COMPREHENSIVE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL

C O N F I D E N T I A L ANKARA 003301

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/10/2015
TAGS: PREL PTER TU UNGA
SUBJECT: COMPREHENSIVE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL
TERRORISM (CCIT): TURKEY'S VIEW

REF: STATE 105937

(U) Classified by Polcounselor John Kunstadter; reasons: E.O.
12958 1.4 (b,d).


1. (U) Action request--see para 8.


2. (C) Summary: Turkey fully supports U.S. efforts to
conclude CCIT convention at the 60th UNGA, acknowledges
resistance exists among some OIC member states on points
which are red lines for both the U.S. and Turkey, and asks
for clarification of the U.S. stance on language concerning
the definition of terrorism. End summary.


3. (C) In response to our June 10 presentation of reftel
demarche, MFA DDG for Counterterrorism Bicakli and First
Secretary Oral expressed Turkey's unequivocal support for

SIPDIS
trying to conclude the CCIT at the 60th UNGA. Turkey played
an important role in gaining OIC consensus to support the
Nuclear Terrorism Convention, Bicakli claimed, and is
pressing on the CCIT in every platform as a matter of utmost
importance.


4. (C) Bicakli acknowledged that some OIC member states
remain a problem. Indeed, Turkey is not party to the OIC
convention against terrorism owing to inclusion of the kind
of language of the right to resistance against occupation and
specific reference to state terrorism that forms red lines
for the U.S. These phrases are red lines for Turkey as well,
he declared. But the OIC itself is not the problem, and
Turkish incumbency of the OIC secretary-generalship is thus
not a lever for achieving consensus acceptable to Turkey or
the U.S., Bicakli claimed.


5. (C) Turkey is chairman in office of the OIC group at the
60th UNGA, and will try to lobby the states -- e.g.,
Pakistan, Iran, and Syria -- that are insisting on
unacceptable language. In answer to our query about which
countries they thought the U.S. should concentrate its
lobbying on, neither wished to give an answer.


6. (C) Bicakli and Oral then brought up the question of a
general definition of terrorism. Acknowledging that
achieving consensus on such a definition is impossible even
among their Turkish colleagues, both seemed taken aback by
our note that the U.S. does not want the effort to provide a
legal base for cooperation in the pursuit of international
terrorists distracted by the search for a definition of
terrorism separate from the offenses to be described in the
CCIT (ref).


7. (C) In this regard they asked three questions. First,
whether the U.S. can accept the definition of terrorism in
the draft convention's article 2. Second, whether the
definition in UNSYG Annan's "In Larger Freedom" report, which
refers to attacks on civilians and non-combatants,
corresponds to what the U.S. could accept. Third, whether we
could provide the MFA with the negotiation coordinator's
draft language on article 18 (activities of military forces)
that reftel says the U.S. could accept.


8. (C) Action request: post would be grateful for answers to
the questions in para 7, including article 18 draft language,
by June 16 if possible.
MOORE