NEA WATER ADVISOR CHARLES LAWSON DISCUSSES

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 ANKARA 002389 SIPDIS SENSITIVE E.O. 12958: N/A TAGS: EAID ETRD IZ PREL SENV SY TU SUBJECT: NEA WATER ADVISOR CHARLES LAWSON DISCUSSES TIGRIS-EUPHRATES COOPERATION WITH TURKISH OFFICIALS REF: A. SECSTATE 55035 ¶B. ANKARA 1230 Sensitive but Unclassified. ¶1. (SBU) SUMMARY: NEA Senior Advisor for Science and Technology Issues Charles Lawson visited Turkey April 18-21 to explore GOT interest in cooperation on the Tigris-Euphrates basin. Lawson visited water infrastructure programs in the Southeast Anatolia Project (GAP),which encompasses the headwaters of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, and met with Turkey's water policy officials in the Foreign Ministry, State Hydraulics Works (DSI) and GAP Administration. In the GAP region, officials and local farmers admitted that the current irrigation infrastructure is wasteful and leads to soil salinization, but DSI said it will eliminate those problems in upcoming irrigation projects by employing better technology. The officials emphasized the Tigris-Euphrates basin (which includes Turkey, Syria and Iraq) could be a basis for building peace and stability in the region, but pointed out that deep-seated suspicions remain among the riparian countries. They agreed that the time was right to explore initial steps of cooperation to build confidence among the parties and were interested in ways the US could help that process. End Summary. GAP -- Southeast Anatolia Project ¶2. (U) NEA Senior Advisor for Science and Technology Issues Charles Lawson visited Turkey April 18-21. He traveled to the GAP region with Ankara Econ Counselor and Science Specialist to learn more about the GAP, Turkey's ambitious plan to harness the headwaters of the Tigris and Euphrates rivers for hydroelectric power, irrigation and economic development in the impoverished southeast region of Turkey. Begun in 1976, the GAP has spent $17 billion of a projected $32 billion to build 9 dams along the Tigris and Euphrates rivers that produce 7,476 MW and provide irrigation for an estimated 210,000 hectares in the arid southeast. The GAP Master Plan calls for 22 dams in all to provide irrigation for 1.7 million hectares, an area about 75% the size of New Jersey. ¶3. (U) Officials at DSI's regional office in the southeast identified several problems with the way farmers use the irrigation water provided by the GAP project. Most farmers are uneducated and rent their fields and are not aware of or do not care about the effect on the land of overusing water. Before the GAP irrigation projects came to this water-scarce region, any marginal increase in water applied to the fields meant much higher yields. With the cheap water provided by the GAP project, farmers tend to over-irrigate their fields, leading to wasted water and salinization of the soil. And the cheap water allowed the farmers to grow cotton, which requires large volumes of water and damages the soil. The irrigation system that was first introduced by the GAP is very low-tech, using open channels and gravity irrigation. As a result, a large percentage of the water in the early irrigation projects is lost to evaporation and drainage is very poor. GAP and DSI officials recognize this mistake and for upcoming irrigation projects plan to use pressurized pipe systems that are 50% more costly but should significantly reduce salinity build-up in the soil. ¶4. (SBU) The largest GAP irrigation project is just north of the Syrian border in the Harran plain, which gets its water from the Ataturk dam via two 23 foot high tunnels that run for 26 kilometers. Local farmers pay DSI nothing for the water and its transportation to Harran. The only charge is levied by the 22 water user associations that collect water fees to maintain the local irrigation infrastructure. The president of one association explained that the associations do not charge by the volume of water farmers use but by the number of hectares they are farming. (Comment: This water price scheme represents an enormous state subsidy to the Harran farmers and encourages individual farmers to use excessive water.) The president said his association recognizes the flaw in the pricing system and plans to begin charging by the volume of water used. He said his farmers have recently received training and are making better decisions. For example, he claimed that in his area, until 2003, 95% of the land was used to grow cotton; in just two years that percentage has declined to 30%. The Politics of Water ¶5. (SBU) MFA DDG Mithat Rende, who coordinates Turkey's transnational water policy, told Lawson that Turkey is looking for ways to encourage cooperation among the Tigris-Euphrates riparian countries. However, he emphasized that the process must start slowly since "there is no trust among the countries." He raised again Turkey's frustration that Iraq had ignored an MFA request for water data. (Note: Turkey requested data in 2001 and repeated the request in ¶2004. End Note.) Lawson informed Rende that recently Embassy Baghdad personnel had discussed this with Iraqi Water Minister al-Rashid, who had been unaware of the request but promised to respond immediately. Rende said that once a reply was received, the MFA would then be prepared to consider Rashid's request for a bilateral technical meeting (ref a). Lawson added that the U.S. could play a helpful role in building cooperation if Turkey and Iraq are interested. Rende said Turkey would appreciate U.S. help as a facilitator of cooperation, and he was eager to receive any U.S. proposals for technical activities that could serve to build confidence among the parties. ¶6. (SBU) Faruk Demir, a former national security advisor to PM Erdogan, explained that water policy has long been a chief foreign policy concern for Turkey. In the past, Turkey has viewed water (especially Turkey's control of the Tigris-Euphrates headwaters) as a weapon to deter hostile policies in Iraq and Syria, and it has explored ways to use Turkey's water resources commercially. According to Demir, Turkey's water policy has not been successful in the past because of Turkey's insecurity -- the fear that any change to the status quo would open Turkey up to losing its current advantage. He was especially critical of the Erdogan government, which does not consider water a national security priority and has no clearly articulated policy. And the MFA is concerned mainly with preserving the status quo -- "the MFA never says no, but rarely implements its yes's." Therefore, any change in Turkey's conservative policy will have to come from the Prime Minister, he concluded. ¶7. (SBU) In a lunch, Former DSI president Dogan Altinbilek and academics Aysegul Kibarioglu and Huseyn Bagci from Middle East Technical University told us that conditions for cooperation on the Tigris-Euphrates are better than they have been in decades. During the Saddam regime, Iraq claimed that 100% of its territory was suitable for irrigation and therefore Iraq had a right to a much larger share of the Tigris-Euphrates water. When Altinbilek was president of DSI, then Turkish President Demirel was a hard-liner on water issues and considered the MFA too soft. At one point, Demirel asked Altinbilek if DSI could divert the Euphrates river to supply water to central Turkey and thereby demonstrate Turkey's ability to cut off water to Syria and Iraq. Altinbilek agreed that confidence-building steps were necessary before real cooperation and joint management of the basin could be accomplished. Once that happens, the three countries can realize tremendous benefits and efficiencies from jointly managing their shared water resources, he added. Comment ¶8. (SBU) Turkish officials understand the importance of cooperation among the riparian countries of the Tigris-Euphrates basin. However, the lack of mutual trust and the cautious approach of Turkish officials means that cooperation will have to start slowly. A prompt and detailed response by the Iraqi side to the Turkish request for Iraqi water data would be a first small step in a long process of easing suspicion and frustration. Both Iraq and Turkey have expressed their interest in cooperation, and Turkey has indicated recently a desire to be more supportive of U.S. objectives in Iraq. It therefore appears to be a good time to test whether Turkey is serious about cooperation and propose one or two USG-funded confidence-building projects (see ref b). EDELMAN