PSI: MISSILE-RELATED TRANSFER TO IRAN VIA TURKEY

S E C R E T ANKARA 003088

SIPDIS

DEPARTMENT FOR NP/CBM, EUR/SE, EUR/PRA

E.O. 12958: DECL: 06/01/2015
TAGS: PARM PREL ETTC MNUC TSPA IR TU MTCRE
SUBJECT: PSI: MISSILE-RELATED TRANSFER TO IRAN VIA TURKEY

REF: A. ANKARA 3053

B. STATE 99755

C. ANKARA 2836

D. ANKARA 2816

Classified By: Acting DCM James R. Moore for reasons 1.4 b/d.


1. (S) Summary: Turkish authorities do not believe "catch
all" export controls (suggested ref B) can be used unless the
shipper of the missile-related equipment destined for Iran is
formally imported into Turkey first. MFA continues to put
its hope on the Chinese taking the shipment back, but are
also searching for other legal mechanisms to block the
shipment. Comparing bills of lading might provide a way to
do that. End Summary.


2. (S) MFA Deputy Director General for Disarmament and Arms
Control Bulent Meric on June 1 invited PolMilCouns to discuss
further the recommendation we had put forward the previous
day about using "catch-all" export controls to stop the
shipment of Chinese-origin missile-related equipment to Iran
(refs A and B). Meric underscored that Ankara agrees that
the ultimate end-use of the material was "not good."
However, as China is not a MTCR participant, Turkey had no
basis to approach the Chinese itself. And because the
material is dual-use and not on the MTCR control list, Turkey
had no export control basis to act against the shipment
unless the shipper imports it to Turkey. Currently, the
material is in a free trade zone and under Turkish
legislation (which Meric said is consistent with EU norms)
this means catch-all controls cannot be applied. No Turkish
customs or export control laws apply to free trade zones,
except for categories of goods prohibited from the zone under
the Free Trade Zone Law. These goods include illicit drugs,
WMD material, etc, but no dual-use items, according to Meric.


3. (S) That said, Meric continued, the GOT wants to stop this
shipment, albeit in a way that is consistent with
international and domestic law. Turkish customs was
currently using its authority to check cargo to run tests on
the items in the shipment. This is how the Turks are
currently preventing the shipment from moving. However, they
can only hold onto the goods another week to ten days, he
said.


4. (S) Meric saw two alternatives: Either the Chinese agree
to take the shipment back (Ankara's preference),or we all
wait to see whether the shipper will move the goods into
Turkey's customs area where catch all controls could be
applied. In response to questions, Meric did not believe the
authorities had any way to encourage the company to choose
that option. He said that MFA had not yet heard from London
about its approach to Beijing, although the UK Ambassador was
to see MFA Acting Undersecretary Nabi Sensoy late June 1 to
discuss this issue. (Comment: Subsequent RMAS discussions
with UK counterparts indicate that, contrary to info ref B,
the Chinese option is still being discussed in Beijing and,
while the Chinese have not agreed to withdraw the shipment,
neither have they given a negative reply.)


5. (S) While Ankara saw its options as limited, Meric
emphasized, it was "leaving no stone unturned" in trying to
find a way to legally stop the shipment. For example, he
said he planned to propose to an interagency group later that
day that Turkish authorities examine the bills of lading
presented for the arrival and the onward shipment of the
goods to see whether any discrepancies could be discovered
that would permit legal action against the shipper for making
a false declaration. He had no idea whether this would work,
but Turkish authorities needed to try everything possible to
find a basis to act, he stated. PolMilCouns observed that a
similar approach had been taken by investigators in the AQ
Khan investigation in Istanbul.


6. (S) Comment: Separately, RMAS sources have reason to
believe the approach of comparing bills of lading could prove
fruitful. End comment.

EDELMAN