TURK TELEKOM'S PRIVATIZATION: OPTIMISM AND GLOOM

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 ANKARA 002812 SIPDIS SENSITIVE USDOC FOR 4212/ITA/MAC/OEURA/CPD/DDEFALCO FCC FOR A THOMAS AND A WEINSHCHENK EB/CBA - MERMOUD, WALTERS E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: ECPS BEXP EFIN TU SUBJECT: TURK TELEKOM'S PRIVATIZATION: OPTIMISM AND GLOOM REF: A. 04 ANKARA 6673 ¶B. ANKARA 2072 ¶C. ANKARA 1209 SENSITIVE BUT UNCLASSIFIED. PLEASE HANDLE ACCORDINGLY. ¶1. (SBU) Summary: Turkey's Privatization Administration has extended to June 24 from May 31 the deadline for bids in the sale of the 55% stake in state telecom company Turk Telekom. While there is lively demand from eight separate bidding groups for the tender, in combination with broad recognition of the importance for achieving successful and timely privatization of Turk Telekom, there are still many negative factors and fears for further delays. Five international bidding groups have pulled out of the process, including Spanish, Belgian, Malaysian, and South Korean firms. End Summary. ¶2. (SBU) On the margins of the fifth STEAM (Strategic Technical and Economic Research Center) Telecom Conference in Istanbul May 9-10, Economic Officer gauged the mood of Turkish government and private officials on the privatization of Turk Telekom (Ref A) and liberalization of the telecom and IT sectors (Refs B and C). Will She or Won't She? - Turk Telekom Privatization Prospects -------------- -------------- ¶3. (SBU) While officials from the Privatization Administration (PA) and the Transportation Ministry expressed full commitment to achieving timely privatization of the 55% share of state telecom company Turk Telekom and representatives of some of the contenders expressed enthusiasm, many observers expressed reservations and pessimism. Turk Telekom management has expressed commitment to privatization (to free them from public procurement and oversight strictures),but the state telecom company was noticeably absent from the conference. The company was busy working with the PA and five of the bidders who had requested an extension in the bidding deadline to continue to evaluate the data. The PA announced an extension of the bidding deadline from May 31 to June 24. Cynics on the meeting's margins noted that summer would offer a convenient excuse for further delay. ¶4. (SBU) The original list of 13 qualified bidder groups has eroded down to the present eight. Over time, Belgian firm Belgacom, Spanish firm Telefonica, Malaysian Multi Global Link, South Korean SK Telekom, and Turkish MNG/MAPA Company have pulled out of the running. The reasons have been strategic, competing investment opportunities, and some concerns expressed about valuation and management of Turk Telekom's 40% share in the troubled Avea mobile operator. Casting further confusion, one of the key contenders, Telecom Italia (which has a 40% share and management control of Avea),announced if it did not win the Turk Telekom bid, it would pull out of Avea. Turkish authorities have sought greater interest from European (or American) companies without success. Deutsche Telekom, for example, recently repeated its lack of interest. ¶5. (SBU) Here is the current list of contenders: -Telecom Italia (viewed as one of the leaders) -Emirates Telecommunications Corp (Etisalat)/Dubai Islamic Bank/(Turkish) Cetel Calik Enerji (recently won the bid for Albania Telecom) -Saudi Oger Telecom (BT Telconsult is advisor) -Koc Holding (prominent Turkish business group; partnership with Sabanci group recently dissolved because of unrelated business conflict; Sabanci is still considering pursuing a separate bid or partnership) -Dogan Companies Group (major Turkish media group) -OYAK (Turkish military pension fund) -Turktell Bilisim Servisleri (subsidiary of dominant mobile company Turkcell),leading 14 member JV -Turkish Privatization Investors (no information available) (The local consortiums are still looking for suitable partners.) ¶6. (SBU) Three leading contenders were enthusiastically present at the STEAM Conference: Telecom Italia, Cetel Calik Enerji, and Saudi Oger. Telecom Italia is perceived as the front runner, but rivals privately grumble about its past over-payment for the mobile license which became Avea's and its recent comments quoted in the press: limited funds available for investment in Turk Telekom and threats to pull out of Avea if it does not win the Turk Telekom tender. An industry expert speculated to EconOff that Saudi Oger might raise concerns about "green" or "Islamic" capital for the Turkish "deep state" or secular establishment (it does sometimes conspicuously drop the "Saudi" part of its name). There is still likelihood for bidders forming new partnerships among themselves or with the outside. ¶7. (SBU) But will it happen? There was broad recognition of the need for privatization to provide better service in this critical sector to Turkey's business and investment environment. Moreover, there is a perception that this would be the last chance, after two previous failed attempts and as some of the most lucrative corporate business gradually gets "cherry picked", reducing potential Turk Telekom value. Some speakers called for greater emphasis on transparent market-based privatization process, as opposed to emphasis on privatization price target. Noting a smaller participation at this STEAM telecom conference, one participant told EconOff that it indicated either fatigue and frustration with the protracted privatization/liberalization process or preference to be out doing telecom business in Istanbul. ¶8. (SBU) Nevertheless, there are several factors that could contribute to more delay or another failed process (Ref A): -Entrenched opposition from labor and the judiciary (the PA is seeking a ruling to limit judiciary appeals to the Danistay- high administrative court). -Turk Telekom generates and transfers significant dividends to the Turkish Treasury (which would be partially replaced by the sale price and taxation of the new owner, in addition to ongoing excise taxes). -Concerns about foreign ownership of a key strategic asset and can the "deep state" accept this? (Especially in combination with foreign control of mobile telecom companies: Turkcell's pending majority ownership from Teliasonera; troubled Telsim's (held by state bank fund) potential foreign acquisition- Vodafone is seriously looking; and Avea's significant ownership by Telecom Italia). -Overemphasis on price, which could exacerbate unrealistic expectations and fuel opposition to whatever price the market determines (at a time of reduced international investor appetite and capacity). -Conflict between Turk Telekom, the Telecom Regulatory Authority, and the Competition Board and continued ambiguity and delay in market liberalization. -Is there the political will to let go of control of a "crown jewel"? Liberalization at a Crawl - Turk Telekom Sees a Zero Sum Game -------------- -------------- ¶9. (SBU) Besides doubts about prospects for a timely privatization of Turk Telekom, the conference generated wide complaints about Turk Telekom's zero sum game mentality and its taking advantage of its dominant position. The well intentioned, but weak, Telecom Regulatory Authority (with a new President- Tayfun Acarer) and the (marginally stronger) Competition Board have been unable to agree on or enforce decisions on interconnection fees and competition (Ref C). Only a few of the 43 long distance service license holders have been able to start operations. ISP's face a price squeeze from Turk Telekom between interconnection wholesale cost and Turk Telekom's retail price for its competing service. ISP's have not been allowed access to the "Kablonet" cable television system (to be split off from Turk Telekom). Turk Telekom has maintained a monopoly on wide band internet service (ADSL) and has not allowed ISP providers or Kablonet to re-market this service, nor to widely put in place VOIP (Voice Over Internet Protocol) service. In seeking to increase its ADSL subscriber numbers in advance of privatization, Turk Telekom has used its advantages to unfairly compete with Kablonet for internet business. Turk Telekom has regularly ignored Telecom Regulatory Authority and Competition Board rulings and/or taken some of its fledgeling competitors to court to challenge them. Comment -------------- ¶10. (SBU) While privatization of state enterprises is a key commitment of the GOT with the IMF, the PA has so far taken the path of lesser resistance in garnering IPO's which do not relinquish state control of major assets and sectors. For the sale of the highly visible and valuable state asset of Turk Telekom, overemphasis on "last chance" and opportunity for a great symbolic splash with the international investment community, while true, is based on wishful thinking. Many observers fear that delays and entrenched opposition will carry the day, while delays will risk to diminish value, which will be self-fulfilling. Leadership of a strong domestic business group may ultimately be a politically and strategically feasible solution, but will it provide adequate capital and know-how to assure high value and innovative service for Turkish consumers? Interested parties recognize Turkey's strong need for a consistent, coherent, and competitive telecom regulatory structure and environment. It is still a work in process. This may ultimately be more important than the prospective Turk Telekom privatization. EDELMAN