that upon signing the EU Constitution Treaty, Turkey sent a letter to EU High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy Solana referring to -- but not reiterating -- the MFA's May 1, 2004 statement regarding "Southern Cypriot Greek Administration's Accession to the EU." The May 1 statement said, in part, "Greek Cypriots" do not represent Turkish Cypriots, do not have authority over the whole island, and cannot be accepted as the legal government representing all the island (we have e-mailed a copy to the Department, USEU and Embassy London). Bilman hinted that the coming Turkish declaration might again refer to, but not reiterate, the May 2004 statement. However, even such a reference could be a problem -- Dawson also recalled the May 1 statement, terming it "not particularly encouraging." ¶9. (C) Whatever the language of the non-recognition declaration, the Turks will have to be careful. While domestic criticism pushes them toward tougher, legally bulletproof text, both Miller and Dawson warn that extreme language will fuel doubts by members states about Turkey's intent to implement the extension protocol, or raise questions about the credibility of Turkey's ostensible agreement. In effect, it would call into question whether Turkey has fulfilled the requirements for the opening of negotiations. The worst case, according to Dawson, would be if the Commission legal service comes to such a conclusion. Letter Exchange v. Signing -------------- ¶10. (C) The Turks and some member states are also not in agreement on the modalities of how Turkey will extend the Ankara Agreement to the ten new members, including the ROC. The Turkish MFA wants a low-key exchange of letters to avoid inflaming domestic opponents; they want to avoid a high-publicity signing ceremony. However, according to UK PolChief Miller, the letter exchange idea "won't fly in Brussels." Although the Commission itself is neutral on this point, Dawson also notes signing is important to some member states. Some member states will not agree to a letter exchange, pointing out the December Summit conclusions require Turkey to "sign." In addition, Turkish refusal to sign could furnish another cause for some member states to question Turkey's commitment to implement the protocol. ¶11. (C) There is a middle ground: Turkey could sign the extension protocol without a ceremony. Miller said the FCO proposed this to MFA Deputy U/S for European Affairs Bozkir during his July 1 visit to London, but Bozkir still insisted on a letter exchange. MCELDOWNEY

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