"OUR VIEWS ARE THE SAME AS YOURS," TURKISH IRAQ

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 ANKARA 002324

SIPDIS

E.O. 12958: DECL: 04/19/2015
TAGS: PREL MARR ETRD TU IZ NATO
SUBJECT: "OUR VIEWS ARE THE SAME AS YOURS," TURKISH IRAQ
ENVOY TELLS S/I AMBASSADOR JONES

REF: BAGHDAD 1645

Classified By: Ambassador Eric S. Edelman for reasons 1.4 (b) and (d).

Summary
--------------


1. (C) Turkey almost entirely shares our views on Iraq, GOT
Special Envoy Koruturk told Senior Adviser and Coordinator
for Iraq Policy Amb. Richard Jones on April 19. Amb. Jones
outlined for the Turks our approach over the coming year,
including providing support for the Iraqi Security Forces
(ISF) and the constitutional process. Koruturk highlighted
Turkish offers to train ISF, police, and politicians in
Turkey. Koruturk bluntly stated that any second border gate
must bypass territory under KDP leader Barzani's influence,
but hinted that a package deal (two new gates) might be a way
around the impasse. Koruturk asked for us to urge the Iraqis
to permit the Turkish consulate in Mosul to re-open, and
recited familiar Turkish concerns about Kirkuk. Jones
requested that Turkey also consider forgiving Iraqi debt and
assisting Iraq's agricultural sector; the Turks will look
into this. While the Turks broad agreement on the future of
Iraq is significant, we need to push them to be more
forthcoming in how they support their newly democratic
neighbor. End summary.

Briefing in the Turks
--------------


2. (C) GOT Special Envoy for Iraq Amb. Osman Koruturk hosted
a working dinner in Istanbul April 19 for visiting Senior
Advisor and Coordinator for Iraq Policy Amb. Richard Jones
(full list of participants in para. 16). Amb. Jones began by
highlighting the USG's main priorities in the coming months:
security for the Iraqi people, and supporting the
constitutional process. He briefed Koruturk on his recent
trip to Iraq, where he urged the Iraq leadership to keep up
the political momentum. On security, Jones noted the
ongoing, gradual shift in emphasis from the CF to the ISF in
providing a safe environment for the Iraqi people. CF are
increasingly engaged in training the ISF, including teaching
them how to deal with crime, not just a political insurgency;
criminals, he noted, are the main force behind kidnappings in
Iraq.


3. (C) Jones reported that the USG is urging the Iraqis not
to avail themselves of the six-month extension available in
the Transitional Administrative Law for drafting the
constitution. He noted that many in the coalition are eyeing
the end of 2005 to rotate or reduce troops in Iraq; delaying
the constitution--and thus the referendum and general
election--would throw a wrench into coalition planning.
Perhaps more important, availing the extension would
encourage political inertia and provide encouragement to the
insurgency. Jones said that IIG Deputy PM Barham Salih made
it clear during their recent discussion that the Iraqi Kurds
would strongly oppose the extension. Since their vote would
essentially be required to approve an extension, the Kurds
may be able to quash this idea on their own even if other
political parties were to support it.

Koruturk: We Agree, and This Is What We're Doing to Help
-------------- --------------


4. (C) Koruturk responded that Turkey's views "are almost
exactly the same" on Iraq, including on the extension issue.
He said that the GOT was "cautiously optimistic" that the
insurgency is waning. He outlined Turkey's efforts to
support nascent democracy in Iraq, including:

--dispatch of two (soon to be five) military personnel to
Iraq in support of NTM-I;
--course offerings in Turkey for ISF officers under NTM-I
(the Turks said this offer is bilateral as well if more
convenient for both sides);
--continuing outreach to Sunni political parties and
religious bodies;
--five-day political training courses planned for Da'wa, PUK,
Sunni parties, and the Turkmen Assembly (Koruturk added that
Turkey is seeking out other parties and is willing to offer
training to all political parties in Iraq);
--police training in Turkey, offered either bilaterally or
through the EU rule of law initiative;
--planning to increase electricity exports to Iraq; and,
--lobbying within the "neighbors' group" on like-minded
goals, such as holding elections on time. Koruturk revealed
that the Turks' draft communique for the (postponed) April
18-19 Istanbul neighbors' conference included language urging
that the ITG not extend the constitutional deadline.
(COMMENT: WE note that the language in the draft obtained by
Embassy Baghdad (reftel)--which refers to the timeline laid
out in UNSCR 1546--tends to support this statement. END
COMMENT.)


5. (C) Amb. Jones expressed the USG's appreciation for these
efforts. He added that Turkey--in addition to training
police and ISF--might also consider training Iraqi prison
workers or support the building of additional prisons. He
recalled that before hostilities commenced in March 2003,
Saddam Hussein released thousands of prisoners, some of whom
later returned to the prisons after April 2003 and torched
them. Given both the insurgency and criminality, Iraq is
desperately short of both prisons and corrections officers.
Koruturk said this was something he could look into.

Second Border Gate: Must Go Around Barzani
--------------


6. (C) Amb. Koruturk raised the issue of the second border
gate with Iraq. He stated candidly that Turkey seeks to
build the second gate at Ovakoy on the far western side of
the border in order to avoid the area of northern Iraq
controlled by KDP leader Masoud Barzani. "We don't want to
be at the mercy of Barzani all the time," he said. (NOTE:
Turkey's relationship with Barzani is prickly at best, and
the Turks have long complained that Iraqi border personnel at
Habur and security personnel on the route through the
KRA--who are all KDP--harass Turkish drivers and demand
excessive fees and extra fines. END NOTE.) Koruturk noted
the importance of Habur for both CF and Iraq and that the
crossing is enormously busy with long backups. (NOTE: 25% of
CF sustainment and two-thirds of humanitarian fuel imports to
Iraq come through Habur. END NOTE.) He said Turkey would
support not only a second gate, but a third or a fourth as
well. But one of these gates--he maintained--must bypass
Barzani, to allow a "direct" connection between Turkey and
the Iraqi heartland.


7. (C) Koruturk noted that Turkey is prepared to guarantee in
writing that the volume at Habur--and thus presumably the
revenue Barzani can collect--will not decrease with the
building of another crossing at Ovakoy. "For Turkey the
issue is not only economic, it is political." Therefore
Turkey does not see the point in pursuing a USTDA feasibility
study which would explore options other than Ovakoy.
However, Koruturk added, Turkey would have no problem with
two new gates going forward, as long as one of them avoided
Barzani's turf.


8. (C) Jones responded that economic concerns must be part of
the conversation on a second--or third--gate. For example, a
gate at Ovakoy would require approximately 100 kilometers of
new road construction in Iraq. (NOTE: Moreover, the road
would run close to the Syrian border, where the insurgency is
currently active. END NOTE.) Koruturk responded that Turkey
could offer loans to finance the Iraqi road construction, but
Jones noted that Iraq can only receive limited debt financing
under IMF rules. MFA Deputy Director General Safak Gokturk
responded that "We shall find our own funding," but provided
no other specifics. Jones repeated our concern that the
decision about a second gate cannot be divorced from good
economic sense.

U.S./EU Iraq Conference
--------------


9. (C) Amb. Jones touched on U.S., EU, and Iraqi plans for a
large meeting to offer support for democracy and economic
development in Iraq planned for this summer in Brussels. He
reported that we are working to sort out details with the EU
based on the Iraqis' desires. Koruturk reiterated Turkey's
strong interest in participating in the conference.
Mosul Consulate...
--------------


10. (C) Koruturk requested U.S. backing to persuade the
Iraqis to allow Turkey to re-open its consulate in Mosul. He
said that at any given time there are about 10,000 Turks in
Iraq--many in northern Iraq--and the embassy in Baghdad is
simply unable to serve these citizens effectively. A
consulate in Mosul would allow Turkey to serve its citizens
and also issue visas for Iraqis to visit Turkey. Koruturk
complained that the Iraqi argument--that Iran would pressure
Iraq to open a consulate if it allowed Turkey to do so--was
illegitimate; "the Iranians are already there, de facto," he
said.

...Support for Iraqi Agriculture...
--------------


11. (C) Jones noted that Turkey should consider assisting
Iraq in providing services for the Iraqi people, for example
in the agriculture sector. He noted that Sadr City has been
relatively quiet of late, not only because Muqtada al-Sadr is
starting to work within the political process, but also
because we have been successful in working to provide sewer,
water, and electricity services there. USDA will soon sign
an MOU with the Iraqi Agriculture Ministry to provide
exchanges and training. An uptick in agriculture, which is
labor-intensive, would help cut down unemployment in Iraq.
Koruturk agreed to look into this; MFA Director General for
the Middle East Oguz Celikkol added that perhaps the Turkish
Agriculture Minister could invite his Iraqi counterpart to
Turkey.

...Debt Relief...
--------------


12. (C) Amb. Jones noted that we are working hard with the
Saudis and other Gulf states on debt relief. We understand
Kuwait and the UAE may/may provide 100% forgiveness. While
Turkey's held debt is relatively small (about $ 1.6 billion,
$ 1.3 billion of which is held by the independent Central
Bank),it would still be important for Turkey to take a
leadership role in forgiving Iraq debt. MFA Deputy DG
Gokturk responded that because of treasury regulations,
Turkey cannot just write off the debt, though it can be
flexible in restructuring it. DCM noted that long-term
rescheduling and at a generous interest rate could stretch
out repayment and be considered the equivalent of
forgiveness; Amb. Jones added that as long as the debt is on
the books, it will work to stifle Iraq's struggling economy.

...and Kirkuk
--------------


13. (C) At the end of the conversation, Amb. Koruturk raised
Kirkuk. He recited an argument that we have heard from him
before: Turkey's greatest concern is that Iraq remain united,
not because of the threat that an independent Kurdish state
could pose, but because of what could happen elsewhere in
Iraq. The Sunni center would become a hotbed of terrorism,
and while the Shia south might not automatically gravitate
toward Iran, it would eventually be forced to due to the
antagonism it would face from its Sunni neighbors. Iran
would then have influence geographically closer to Israel.
This loss of balance in favor of Iran would threaten Turkey,
Israel, and the entire region. Thus Kirkuk must remain an
Iraqi city and the process of carrying out the requirements
of Article 58 must be laid out in the constitution, must be
clear, fair, and transparent, and should be implemented after
the constitutional process. Turkey does not favor Kirkuk
becoming part of the KRA, and has heard similar sentiments
from Iraqi Sunnis and Shias as well as others of Iraq's
neighbors.


14. (C) Amb. Jones responded that the process for dealing
with Kirkuk must be acceptable to all Iraqis. Additionally,
we must work together to improve the conditions for the
people of Kirkuk. The U.S. has contributed $50 million to
the Kirkuk Foundation (though the money is still in the hands
of the IIG),and the KRG reportedly has another $50 million
in escrow awaiting implementation of the Fund. This Fund
must get going to work on the infrastructure projects Kirkuk
so sorely needs. We are also lacking adequate funding for the
Iraqi Property Claims Commission (IPCC). The IPCC can and
has adjudicated thousands of claims, but cannot settle claims
requiring compensation due to lack of funding. Koruturk
noted that the GOT may be able to assist the IPCC because it
has in its possession Ottoman land deed records dating up to
1917; some of these might be helpful in adjudicating claims.
Amb. Jones responded that this could be a welcome
contribution.

Comment
--------------


15. (C) This and other conversations with the Turks indicate
that they do see eye to eye with us in general terms on the
political future of Iraq. Turkey has calculated that it is
better off with a democracy on its borders, yet it does not
now seem ready to lean further forward on supporting this
democracy. The GOT has offered training courses for the ISF
in Iraq, but seems unprepared to send more than a handful of
officers under NATO auspices. Turkey wants a second border
gate, but cannot see past its problems with Barzani to make
it happen quickly. Nagging issues such as Kirkuk and the PKK
(Koruturk never once mentioned the latter, although it was
the only criticism CHOD GEN Ozkok had of the U.S. in a major
speech on April 20) will continue to linger in the background
as we push Turkey to be more forthcoming. End comment.


16. (U) List of participants:

Turkey:
Amb. Osman Koruturk, GOT Special Envoy for Iraq
Amb. Oguz Celikkol, MFA Director General for the Middle East
Safak Gokturk, MFA Deputy Director General for the Middle East
Ozcan Sahin, MFA Iraq Desk (notetaker)

U.S.:
Amb. Richard Jones, Senior Advisor and Coordinator for Iraq
Policy
Amb. Eric Edelman
DCM Robert Deutsch
Stuart Smith, POL/ECON Chief, AmConGen Istanbul
PMA notetaker


17. (U) Ambassador Jones cleared this message.


18. (U) Iraq posts minimize considered.
EDELMAN